首楞嚴義疏注經 4.600

4.600

初二句牒其所計，若實下五句破其斷無。若實此聞隨聲而滅，則汝一身應如木石，再擊鍾時如何聞響？知有下五句對釋無生，有無之知自屬聲境，且不關聞，故云自是聲塵或有或無，聞性常然未曾起滅，故云豈彼聞性為汝有無。聞實下二句反結有性，聞若實無，證無者誰？既若知此是無聞者，驗知不滅，豈隨聲無？

The first two sentences reiterate what was asserted. The five sentences from "If there were truly" downward refute its annihilative absence. If this hearing truly perished following the sound, then your entire body would be like wood or stone; when the bell is struck again, how could you hear the reverberation? The five sentences from "Knowing presence" downward explain non-arising in contrast: knowing presence and absence naturally belongs to the sensory sphere of sound and does not concern hearing; hence it says "naturally belongs to the dust of sound being either absent or present." The nature of hearing is ever so, having never arisen or perished; hence it says "how could that nature of hearing be present or absent on your account?" The two sentences from "If hearing were truly" downward conclude in reverse that the nature exists: if hearing were truly absent, who is the one witnessing this absence? Since you know that this is the absence of hearing, it is proven that it has not perished; how could it be absent along with the sound?