俱舍論記 1.190

1.190

「論曰至所生受」者，此別釋受，謂能領納隨順觸境是受自性。問：諸心、心所同緣一境皆能執受，與受何別？解云：諸心、心所雖復同緣俱名執受，受領納強，名自性受。猶如十人同處坐，一人是賊，傍怱有人叫喚呼賊。雖復十人同聞賊聲，實是賊者領即偏強，不同餘九。受領境強，想等領境弱，應知亦爾。又解：諸心、心所雖復同緣皆執受境，想等諸法從別立名，受無別名，雖標總稱即受別名。如色處等，雖有兩解，前解為勝。總說有三，謂樂受等，約依因異，別說成六。言受身者，身是體義。故《對法論》云「身義體義無差別也。」若依《顯宗》第二，領納隨觸名自性受。故彼論云「云何此受？領納隨觸，謂受是觸隣近果故。此隨觸聲，為顯因義，能順受故。受能領納，能順觸因，是故說受領納隨觸，領納隨觸名自性受。領納所緣亦是受相，與一境法別相難知，一切皆同領納境故。以心、心所執受境時，一切皆各領納自境，是故唯說領納隨觸名自性受，別相定故。領納所緣名執取受，非此所辨，相不定故。」廣辯二受，如《順正理》及《五事論》。解云：彼論意說，受有二種：一執取受，謂一切心、心所法執取前境，皆名執取受。二自性受，謂受能領納自所隨觸，取觸勢分名領納觸。執取難分不約彼說，自性易顯故約此明受。

"The treatise says: ... feeling born of": here feeling is explained separately, meaning that the capacity to experience (anubhūti) the object conformable to contact is the intrinsic nature of feeling. Question: Since all minds and mental factors together cognize the same object and are all capable of apprehending it, how does [this] differ from feeling? Explanation: Although all minds and mental factors together cognize [the object] and are all said to apprehend it, the experiencing by feeling is intense, and is called intrinsic feeling (svabhāva-vedanā). It is just like ten persons sitting together in the same place, one of whom is a thief, when someone nearby suddenly shouts and cries out "Thief!". Although all ten persons together hear the shout of "Thief!", the one who is truly the thief experiences it with particular intensity, unlike the remaining nine. That feeling experiences the object intensely while conception, etc., experience the object weakly should be understood in just the same way. Another explanation: Although all minds and mental factors together cognize and apprehend the object, the various factors such as conception establish their names from their specific [characteristics], whereas feeling has no distinct name; although marked by a general designation, that is the specific name of feeling, just as with the form base, etc. Although there are two explanations, the former explanation is superior. In general, there are three, namely pleasant feeling and so forth; differentiated according to the differences in supports and causes, they are explained as six. To say "bodies of feeling" means that 'body' has the meaning of substantial essence. Thus the *Abhidharma-dharmaskandha-śāstra* says: "The meaning of body and the meaning of substantial essence have no distinction." If based on the second [fascicle of the] *Abhidharmadīpa* (*Xianzong lun*), experiencing conformable to contact is named intrinsic feeling. Thus that treatise states: "What is this feeling? It is the experiencing conformable to contact, because feeling is the proximate fruit of contact. This term 'conformable to contact' is used to reveal the meaning of cause, as it conforms to feeling. Feeling can experience that cause of contact which it conforms to; therefore, feeling is said to experience conformable to contact, and experiencing conformable to contact is named intrinsic feeling. Experiencing the cognitive object is also a characteristic of feeling, but its distinct characteristic is difficult to discern from the factors of the same cognitive object, because all alike experience the object. When mind and mental factors apprehend the object, all individually experience their own object; therefore, solely experiencing conformable to contact is named intrinsic feeling, because its distinct characteristic is fixed. Experiencing the cognitive object is named apprehensive feeling (saṃgrahītṛ-vedanā); it is not what is analyzed here, because its characteristic is not fixed." For an extensive analysis of the two feelings, see *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Pañcavastuka*. Explanation: The intent of that treatise is to say that feeling is of two kinds: first, apprehensive feeling, meaning that all minds and mental factors apprehending the preceding object are all called apprehensive feeling; second, intrinsic feeling, meaning that feeling is capable of experiencing its own conformable contact, grasping the force and momentum of contact being called experiencing contact. Because apprehension is difficult to distinguish, it is not explained with reference to it; because intrinsic nature is easy to demonstrate, feeling is clarified with reference to this.