俱舍論記 13.122

13.122

「戒為隄塘至而破戒者」者，此破第八證。汝前所說戒為隄塘義，亦應准此別解脫律儀釋。謂先加行思立誓限言定不作惡熏成思種，由思種子增長力故，後數憶念慚愧現前，能自制持令不犯戒。故隄塘義，由心受持而無別體。汝說一切有部若由無表別有實體，念念現前能遮犯戒，應無失念而破戒者。若依經部，思種名戒而無別體，種若有力能憶不犯，種若無力不能憶念即便犯戒，以無別體可容犯戒。

On "Morality is an embankment ... those who break precepts": This refutes the eighth proof. What you previously stated regarding the meaning of morality as an embankment should also be explained by analogy to this prātimokṣa restraint. That is, by the prior preparatory volition, one establishes a vow and boundary, resolving definitively not to commit evil, perfuming into volition-seeds; by the power of the increase of these volition-seeds, later, when one frequently recollects and shame and conscience become present, one can restrain oneself, preventing transgression of precepts. Therefore the meaning of an embankment is maintained by the mind, without a separate substantial entity. If, according to your Sarvāstivāda, non-revelation had a separate real entity that was present moment by moment and able to obstruct transgression of precepts, there should be no one who breaks precepts through loss of mindfulness. According to the Sautrāntika, volition-seeds are called precepts and have no separate substantial entity: if the seed is powerful, one can remember and not transgress; if the seed lacks power, one cannot remember and then transgresses; since there is no separate substantial entity, transgression of precepts can be admitted.