俱舍論記 1.19

1.19

二出過非者，破第一師云：若不染無知異熟無記心心所法為體性者，二乘無學異熟生心不現在前，非成就故，應名為佛。若言以必起故不名佛者，後起成時可不名佛，未起不成應名為佛。若言有習氣故不名佛者，是即由彼不名為佛，何關異熟心心所法？故說非理。破第二師云：若不染無知以四無記心等為體者，欲色二界無覆無記不現在前，容成過、未。無色無學異熟生心不現在前，非成過、未，應名為佛。故亦非理。若言以必起故、有習氣故不名為佛者，准前徵破，故亦非理。破第三師云：若不染無知以自性無記心等為體：通三界中恒成過、未者，雖無不成之過，然與《識身足論》十四相違。彼論解十二心中，生無色界異熟生心不現在前，不成就無覆無記心。既違此說，故亦非理。破第四師云：若不染無知以眾同分為體者，別作一途，或容此說。撿尋諸論全無此文，故亦非理。破第五師云：若以不自在為障體者，《正理》七十破云「必有少法力為能障，令彼於定不自在轉。若不爾者，彼有何緣於諸定中不得自在？」解云：必有少不染無知法。破第六師云：若以不得為障體者，《正理》七十破云「不得定者，必有所因。不可說言即因不得，自體不應還因自故。或煩惱障，亦應可說即以應果不得為性。彼既不然，此云何爾？」破第七師云：若以不懃求等為障體者，《正理》七十破云「阿羅漢果亦由於加行不懃求等故，體不得生，豈便無別煩惱障體？」破第八師云：若不染無知以智無為體者，《正理》二十八云「古師破云：非唯智無，無法無容能為因。」破第九師云：若不染無知以心心所總名習氣為體性者，《正理》二十八古師破云「亦不應說有如是類心及心所總名習氣，不染無知前已說故。謂此無知，為自性住心等為體？為有差別？若自性住心等為體，佛亦應有不染無知。若有差別，能差別者可是無知，非所差別。現見善等品類差別心、心所中，必有別法為能差別，非即一切。如善品中必有信等，不善品中有無漸等，染污品中有放逸等。如是等類心、心所中，必有別法為能差別。故知此中亦有別法能為差別者，是不染無知（解云：准此破文故，知有總計家）。」破第十古師云：若不染無知於心所中別有一體者，《正理》二十八云「正義家破云：今詳彼言有太過失。諸異生等心、心所法，皆不如實覺味、勢、熟等相，然不見生餘心、心所故。又一一念，彼心、心所差別而生，應念念中各有別別無知法起。若謂有異相令無知差別，即此是能差別心品，何須別計不染無知？」解云：若未知位此法恒行，一切異生、聲聞、獨覺皆不了知故。應竝有無知，而實不見生餘心品，但有善等諸心所生。若謂此法不違一切，於念念中常相應者，所相應品有差別故應有差別。由彼差別，令相應品別異而生。若謂異相是差別者，即彼異相能令心品別別無知，何勞別法？破第十一𨗴摩云若不染無知以習氣為體者，《正理》二十八破云「如是所說理亦可然，而彼不能顯其體性。不染習氣其體是何？非但虛言令生實解（解云：總言習氣，理亦無違；不能顯體，終成謬說也）。」

Second, pointing out faults and errors: Refuting the first teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the vipāka-indeterminate mind and mental factors as its intrinsic nature, then when an arhat of the two vehicles has no vipāka-born mind currently manifesting and does not possess it, they ought to be named a Buddha. If you say they are not named a Buddha because it will definitely arise, then when it arises later and is possessed, they might not be named a Buddha, but when it has not arisen and is not possessed, they ought to be named a Buddha. If you say they are not named a Buddha because they have impressions, then it is precisely on account of those [impressions] that they are not named a Buddha; what does this have to do with the vipāka mind and mental factors? Therefore, this statement is illogical. Refuting the second teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the four indeterminate minds and the like as its intrinsic nature, then when unobscured-indeterminate minds of the desire and form realms are not currently manifesting, they could still be accomplished across past and future. But when a formless realm aśaikṣa has no vipāka-born mind currently manifesting, and does not accomplish it in the past or future, they ought to be named a Buddha. Therefore this is also illogical. If you say they are not named a Buddha because it will definitely arise or because they have impressions, the refutation applies as above; hence this too is illogical. Refuting the third teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the naturally indeterminate mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, pervading the three realms and constantly accomplished across past and future, although it would be free of the fault of non-accomplishment, it contradicts the Vijñānakāya, fascicle fourteen. That treatise, in explaining the twelve minds, states that when one is born in the formless realm and the vipāka-born mind is not currently manifesting, one does not possess the unobscured-indeterminate mind. Since it contradicts this statement, it is also illogical. Refuting the fourth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took generic similarity as its intrinsic nature, treating it as an alternative avenue might perhaps allow such an assertion, but upon searching through the treatises there is no such text at all; therefore this too is illogical. Refuting the fifth teacher: If non-mastery were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "There must be some subtle phenomenon that acts with force as an obstructor, causing them to function without mastery regarding the absorptions. If it were not so, by what condition would they fail to attain mastery in the absorptions?" Explanation: There must be some subtle phenomenon of undefiled ignorance. Refuting the sixth teacher: If non-acquisition were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "Those who do not acquire the absorptions must have a cause. It cannot be said that non-acquisition is itself the cause, for an entity cannot be its own cause. Or else, the obstacle of affliction should also be said to take the non-acquisition of the fruit of arhatship as its nature. Since that is not so, why should this be so?" Refuting the seventh teacher: If lack of diligent seeking and the like were taken as the intrinsic nature of the obstacle, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle seventy, refutes this, saying: "The fruit of arhatship also fails to arise in its entity due to lack of diligent seeking in preparation and the like; could there then be no distinct entity of the obstacle of affliction?" Refuting the eighth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the nonexistence of wisdom as its intrinsic nature, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "An ancient master refuted it, saying: 'It is not merely the nonexistence of wisdom, for a nonexistent phenomenon cannot possibly act as a cause.'" Refuting the ninth teacher: If undefiled ignorance took the mind and mental factors collectively named impressions as its intrinsic nature, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, records an ancient master's refutation, saying: "Nor should it be said that mind and mental factors of such a class are collectively named impressions, because undefiled ignorance was already explained previously. That is, does this ignorance take the naturally abiding mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, or does it have a differentiating factor? If it takes the naturally abiding mind and the like as its intrinsic nature, the Buddha should also possess undefiled ignorance. If there is a differentiating factor, that which differentiates could be ignorance, not that which is differentiated. We observe that among mind and mental factors differentiated into wholesome and other classes, there must be a distinct phenomenon that serves as the differentiator, not all of them together. For example, in the wholesome class there must be faith and the like, in the unwholesome class there are shamelessness and the like, and in the defiled class there is heedlessness and the like. Among such classes of mind and mental factors, there must be a distinct phenomenon that serves as the differentiator. Therefore we know that here too there is a distinct phenomenon capable of differentiating, which is undefiled ignorance." (Explanation: Based on this text of refutation, we know there was a proponent of this collective view.) Refuting the tenth, ancient master: If undefiled ignorance had a distinct entity among the mental factors, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, states: "The orthodox master refutes it, saying: 'Examining their assertion now, it has excessive faults. The mind and mental factors of ordinary worldlings and the like do not perceive the characteristics of taste, potency, maturation, and so forth as they truly are, yet no other mental factors are seen to arise. Furthermore, in each single moment, those minds and mental factors arise distinctly; thus in moment after moment, distinct phenomena of ignorance ought to arise individually. If it is said that there are different characteristics that cause the ignorance to be differentiated, then these [characteristics] are themselves what can differentiate the classes of mind; why positing a distinct undefiled ignorance?'" Explanation: If in an unawakened state this phenomenon functions constantly, then because all ordinary worldlings, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas fail to understand, they should all equally possess this ignorance, yet in reality no other class of mind is seen to arise—only wholesome and other mental factors arise. If it is said that this phenomenon does not conflict with anything and is constantly associated in moment after moment, then because the associated classes have differences, it ought to have differences. Due to those differences, the associated classes would arise differently. If it is said that different characteristics constitute the differentiation, then those very characteristics can cause the classes of mind to have distinct ignorances; why labor to posit a separate phenomenon? Refuting the eleventh, *Kṣema, who claims undefiled ignorance takes impressions as its intrinsic nature: the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle twenty-eight, refutes this, saying: "What is stated in this way could indeed be reasonable, yet he is unable to demonstrate its intrinsic nature. What is the intrinsic nature of this undefiled impression? Mere empty words cannot produce true understanding." (Explanation: Speaking generally of impressions does not contradict reason, but being unable to demonstrate its entity ultimately renders it a flawed doctrine.)