首楞嚴義疏注經 2.327

2.327

佛意問云，如汝文殊是一體性，吾欲於此更立是名為是文殊，復欲於此立一無名為無文殊，為得已否？意顯一真體上不立是名、不立無相，是即對非以立，無即待有而稱，是非、有無戲論之見，豈會一真。前約觀門無是非相，唯證乃知，若不指事以明，未證如何領解？故託文殊以明一相。

The Buddha's intended question is: as with you, Mañjuśrī, who are of one substance, if I wished on top of this to establish an affirmation and call it "being Mañjuśrī," and furthermore wished on top of this to establish a negation and call it "having no Mañjuśrī," could that be done or not? The intention is to show that upon the one true substance, neither the designation of "is" nor the characteristic of "is not" is established. "Is" is established in opposition to "is not," and "having no" is stated in dependence on "having." The views of "is" and "is not," "having" and "not having," are frivolous discourse; how could they accord with the one truth? Previously, in terms of contemplation, there were no characteristics of "is" and "is not," known only through realization; if not illuminated by pointing to actual things, how could those who have not realized it grasp it? Therefore, he relied on Mañjuśrī to clarify the single characteristic.