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菩薩戒義疏 1.12

菩薩戒義疏 1.12

Language
Classical Chinese

1.12

第二出體者,初明無作,次明止行二善。初戒體者,不起而已,起即性無作假色,經論互說諍論有無。一云都無無作,色心假合共成眾生,善惡本由心起,不應別有頑善頑惡,皆是指心誓不為惡,即名受戒。《瓔珞經》云:「一切聖凡戒盡以心為體,心無盡故戒亦無盡。」或言教為戒體,或云真諦為戒體,或言願為戒體,無別無作。《大經》聖行觀析無常,阿闍世王觀析境界,但明色心,不道無作。五陰名教通大小乘,唯有一色四心。小乘引接小根,恐其輕慢因果,權言重惡,口能別生一法,無作牽報,善法須行,惡法須止,行一則有兩力,豈可不慎?方便假說,適會一時,直如論主一生成四果法,勝別有凡夫法,豈可依此便是實耶?若因中別有頑善共為佛因,佛地亦別有此善共為佛果,當知心為因果,更無別法。二云:大小乘經論盡有無作,皆是實法。何者?心力巨大,能生種種諸法,能牽果報。小乘明此別有一善,能制定佛法,憑師受發,極至盡形,或依定依道品別生,皆以心力勝用,有此感發。《成論》有〈無作品〉云:是非色非心聚。律師用義,亦依此說。若毘曇義,戒是色聚,無作是假色,亦言無教,非對眼色。大乘所明,戒是色法。《大論》云:多少思是心數,云何言多少耶?觀論意,以戒是色,即問:此是數義,大乘云何而用數義?解云:若用非色非心,復同《成實》,還是小乘。今言數自家是數色,大乘色何關數家?《中論》云:「語言雖同,其心則異。」今大乘明戒是色聚也。大乘情期極果,憑師一受,遠至菩提,隨定隨道,誓修諸善,誓度含識。亦以此心力大,別發戒善,為行者所緣,止息諸惡。《優婆塞戒經》云:譬如有面有鏡,則有像現。如是因作,便有無作。《大論》解戒度云:「罪不罪不可得,具足尸羅。」此是戒度正體。復云:云何名戒?以心生口言,從今受,息身口惡法,是名為戒。既有能持所持,則別有法,即無作也。《地持.戒品》云:下軟心犯後四重,不失律儀。增上心犯,則失律儀。若不捨菩提願,不增上心犯,亦不失律儀。若都無無作,何得言失?《梵網》大本即大乘教。下文云:「若不見好相,雖佛菩薩前受,不名得戒。」又云:若有七遮,雖發心欲受,不名得戒。若直以心為戒,發便是戒,何故言不得?《大經》云:「非異色因果」。又念戒中「雖無形色,而可護持;雖無觸對,善修方便,可令具足。」又如刀劍、灰汁、脚足、橋梁。若即心為戒,何假言無形色、無觸對?故知別有無作能持戒心,以為真戒聖行。與世王中不道觀析無作,直舉色心者,是易觀者耳,亦不言無無作。小乘說四果,大乘開之是權;法勝說凡夫法,跋摩明其非有。未有大乘經開無作是權。又既頑善作佛因,此自非妨。如無常善,亦作常善因,即其例也。然此二釋,舊所諍論。言無,於理極會,在文難愜;言有,於理難安,在文極便。既皆有文,何者當道理耶?然理非當非無當,當無當皆得論理教義。若言無者,於理為當。若言有者,於教為當。理則為實,教則為權。在實雖無,教門則有。令之所用,有無作也。次明道、定皆以無作為體。定共於定心中發無作,無復諸惡。道共者,見諦道中所發無作,與心上勝道俱,故言道共也。止觀師釋:未必見道所發無作是道共戒,秖取中道正觀心中發此無作,有防非止惡義,故云道共。《大經》云:一、心法戒,二、受世教戒。菩薩得心法戒,謂道共戒。得此戒者,終不為惡。不從師授,故稱為得。中道心中,發得此戒也。受世教戒,謂白四羯磨,然後乃得。必假憑師,故稱為受。差別約示,故言世教也。定共、道共通大小乘。大乘道定入攝善法戒。有師言:唯入禪定能發無作。欲界定不發無作,唯假空解能發無作。有言:但令證此定道,隨能止伏,麁品成就,便發無作。欲界定念處前,皆能發戒也。次論興廢者,初菩薩律儀,方便求受,其體則興。若捨菩提願,若增上煩惱犯十重,其體則廢。若無此二緣,至佛乃廢。定道兩戒,得定得道為因。初念定道,未與戒俱,具足前心為因。第二念心方與戒俱,爾時是興。出定出道最後一念,爾時即廢。二言:入定入道時,戒與心俱,是時名興。出定出道時,戒與心俱謝,是時名廢。俱稱心俱戒也。三言:一發之後,出入恒有。後入勝定勝道,隨從勝受名,爾時恒興。退定退道,三藏盡壽,菩薩至菩提,爾時即廢。攝善、攝生與律儀同。隨受則興,二緣則廢也。次三聚戒體者,律儀者,法戒儀則,規矩行人,令入道也。又云:律者,埒也。如此馬埒,令馬調直。律亦如是,調直行人,不令作惡。大士誓心,不過止惡興善。若不動身口,即是止惡。發戒防動不動,即是律儀戒。若應動身口,即是興善。今發此戒,防其不動。攝善、攝生即是應動涉事,故開為兩取。策勵眾善,依六度門稱善法;起心兼物,依四弘門稱攝眾生。即是為人故動,下化眾生,中修萬善,上歸佛果也。律儀多主內德,攝生外化,攝善兼於內外,故立三聚戒也。

Second, expounding the essence [of the precepts]: first, clarifying the non-informative [aspect] (avijñapti); next, clarifying the two wholesomenesses of cessation and performance. First, as for the essence of the precepts: it does not arise on its own; once arisen, it is inherently the provisional matter of the non-informative (avijñapti-rūpa). The sūtras and treatises present differing accounts, debating its existence or nonexistence. One view states that there is no non-informative [aspect] at all. Matter and mind provisionally combine to jointly form a sentient being; good and evil fundamentally arise from the mind, and there ought not to be separately an inert good or an inert evil. All [instances of receiving precepts] simply refer to the mind vowing not to commit evil, which is then termed 'receiving precepts.' The Yingluo jing says: 'All precepts of sages and ordinary beings take the mind as their essence entirely; because the mind is inexhaustible, the precepts are also inexhaustible.' Some say that teaching is the essence of the precepts; some say that the ultimate truth is the essence of the precepts; some say that vows are the essence of the precepts—there is no separate non-informative [aspect]. In the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, when the holy practice analyzes impermanence, and when King Ajātaśatru analyzes the perceptual spheres, they clarify only matter and mind, without speaking of the non-informative. The designations and teachings of the five aggregates are shared by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna: there is only one matter and four minds. In leading and receiving those of inferior faculties, the Hīnayāna feared they would take cause and effect lightly, and so provisionally spoke of heavy evil, [claiming that] speech can separately generate a distinct dharma—the non-informative which pulls karmic retribution—such that wholesome dharmas must be practiced and unwholesome dharmas must be ceased; practicing one yields twofold power—how could one not be cautious? This was an expedient, provisional explanation suited to a particular moment, just as the treatise master's [teaching of] attaining the four fruits in a single lifetime was superior to [the teaching of] a separate ordinary-being dharma—how could one rely on this as ultimate reality? If in the causal stage there were separately an inert good jointly acting as the cause of Buddhahood, then in the Buddha-stage there would also separately be this good jointly acting as the fruit of Buddhahood; one should know that the mind constitutes cause and fruit, and there is no other separate dharma. The second view states: The sūtras and treatises of both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna all affirm the non-informative, and all consider it a real dharma. Why is this? The power of the mind is immense; it can produce various dharmas and can pull karmic retribution. The Hīnayāna explains that there is separately a wholesome [dharma] capable of instituting the Buddha's teachings; relying on a preceptor, it is received and generated, enduring at most to the end of one's physical form; or it arises distinctly in dependence on meditation or the factors of the path. All of these, through the superior function of mental power, undergo this arousal. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra contains a 'Non-informative Chapter,' which says: it belongs to the category of neither-matter-nor-mind. Vinaya masters, in adopting this doctrine, also rely on this explanation. In the doctrine of the Abhidharma, precepts belong to the category of matter, the non-informative is provisional matter, and is also called non-instructive, not being visible matter facing the eye. As explained by the Mahāyāna, precepts are material dharmas. The Dàzhìdù lùn states: 'Thought of greater or lesser degree belongs to mental factors; how could one speak of greater or lesser [matter]?' Examining the intention of the treatise, since it considers the precepts to be matter, the question is raised: 'This is the doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda; why does the Mahāyāna adopt the Sarvāstivāda doctrine?' The explanation says: If one adopted neither-matter-nor-mind, that would again be the same as the Tattvasiddhi, which is still Hīnayāna. Now, when the Sarvāstivāda says it, it is their own Sarvāstivāda matter; what does Mahāyāna matter have to do with the Sarvāstivāda school? The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'Though the words are the same, their meaning is different.' Now the Mahāyāna clarifies that precepts belong to the category of matter. The Mahāyāna emotionally aspires to the ultimate fruit: relying on a preceptor for a single reception, it reaches far to bodhi; conforming to meditation and conforming to the path, one vows to cultivate all wholesome deeds and vows to liberate sentient beings. Also, because this power of mind is great, it distinctly generates the wholesome [dharma] of the precepts, which serves as an object of focus for the practitioner to cease all evil. The Upāsakaśīla-sūtra says: 'Just as when there is a face and a mirror, a reflection appears; so too, because there is informative [action] (vijñapti), there is non-informative [aspect] (avijñapti).' The Dàzhìdù lùn, explaining the perfection of precepts, says: 'Neither offense nor non-offense can be apprehended; this is to be endowed with śīla.' This is the true essence of the perfection of precepts. It further says: 'What is called a precept? With mind arising and mouth speaking: "From now on, having received [them], I cease the unwholesome dharmas of body and speech"—this is called a precept.' Since there are the agent of upholding and that which is upheld, there is a distinct dharma, which is the non-informative. The 'Chapter on Precepts' in the Bodhisattvabhūmi says: 'Committing the latter four major offenses with a weak mind does not cause the loss of the saṃvara. Committing them with a dominant mind causes the loss of the saṃvara. If one does not abandon the bodhi-vow and does not commit them with a dominant mind, one also does not lose the saṃvara.' If there were no non-informative [aspect] at all, how could one speak of 'loss'? The Great Text of the Brahmajāla-sūtra is indeed the Mahāyāna teaching. The text below says: 'If one does not see good signs, even though received before a Buddha or bodhisattva, it is not termed obtaining the precepts.' It also says: 'If there are the seven disqualifications, even though one arouses the mind desiring to receive them, it is not termed obtaining the precepts.' If the mind alone were the precepts, then arousing it would immediately be the precepts; why would it say one does not obtain them? The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'They are not causes and fruits of a different matter.' Furthermore, in mindfulness of the precepts: 'Though devoid of physical form, they can be safeguarded; though devoid of sensory contact, through skillful cultivation of expedients, they can be made complete.' They are also compared to knives and swords, lye, feet, and bridges. If the mind itself were the precepts, why rely on saying 'devoid of physical form' and 'devoid of sensory contact'? Therefore we know there is distinctly a non-informative [dharma] that can uphold the precept-mind, serving as the true precept and holy practice. As for not speaking of analyzing the non-informative in [the passage on] the king of the world [Ajātaśatru], but directly citing matter and mind: that was simply what was easy to contemplate; it also did not say that the non-informative does not exist. The Hīnayāna spoke of the four fruits, which the Mahāyāna revealed to be an expedient; Dharmaśrī spoke of the ordinary-being dharma, which Dharmatrāta clarified to be nonexistent. But no Mahāyāna sūtra has yet revealed the non-informative to be an expedient. Furthermore, that an inert good should serve as the cause of Buddhahood is by no means an obstacle. Just as impermanent good also serves as the cause of permanent good, this is of the same pattern. However, these two interpretations have long been debated. To say it does not exist accords exceedingly well with principle, yet is difficult to satisfy in the textual passages; to say it exists is difficult to settle in principle, yet accords exceedingly well with the textual passages. Since both have textual authority, which one conforms to the correct principle? However, principle is neither conforming nor non-conforming; whether conforming or non-conforming, both can be discussed in terms of principle and teaching. If one says it does not exist, it conforms to principle. If one says it exists, it conforms to the teaching. Principle is the real; teaching is the expedient. Though in the real it does not exist, in the gateway of teaching it does exist. What is adopted now is that the non-informative does exist. Next, clarifying that both path- and meditation-[concomitant precepts] take the non-informative as their essence: Concerning the meditation-concomitant, within the mind of meditative concentration, one generates the non-informative, and all evils no longer exist. As for the path-concomitant, the non-informative generated in the path of seeing the truth accompanies the superior path in the mind; hence they are called 'path-concomitant.' Masters of cessation and contemplation explain: It is not necessarily the non-informative generated in the path of seeing that constitutes the path-concomitant precepts; simply taking the generation of this non-informative within the mind of the correct contemplation of the Middle Way, which has the sense of preventing wrongdoing and ceasing evil, is why they are called 'path-concomitant.' The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'First, the mind-dharma precepts; second, receiving worldly-instruction precepts.' When a bodhisattva obtains the mind-dharma precepts, this refers to the path-concomitant precepts. One who obtains these precepts will never commit evil. Because they are not conferred by a preceptor, they are termed 'obtained.' Within the mind of the Middle Way, one generates and obtains these precepts. Receiving worldly-instruction precepts refers to obtaining them only after the fourfold karmavācanā. Because one must rely on a preceptor, they are termed 'received.' Being delineated according to distinctions, they are called 'worldly instruction.' Meditation-concomitant and path-concomitant [precepts] are shared by both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. In the Mahāyāna, meditation and the path enter the precepts of accumulating wholesome dharmas. Some masters say: Only upon entering dhyāna concentration can one generate the non-informative. Concentration of the desire realm does not generate the non-informative; only relying on the understanding of emptiness can generate the non-informative. Others say: If one is merely made to realize this concentration and path, conforming to the ability to halt and subdue [defilements], with the coarse grades accomplished, one immediately generates the non-informative. Concentration of the desire realm, prior to the foundations of mindfulness, can all generate precepts. Next, discussing their arising and cessation: First, concerning the bodhisattva saṃvara, when one seeks and receives them through expedients, their essence arises. If one abandons the bodhi-vow, or if through dominant afflictions one commits the ten major offenses, their essence ceases. If these two conditions are absent, they cease only upon reaching Buddhahood. The two precepts of meditation and the path have the attainment of concentration and the attainment of the path as their cause. In the first moment of thought of concentration or the path, they do not yet accompany the precepts; having the preceding mind complete serves as the cause. Only in the second moment of thought do they accompany the precepts; at that time they arise. In the final moment of thought when emerging from concentration or the path, at that time they immediately cease. A second view says: When entering concentration or entering the path, the precepts accompany the mind; at this time they are termed 'arisen.' When emerging from concentration or emerging from the path, the precepts pass away along with the mind; at this time they are termed 'ceased.' Both are called 'mind-concomitant precepts.' A third view says: Once arisen, whether emerging or entering, they perpetually exist. Later, when entering superior concentration or the superior path, conforming to and following the superior, they receive their designation; at that time they are perpetually arisen. When falling back from concentration or falling back from the path, for the Tripiṭaka [practitioner] they cease at the end of life; for the bodhisattva they cease upon reaching bodhi; at that time they immediately cease. The precepts of accumulating wholesome dharmas and the precepts of benefiting sentient beings are the same as the saṃvara. Conforming to reception, they arise; through the two conditions, they cease. Next, concerning the essence of the three clusters of precepts: 'Saṃvara' (moral restraint) means the rules and standards of the Dharma precepts, which regulate practitioners and cause them to enter the path. It is also said: 'Lü' (restraint/discipline) means an enclosure (lie). Like an enclosure for horses, it makes the horses tame and straightforward. The discipline is also like this: it tames and makes the practitioner straightforward, not allowing them to commit evil. The vows of a mahāsattva do not go beyond ceasing evil and giving rise to good. If one does not move body and speech, that is ceasing evil. Generating precepts to guard against movement [when one should] not move is the precepts of moral restraint. If one ought to move body and speech, that is giving rise to good. Now, generating this precept guards against not moving [when one should]. Accumulating wholesome dharmas and benefiting sentient beings are precisely when one ought to move and engage in affairs; therefore they are opened into two aspects. Spurring on all wholesome deeds according to the gateway of the six perfections is called wholesome dharmas; arousing the mind to assist living beings according to the gateway of the four universal vows is called benefiting sentient beings. That is, moving for the sake of others: below, transforming sentient beings; in the middle, cultivating the myriad wholesome deeds; above, returning to the fruit of Buddhahood. The precepts of moral restraint primarily govern inner virtue; benefiting sentient beings is outward transformation; accumulating wholesome dharmas encompasses both inner and outer. Therefore, the three clusters of precepts are established.

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