俱舍論記 12.115

12.115

「此二體別至寧異色觸」者，論主復破。此實德二體各別者，理必不然。以審觀時，即於色等立極微名，非離色、聲、香、味、觸外，有汝所立別實句中地、水、火、風極微體性。故非實、德二體各別。又勝論宗中自許，實句義中地等眼根所取。寧異德句中色、身根所取，寧異德句中觸？此即以理徵破勝論。一說：地、水、火、風，眼根俱能取四。一說：身根能取四種，眼根但取地、水、火三。所以者何？以身能觸冷、煖等風，故身非眼。

Regarding [the text from] “These two substances being distinct…” up to “…how are they different from visible form and tangible?”: the author refutes it again. That the substances of these two, substance and quality, are distinct is logically impossible. For upon careful examination, the name “atom” is established right upon visible form and so forth; it is not the case that apart from visible form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible, there is the substantial nature of the atoms of earth, water, fire, and wind in a distinct category of substance as posited by you. Therefore, it is not that the two substances, substance and quality, are distinct. Furthermore, the Vaiśeṣika school itself concedes that earth and so forth in the category of substance are apprehended by the eye faculty—how then are they different from visible form in the category of quality? And they are apprehended by the body faculty—how then are they different from the tangible in the category of quality? This uses reason to cross-examine and refute the Vaiśeṣikas. One theory states: the eye faculty can apprehend all four: earth, water, fire, and wind. Another theory states: the body faculty can apprehend all four, while the eye faculty only apprehends the three: earth, water, and fire. Why is that? Because the body can touch cold, warm, and other winds, so the body is [used], not the eye.