菩薩戒本疏 1.39

1.39

具緣成犯者，成犯之緣通別各五。通緣五者，一、受菩薩淨戒，二、住己自性非狂亂等，三、非重苦所逼，反此無犯。故《菩薩地》云：「一切處無違犯者，謂若彼心增上狂亂，若重苦受之所逼切，若未曾受淨戒律儀。」義加二緣：一、有憶念，謂轉生時若憶先受隨作成犯，若不憶念雖作無犯。二、無利生緣，若有利生處許行殺等。故前三及二為通緣五。別緣五者，五十九云：「若廣建立十惡業道自性差別，復由五相。何等為五？一、事，二、想，三、欲樂，四、煩惱，五、方便究竟。事者，一一業道各別決定所依處事，或有情數或非有情數，隨其所應十惡業道依之而轉。想者有四，謂一、於彼非彼想（如律所云人非人想），二、非於彼彼想（非人人想），三、於彼彼想（人作人想），四、非於彼非彼想（非人非人想）。欲樂者，或有倒想，或無倒想樂所作欲。煩惱者，或貪、或瞋、或癡、或貪瞋、或貪癡、或瞋癡、或貪瞋癡，一切皆具。方便究竟者，即於所欲作業隨起方便，或於爾時、或於後時而得究竟。由此五相成於殺生乃至邪見諸業道中，隨其所應當廣建立圓滿自性十種差別。」《論》文如是，今依彼意釋此犯緣。殺中事者，謂有情數眾生為事。此有三品：一、上品，謂佛、聖人、父母、師僧，害即犯逆并重。下三果人，一云非逆，《涅槃經》中入中殺故。畢定菩薩，同上殺科。一云是逆。下七逆中，唯言殺聖人，不云無學，故殺養胎母。一云犯逆，於菩薩過重故。一云唯重，非生本故。二、中品，謂人、天，害唯犯重。三、下品，謂下四趣。一云若害，但犯輕垢，非道器故。文云「一切有命」者，舉輕況重耳。聲聞戒中亦云乃至蟻子不應奪命，豈即成重？一云成重，文無簡故。聲聞戒中，初雖總說，下則簡別。此中不爾，曾無簡別，故知是重。想者，《論》云：「若能害者，於眾生所作眾生想，起害生欲，此想即名於彼眾生不顛倒。」然想有三：一、不倒想，謂如人作人想，即第三句於彼彼想；及非人作非人想，即第四句非於彼非彼想。二、顛倒想，謂人作非人想，即是第一句於彼非彼想；及於非人作人想，即第二句非於彼彼想。三、疑想，謂人非人疑、非人人疑。《論》雖不說，准律應有。不倒二中，人人想犯根本，非人非人想無犯。若望非畜，亦犯根本；今就非情，故說無犯。倒想中二，俱不犯本。然應分別：初人作非人想，本迷不犯，轉想亦犯；後非人人想，雖不犯本，一向有罪，犯方便故。欲樂者，《論》云：「依此想故，作如是心：我當害生。如是名為殺生欲樂。」此則殺思，名為欲張等。漫者，隨遇悉害。若漫心者，隨所遇境，皆成根本。若剋心者，心境相稱，即成根本；若不相稱，不遂故輕。煩惱者，《論》云：「此能害者，或貪所弊，或嗔所弊，或癡所弊，或二所弊，或三所弊，而起作心，是名煩惱。」方便究竟者，彼由欲樂及染污心，或自或他發起方便加害眾生，若害無間彼便命終，即此方便當於爾時說名成就究竟業道。若於後時彼方命終，由此方便彼命終時，乃名成就究竟業道。

Regarding the fulfillment of conditions constituting an offense: the conditions that constitute an offense are divided into general and specific, each having five. As for the five general conditions: first, having received the pure precepts of a bodhisattva; second, abiding in one's own nature without being deranged, and so forth; third, not being oppressed by intense suffering. If it is contrary to these, there is no offense. Therefore, the Bodhisattvabhūmi states: "Those who are free of violation in all cases are: if their minds are excessively deranged, if they are oppressed by intense painful feeling, or if they have never received the pure precept discipline." In sense, two conditions are added: first, having recollection, meaning that upon transmigration, if one remembers the earlier reception [of the precepts], committing [the deed] constitutes an offense, but if one does not remember, committing it does not constitute an offense; second, having no condition of benefiting sentient beings, for where there is a benefit to sentient beings, killing and so forth is permitted. Thus, the former three together with these two make the five general conditions. As for the five specific conditions: [the Bodhisattvabhūmi], chapter 59, states: "If one were to broadly establish the distinctions of the intrinsic nature of the ten unwholesome courses of action, it is also due to five marks. What are the five? First, the basis (vastu); second, the perception (saṃjñā); third, desire-enjoyment (chanda); fourth, defilement (kleśa); fifth, application and consummation (prayoga-niṣṭhā). The basis refers to the specifically determined basis of each course of action, either belonging to sentient beings or not belonging to sentient beings, in accordance with which the ten unwholesome courses of action operate. Perception is fourfold, namely: 1. Perceiving that [person] as not that [person] (such as what the Vinaya calls perceiving a human as a non-human); 2. Not perceiving that [person] as that [person] (perceiving a non-human as a human); 3. Perceiving that [person] as that [person] (taking a human to be a human); 4. Perceiving not that [person] as not that [person] (taking a non-human to be a non-human). Desire-enjoyment refers to the desire to do what one enjoys, either with inverted perception or with non-inverted perception. Defilement refers to greed, or anger, or delusion, or greed and anger, or greed and delusion, or anger and delusion, or greed, anger, and delusion—all being present. Application and consummation refers to initiating application in accord with the action one desires to perform, achieving consummation either at that time or at a later time. Through these five marks, in the courses of action from killing living beings up to wrong view, one should broadly establish the ten distinct varieties of complete intrinsic nature as appropriate." Such is the text of the treatise. Now, relying on its meaning, we explain these conditions of offense. As for the basis in killing: it refers to living beings belonging to the category of sentient beings being the basis. This has three grades: First, the superior grade, namely Buddhas, noble persons, parents, and preceptor monks; killing them immediately constitutes an ānantarya sin as well as a parājika offense. Regarding persons of the lower three fruits [of the śrāvaka], one view says it is not an ānantarya sin, because in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra they are classified under intermediate killing. Definite bodhisattvas are classified under the same penalty as superior killing. Another view says it is an ānantarya sin, because below in the seven ānantarya sins it only mentions killing a noble person and does not specify an aśaikṣa. Hence, killing a mother who is pregnant with an embryo: one view says it constitutes an ānantarya sin, because the offense against a bodhisattva is grave; another view says it is solely a parājika offense, because she is not the source of one's own birth. Second, the intermediate grade, namely humans and devas; killing them constitutes only a parājika offense. Third, the inferior grade, namely the four lower destinies. One view says that if one kills them, it constitutes only a duṣkṛta offense, because they are not vessels for the path. The text's stating "all that have life" is merely citing the light to illustrate the grave. In the śrāvaka precepts it is also stated that one should not take life down to an ant, yet how could that constitute a parājika offense? Another view says it constitutes a parājika offense, because the text makes no exception. In the śrāvaka precepts, although it first speaks in general terms, it makes distinctions below. Here it is not so, having never made an exception; thus we know it is a parājika offense. As for perception: the treatise states, "If the killer, regarding a sentient being, forms the perception of a sentient being and gives rise to the desire to kill living beings, this perception is called non-inverted regarding that sentient being." However, perception is threefold: 1. Non-inverted perception, meaning taking a human to be a human, which is the third phrase 'perceiving that [person] as that [person]'; and taking a non-human to be a non-human, which is the fourth phrase 'perceiving not that [person] as not that [person]'. 2. Inverted perception, meaning taking a human to be a non-human, which is the first phrase 'perceiving that [person] as not that [person]'; and taking a non-human to be a human, which is the second phrase 'not perceiving that [person] as that [person]'. 3. Doubtful perception, meaning doubting whether it is a human or non-human, or doubting whether it is a non-human or human. Although the treatise does not mention it, it should exist according to the Vinaya. Among the two non-inverted perceptions: taking a human to be a human violates the fundamental [precept]; taking a non-human to be a non-human incurs no violation. If viewed with respect to non-humans or animals, it also violates the fundamental [precept]; here, speaking with respect to non-sentient things, it is said to have no violation. Among the two inverted perceptions, neither violates the fundamental [precept]. Yet a distinction should be made: in the first, taking a human to be a non-human, if fundamentally confused there is no violation, but if the perception shifts there is also a violation; in the second, taking a non-human to be a human, although it does not violate the fundamental [precept], it is unequivocally an offense, because it violates [the precept of] application. As for desire-enjoyment: the treatise states, "Relying on this perception, one produces such a thought: 'I shall kill the living being.' This is called the desire-enjoyment of killing living beings." This volition to kill is called desire, broad [or targeted]. 'Broad' means killing whatever one encounters. In the case of a broad mind, whatever object one encounters, all constitute the fundamental [offense]. In the case of a targeted mind, if mind and object correspond, it constitutes the fundamental [offense]; if they do not correspond, it is light because it was not fulfilled. As for defilement: the treatise states, "This killer is blinded by greed, or blinded by anger, or blinded by delusion, or blinded by two, or blinded by three, and produces the intention to act; this is called defilement." As for application and consummation: driven by desire-enjoyment and a defiled mind, by oneself or through another, one initiates the application to harm sentient beings; if the other's life immediately terminates upon harm, this very application is said to achieve the consummated course of action at that time. If the other's life terminates only at a later time, it is only at the time of their death through this application that it is called achieving the consummated course of action.