俱舍論記 1.128

1.128

「或有色處至謂所餘色」者，此即第三句。顯、形平等無別新生，生智力齊皆俱句攝。所餘色者，即餘十二種色。故《婆沙》云「或有顯、形故可知，謂餘十二種色，謂長、短、方、圓、正、不正、高、下、雲、烟、塵、霧（已上論文）。」此第三句亦應言青等一分長等一分，而不說者，略而不論。或可影顯。或餘色言已表一分。又解：於此聚中有顯、形者皆俱句攝。若顯離形是第一句，雖身表邊亦有顯色，然別立為第二句者，業性暫起生形智勝，故別說之。若依《正理》三十四，有一說意，第三句中十六種，除影、光、明、闇。此師意說：無有離形青、黃、赤、白，故青等四俱句所攝，非初句收。雖身表處亦有顯色，而別立為第二句者，如前釋通。此即意別。又解：此非正義，諸論皆說青、黃、赤、白初句攝故。或於正義亦不相違，且據青等有形者說，以實青等一分亦初句攝。若依《雜心》，立壁畫等為第三句。此非正義，《正理論》意不許壁畫有別實形。夫形色者，觸憶長等。觸畫不憶，明非有形。或是正義，《正理論》說畫無形者，據輕薄色，觸不憶形；《雜心》言有，據重色說，觸可憶形。各據一義，理竝無違。

On "There are visual sense-bases […] namely, the remaining forms": this is the third alternative. Where colour and shape are equal and there is no separate new generation, and their powers to generate cognition are equal, all are included in the alternative of both. "The remaining forms" refers to the remaining twelve kinds of form. Hence the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "There are those knowable due to colour and shape, namely the remaining twelve kinds of form, which are long, short, square, round, high, low, regular, irregular, cloud, smoke, dust, and mist (this concludes the text of the treatise)." In this third alternative, it should also have said "a portion of blue and the like and a portion of long and the like"; that it does not say so is because it speaks concisely and omits this discussion. Or perhaps it is implied by shadow. Or the words "the remaining forms" already express that portion. Another explanation: In this aggregate, whatever possesses colour and shape is included in the alternative of both. If colour is separated from shape, it is the first alternative; although beside bodily communication there is also colour, yet it is separately established as the second alternative because the nature of the action arises temporarily and the generation of the cognition of shape is superior, so it is spoken of separately. According to the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 34, the intention of one opinion is that sixteen kinds are in the third alternative, excluding shadow, radiance, brightness, and darkness. This master's meaning is: there is no blue, yellow, red, or white apart from shape; therefore, the four including blue are included in the alternative of both, and not subsumed under the first alternative. Although there is also colour at the locus of bodily communication, yet it is separately established as the second alternative, resolved as explained before. This is a different intention. Another explanation: This is not the orthodox view, because all the treatises state that blue, yellow, red, and white are included in the first alternative. Or, it also does not contradict the orthodox view: it is spoken provisionally in terms of blue and the like that possess shape, since in reality a portion of blue and the like is also included in the first alternative. According to the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, wall paintings and the like are established as the third alternative. This is not the orthodox view: the intention of the Nyāyānusāra does not allow that wall paintings have a separate, real shape. For in the case of shape-form, upon tactile contact one recollects long and so on; touching a painting, one does not recollect this, which shows it does not have shape. Or it is the orthodox view: when the Nyāyānusāra says paintings have no shape, it speaks in terms of light, thin pigment where touch does not recollect shape; when the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya says it exists, it speaks in terms of heavy pigment where touch can recollect shape. Each relies on one meaning, and logically neither is contradictory.