俱舍論記 1.141

1.141

「已說香處至同修勇進樂」者，此下別解觸。所觸名觸，即十一種。雖根對境實不相觸，無間生時根是識依，假說能觸。觸非識依，不說彼觸能觸身根，但名所觸。觸與身根極相隣近，故得觸名。香、味二種雖亦至根，非如彼境，故不名觸。問：一切四大皆發身識不？答：異說不同。故《婆沙》一百二十七云「問：緣五色根所依大種發身識不？有說不發，如五色根不可觸故不發身識，所依大種理亦應然。問：若爾，何故說為身識所識？答：依法性說身識所識，未來世中身識境故，然無現在發身識義。有說：除身根所依大種，皆能發身識，以身根所依極隣近故不能發身識；然他身識所緣境故，亦得名為身識所識（雖有兩解，然無評文）。」滑等四種顯別有體，不同經部，故各言性。冷、飢、渴三是心所中欲之異名，非正目觸。言觸是欲，從果標名，故不言性。《法蘊》第十亦同此論。然《婆沙》十三，七所造觸皆有性字。言性者據體性說，一切諸法皆有性故。不言性者顯從果立名，或略不說。若依經部，觸中但有四大種，無別所造觸。問：澁、滑、輕、重各相對立，何故對冷不說燸耶？解云：煗即火大，故不別立。難云：冷即水大，應不別立？解云：水是濕性，不應名冷。問：七所造觸，何大偏增相望有異？答：如《婆沙》一百二十七云「不由大種偏增故。滑乃至渴，但由大種性類差別，有生滑果，乃至有生渴果。有餘師言：水、火增故滑。地、風增故澁。火、風增故輕。地、水增故重。水、風增故冷。風增故飢。謂風增故擊動食消，引飢觸生，便發食欲。火增故渴，謂火增故煎迫飲消，引渴觸生便發飲欲（然無評家。《正理》同後師）。」問：悶、力、劣等，何觸所收？答：《正理》第一云「悶不離滑。力即澁、重，劣在輕、耎，輕性中攝。如是其餘所觸種類，隨其所應十一中攝（已上論文）。」四大，指同下解。釋滑等四，如文可知。冷、飢、渴三相隱難知，若不約果以明，其體難顯。謂煖欲因名冷，食欲因名飢，飲欲因名渴。冷、飢、渴三是欲異名，因觸生欲，觸是因、欲是果，此三皆於觸因之上立欲果之名，作如是說。故《入阿毘達磨》云「由此所逼，煖欲因名冷、食欲因名飢、飲欲因名渴，此皆於因立果名故，引頌證於因立果名。佛出世非樂，能生樂故，稱佛為樂，因立果名。餘准此釋。問：火大熱觸亦生冷欲，何不以欲標名？解云：火大是強，當體立稱；冷觸昧劣，故從果立名。

Regarding "Having explained the sense-datum of fragrance […] up to […] together cultivate the joy of vigorous effort": Below this distinguishes and explains touch. What is touched is called touch; that is, eleven kinds. Although sense faculty and object do not actually touch each other when confronting each other, when consciousness arises immediately without interval, the sense faculty is the basis of consciousness, and is metaphorically called the "toucher". Tangible objects are not the basis of consciousness, so one does not say that those tangible objects can touch the body faculty; they are merely called "the touched". Tangible objects are in extremely close proximity to the body faculty; hence they obtain the name "touch". Although fragrance and taste also reach their faculties, they are not like this object; hence they are not named touch. Question: Do all four primary elements give rise to body-consciousness? Answer: There are differing opinions. Thus, fascicle 127 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "Question: Do the primary elements that serve as the support for the five physical faculties give rise to body-consciousness? Some say they do not. Just as the five physical faculties cannot be touched and therefore do not give rise to body-consciousness, so in principle should it be for the supporting primary elements. Question: If so, why are they said to be cognized by body-consciousness? Answer: It is stated according to the nature of phenomena that they are cognized by body-consciousness, because they are objects of body-consciousness in future times; however, there is no sense of their giving rise to body-consciousness in the present. Some say: With the exception of the primary elements that support the body faculty itself, all can give rise to body-consciousness; because the support of the body faculty is in extreme proximity, it cannot give rise to body-consciousness. However, because they are cognitive objects of another's body-consciousness, they also come to be named as cognized by body-consciousness (Although there are two explanations, there is no evaluative judgment)." The four kinds such as smoothness show that they have separate real entities, unlike the Sautrāntika view, and thus each is referred to as a "nature". Cold, hunger, and thirst are different names for desire among mental factors; they do not directly denote touch. Calling touch "desire" designates the name from the effect; therefore they are not called "natures". Fascicle 10 of the *Dharmaskandha* also agrees with this treatise. However, in fascicle 13 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, all seven derived tangibles have the word "nature". Stating "nature" is said on the basis of intrinsic nature, because all phenomena have an intrinsic nature. Not stating "nature" indicates that the name is established from the effect, or that it is omitted for brevity. According to the Sautrāntikas, within touch there are only the four primary elements, and no separate derived tangibles. Question: Roughness, smoothness, lightness, and heaviness are each established in opposition to one another; why is warmth not stated in opposition to cold? The explanation says: Warmth is just the fire element; hence it is not separately posited. Objection: Cold is just the water element; should it not also not be separately posited? The explanation says: Water is of a moist nature; it should not be named cold. Question: Among the seven derived tangibles, by the preponderance of which primary element do their reciprocal differences occur? Answer: As fascicle 127 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* says: "It is not due to the preponderance of a primary element. Smoothness up to thirst are simply due to distinctions in the natures and classes of the primary elements, such that there are those producing the effect of smoothness, up to those producing the effect of thirst. Other masters say: Due to an increase of water and fire, there is smoothness. Due to an increase of earth and wind, there is roughness. Due to an increase of fire and wind, there is lightness. Due to an increase of earth and water, there is heaviness. Due to an increase of water and wind, there is cold. Due to an increase of wind, there is hunger; that is, because of the increase of wind, it agitates and digests food, inducing the touch of hunger to arise, which then prompts the desire for food. Due to an increase of fire, there is thirst; that is, because of the increase of fire, it parches and consumes drink, inducing the touch of thirst to arise, which then prompts the desire for drink (However, there is no critical arbitrator; the *Nyāyānusāra* agrees with the latter masters)." Question: Under which tangibles are faintness, strength, weakness, and so forth subsumed? Answer: Fascicle 1 of the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Faintness is not separate from smoothness. Strength is just roughness and heaviness. Weakness resides in lightness and softness, subsumed within lightness. Other classes of tangibles like this are subsumed within the eleven according to what is appropriate (The above is the text of the treatise)." The four primary elements are referred to the explanation below. The explanation of the four such as smoothness is understandable from the text. The characteristics of the three—cold, hunger, and thirst—are concealed and difficult to know; if not clarified with reference to the effect, their entities are difficult to reveal. That is, the cause of the desire for warmth is named cold; the cause of the desire for food is named hunger; the cause of the desire for drink is named thirst. Cold, hunger, and thirst are different names for desire: desire arises due to touch; touch is the cause and desire is the effect. These three all establish the name of the effect, desire, upon the cause, touch, and are described in this way. Thus the *Abhidharmāvatāra* says: "Afflicted by these, the cause of the desire for warmth is named cold, the cause of the desire for food is named hunger, and the cause of the desire for drink is named thirst; these are all because the name of the effect is established upon the cause." A verse is cited to corroborate establishing the name of the effect upon the cause: the arising of a Buddha is not bliss in itself, but because it can produce bliss, the Buddha is called bliss, establishing the name of the effect upon the cause. The rest should be explained by analogy with this. Question: The hot touch of the fire element also produces the desire for cold; why is it not designated with the name of the desire? The explanation says: The fire element is strong, and its designation is established on its own entity; cold touch is dim and weak, and thus its name is established from the effect.