俱舍論記 1.90

1.90

「永礙當生至得非擇滅」者，此釋非擇滅。謂有法體，而能永礙未來法生，此法本欲礙生法不生，若法不生便起得送與行者，故名得滅。前滅是善，後滅無記，故云異前。名非擇滅，此結體也。由擇故得，名為擇滅。「得不因擇但由闕緣」，名非擇滅，此釋名也。又解：擇滅由擇故得，非擇滅由闕緣得，故言得滅異前。如眼與意識，前後相續專一色時，言眼已攝眼識，以見色時必有識故。或言意者，所謂眼識，十二處中亦名意故。或言意者，所謂意處，以七心界皆名意故。若作此解，具攝意識及眼識故。眼識同時，意識前後。餘色、聲、香、味、觸等境落謝過去，應緣彼境五識身等。住未來世畢竟不生，由五識等不能緣彼過去境界，緣不具故，得非擇滅。觸等等取法界等中，有與能緣同時為境，如他心智所緣境等。五識身等，等取意識等，以亦有緣同時境故，如他心智等。問：法不生時但由闕緣，何關此滅？答：《顯宗論》云「非唯緣闕便永不生，後遇同類緣，彼復應生故。謂若先緣闕，彼法可不生。後遇同類緣，何障令不起（解云：彼論意說，非唯緣闕令法不生，此法不生亦由滅故）。」應知此滅約得，偏說不生。據體實通三世、有為。故《婆沙》三十二評家云「非擇滅如有為法數量，擇滅但如有漏法數量。」彼論既言如有為量，過去、現在及當生法既有為攝，准知彼法有非擇滅。若言無者，此體不生，應無此滅。若言不生方有此滅，此滅含有，應是無常。若言生、不生法其性各定，生法即無、不生即有故言常者，論不應說闕緣之言。又若爾者，修道無用。由斯理證，故通有為。更有多文，不能廣引。問：此非擇滅，諸有情類為皆共得、不共得耶？解云：若外非情共有法上非擇滅，即共得，以諸有情共業感故。若內有情不共法上非擇滅，即各別得，以諸有情別業感故。故《婆沙》三十二云「此不決定，於共有法非擇滅即共得，於不共法上非擇滅即各別得。」又解：外非情法及他身中色、香、味、觸相顯，皆可共受用故。此若闕緣，即共起得。五根及心心、所法等，相隱別用，此若闕緣即各別得。又解：諸內外法，隨若干有情應令共受用，此各不生。隨若干有情應令共受用者，即起得得，此名共得。若唯令自受用者，此法不生，但自起得，名各別得。

Regarding "perpetually obstructing future arising ... one obtains cessation not through deliberation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha)": this explains apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. It means that there is an entity of a dharma that is able perpetually to obstruct the arising of future dharmas. This dharma fundamentally intends to obstruct arising so that dharmas do not arise; and when a dharma does not arise, an acquisition (prāpti) then arises and presents it to the practitioner, which is why it is called "obtaining cessation". The former cessation [i.e., pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha] is wholesome, while this latter cessation is indeterminate (avyākṛta); therefore it says, "distinct from the former". It is called "cessation not through deliberation" (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha): this concludes [the definition of] its entity. That which is obtained on account of deliberation is called pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. "Obtained not on account of deliberation, but solely through the deficiency of conditions" is called apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha: this explains its name. Another explanation: pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is obtained through deliberation, while apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is obtained through the deficiency of conditions; hence it is said that obtaining cessation is distinct from the former. For example, when the eye and the mental consciousness, in continuous sequence, are exclusively fixed upon a single visible form, the mention of the eye already subsumes the eye-consciousness, because when seeing form there must be consciousness. Or, when it says "mind" (manas), it refers to the eye-consciousness, since within the twelve sense bases (āyatana) it is also called manas. Or, when it says "mind", it refers to the mind base (manāyatana), since all seven mind elements (citta-dhātu) are called manas. If taken according to this explanation, both mental consciousness and eye-consciousness are completely subsumed. The eye-consciousness is simultaneous, while the mental consciousness is sequential. When other objects such as form, sound, smell, taste, and tangibles pass away into the past, the groups of the five consciousnesses that ought to have taken those objects as their objective conditions remain in the future time period and ultimately do not arise. Because the five consciousnesses and so forth cannot take those past realms as objects, their conditions are incomplete, and thus one obtains apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. "Tangibles and so forth" includes [dharmas] within the dharma element (dharma-dhātu) and so forth that are simultaneous objects with the cognizing [consciousness], such as the objects cognized by the knowledge of others' minds (paracitta-jñāna). "The groups of the five consciousnesses and so forth" includes the mental consciousness and so forth, because there are also [mental consciousnesses] that take simultaneous objects, such as the knowledge of others' minds. Question: When a dharma does not arise, it is solely due to a deficiency of conditions; what has it to do with this cessation? Answer: The Xianzong lun says: "It is not solely through the deficiency of conditions that it perpetually does not arise, for if it later encountered conditions of the same class, it ought to arise again. That is to say, if conditions were previously deficient, that dharma might well not arise; but when it later encounters conditions of the same class, what would obstruct it and prevent it from arising? (The commentary explains: The meaning of that treatise is that it is not solely the deficiency of conditions that makes a dharma not arise; that this dharma does not arise is also due to this cessation)." One should know that this cessation, in terms of acquisition, is spoken of particularly with regard to what does not arise. In terms of its real entity, however, it pervades all conditioned dharmas across the three times. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 32, in its definitive verdict states: "Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has the same quantity as conditioned dharmas, whereas pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha has only the same quantity as contaminated (sāsrava) dharmas." Since that treatise says it has the same quantity as conditioned dharmas, and since past, present, and dharmas destined to arise are all subsumed under conditioned dharmas, we infer by this that those dharmas possess apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. If one were to say they do not have it, then when this entity does not arise, there should be no such cessation. If one were to say that only when it does not arise does this cessation exist, then this cessation would contain coming-into-being, and ought to be impermanent. If one were to say that the natures of dharmas that arise and dharmas that do not arise are each fixed, so that arising dharmas lack it and non-arising dharmas have it, and it is therefore permanent, then the treatise should not have used the words "deficiency of conditions". Furthermore, if that were so, cultivating the path would be useless. By the proof of this reasoning, it therefore pervades conditioned dharmas. There are many more texts, but they cannot be quoted extensively. Question: As for this apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, do all sentient beings obtain it in common, or do they obtain it individually? The explanation is: If it is the apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha upon external, insentient, shared dharmas, it is obtained in common, because it is brought about by the collective karma of sentient beings. If it is the apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha upon internal, sentient, unshared dharmas, it is obtained individually, because it is brought about by the individual karma of sentient beings. Thus the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 32, states: "This is not determinate: on shared dharmas, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is obtained in common; on unshared dharmas, apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha is obtained individually." Another explanation: External, insentient dharmas and the visible forms, sounds, smells, and tangibles in another's body have manifest characteristics and can all be experienced in common; if conditions are deficient for these, an acquisition arises in common. The five sense organs and the minds and mental factors (caitasika) have hidden characteristics and distinct functions; if conditions are deficient for these, it is obtained individually. Yet another explanation: For all internal and external dharmas, when they do not arise for as many sentient beings as ought to have experienced them in common, an acquisition arises for as many sentient beings as ought to have experienced them in common; this is called obtaining in common. If it was meant only for one's own experience, and this dharma does not arise, an acquisition arises only for oneself; this is called obtaining individually.