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請觀音經疏闡義鈔 1.58

English (machine translation) 1.58

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1.58

"That which is refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra": the treatise states, "Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, neither from both nor without a cause; therefore they are said to be unarisen." Since Nāgārjuna has already refuted them, how could one hold to one of the four kinds of attachments as before? Would it be other false speech? The sixty-two views mean: the self is great and form is small; form is great and the self is small; form is the self; the self is apart from form. The four aggregates are also like this; across the five aggregates in the three time periods, they total sixty. Not departing from existence and non-existence, hence there are sixty-two, all subsumed under extreme views. Now, generating the four views regarding object and wisdom actually means the full arising of the eighty-eight entangling proclivities; they are stated briefly as extreme views and the three feelings. If fully discussed: whenever one clings to any proposition, claiming "I know and understand this dharma," reckoning a self within dharmas is the view of a self; clinging to the first and third propositions falls into the extreme of existence; clinging to the second and fourth propositions falls into the extreme of non-existence; they are subsumed under the sixty-two views, which are extreme views. Clinging falsely like this without conforming to correct principle is wrong view. Clinging to this as real and reckoning it to be nirvāṇa is clinging to views. Grasping at the result, claiming this to be the path and practicing according to it, is clinging to rules and vows. Grasping at the cause has three sufferings: pleasant feeling has the suffering of decay; painful feeling has the suffering of suffering itself; neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling has the suffering of conditioning. "Pleasant feeling then brings craving" and so forth means that when clinging to one kind of object and wisdom as correct, if another praises it, the mind becomes attached, generating joy and delight; this is the proclivity of greed. Painful feeling: if another opposes it, one becomes indignant and generates anger, so the mind suffers; this is the proclivity of anger. Neither painful nor pleasant: that is, when neither criticized nor praised, it is in the proclivity of delusion and the equal portions, which are also included within the three proclivities. Furthermore, "I understand this object and wisdom, others do not understand it"—feeling arrogant toward others based on what one clings to is the proclivity of conceit. Having clung to this as correct, though one does not doubt now, one will have great doubt later; this is the proclivity of doubt. Thus the ten proclivities are distinctly present, all arising from the clung-to object and wisdom. Applying these across the three realms and four noble truths yields the eighty-eight proclivities. In terms of contemplation applied across the three realms, there are ninety-eight proclivities. Now, among the five sharp ones, briefly citing extreme views, and among the five dull ones, briefly elucidating the four divisions, is speaking from the essentials: because the object and wisdom of the four propositions all fall to one extreme, and based on this clinging all three feelings arise, their marks are easy to perceive, so they are provisionally elucidated. If examined in detail as above, they are fully ninety-eight; hence the text below states: "Knowing the ninety-eight proclivities in each and every proposition is called recognizing the sickness."

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