俱舍論記 13.169

13.169

「頌曰至勝無記二常」者，答。就頌中，初四句明四善，第五句明不善，第六句明無記。就前四句中，初句明勝義善，第二句明自性善，第三句明相應善，第四句明等起善。翻此四善，不善亦四。無記有一，所謂勝義。問：何故善、不善各有四種，無記唯一？解云：於心所中無別心所是自性無記，由無自性，不立相應。由不立自性、相應，亦不立等起。設立此三，攝法亦不盡。故《正理》三十六云「無別自性、相應、等起，無一心所唯無記性與無記心遍相應故。設方便立自性等三，亦攝不盡，無記多故。由是無記唯有二種：一者勝義、二者自性。有為無記是自性攝，不待別因成無記故。無為無記是勝義攝，以性是常無異門故（已上論文）。」此論意同《正理》，亦有二種。不言自性，略而不論問《正理》若言有為無記，皆是自性。何故《婆沙》八十七於欲界中云「無記有五：一異熟生法、二威儀路法、三工巧處法、四通果無記法、五自性無記法。」又於色界中云「無記有四，除工巧，所餘如欲界說。」又於無色界中云「無記有二：一異熟生、二自性無記。」解云：《正理論》據有為法中，體是無記皆名自性。《婆沙》就有為法中，據義差別復開五種，前四不攝方名自性。應知無記諸論不同，或說一種所謂勝義，或說二種謂勝義、自性，或說四種謂異熟、威儀、工巧、通果，或說五種又加自性，或說六種又加勝義。此乃廣略不同、開合為異，亦無妨矣。問：此論若立四種善等，何故《婆沙》第二云「今應問彼：若唯五根是自性善，所餘善法自性是何？若謂彼是不善、無記雜五根故亦名善者如是五根與彼相雜，何故不名不善、無記？然信等五與所餘法，同一所依、同一行相、同一所緣、一起、一住、一滅、一果、同一等流、同一異熟，而言五根是自性善，餘相雜故假立善名，但順妄情不應正理。勿有此過，故應說言世第一法根非根性。」准《婆沙》破意，諸心所等皆同一依等，如何五根獨名自性？是即《婆沙》總立自性。如善既然，不善、無記亦應准此唯說自性。更立相應等三，豈不相違？解云？《婆沙》既以一依等破立五根為自性善，明知說四種善者述異師義。又解：安慧菩薩《俱舍釋》中解：據實而言皆是自性善。然世親阿闍梨立四種者，隨義勝劣建立異名，善中最強勝者勝義善，次強者立自性，次劣者立相應，最劣者名等起。不善隨義亦立四種。故《婆沙》一百四十四三性分別二十二根，有一師亦說有四種善、不善，與此論同，然不見破。又解：《婆沙》前文但破異師立五根為自性善，不破立無貪等為自性善。故彼前、後亦不相違。

Regarding the verse down to "the ultimate unspecified is the two permanents": this is the answer. Within the verse, the first four lines clarify the four goods, the fifth line clarifies the unwholesome, and the sixth line clarifies the unspecified. Within the first four lines, the first line clarifies the ultimate good, the second line clarifies intrinsic good, the third line clarifies associated good, and the fourth line clarifies originated good. Reversing these four goods, the unwholesome also has four. The unspecified has only one, namely the ultimate. Question: Why do the good and unwholesome each have four kinds, while the unspecified has only one? The explanation says: Among the mental factors, there is no distinct mental factor that is intrinsically unspecified. Because there is no intrinsic nature, association is not established. Because neither intrinsic nature nor association is established, origination is also not established. Even if one were to tentatively establish these three, they would not encompass all dharmas. Thus, Nyāyānusāra 36 states: "There are no distinct intrinsic, associated, or originated [unspecified factors], because there is no single mental factor that is exclusively unspecified and universally associated with an unspecified mind. Even if one were expediently to establish the three such as intrinsic nature, they would not encompass all, because unspecified [dharmas] are numerous. Therefore, the unspecified has only two kinds: first, the ultimate; second, intrinsic nature. Conditioned unspecified [dharmas] are subsumed under intrinsic nature, because they do not depend on a distinct cause to become unspecified. Unconditioned unspecified [dharmas] are subsumed under the ultimate, because their nature is permanent and without variation" (end of treatise citation). The intention of this treatise is the same as the Nyāyānusāra, having two kinds as well; it does not mention intrinsic nature merely because it abbreviates and does not discuss it. Question: If the Nyāyānusāra says that conditioned unspecified [dharmas] are all intrinsic, why does Mahāvibhāṣā 87 state regarding the Desire Realm: "The unspecified has five: 1. vipākaja dharmas; 2. iryāpatha dharmas; 3. śilpasthāna dharmas; 4. abhijñāphala unspecified dharmas; 5. intrinsically unspecified dharmas." And regarding the Form Realm it states: "The unspecified has four, excluding śilpasthāna, the rest being as explained for the Desire Realm." And regarding the Formless Realm it states: "The unspecified has two: 1. vipākaja; 2. intrinsically unspecified." The explanation says: The Nyāyānusāra is based on conditioned dharmas whose essence is unspecified all being called 'intrinsic.' The Mahāvibhāṣā, within conditioned dharmas, opens five kinds based on distinctions of meaning; only what is not subsumed under the first four is called 'intrinsic.' It should be known that the treatises differ regarding the unspecified: some teach one kind, namely the ultimate; some teach two kinds, namely ultimate and intrinsic; some teach four kinds, namely vipākaja, iryāpatha, śilpasthāna, and abhijñāphala; some teach five kinds, further adding intrinsic; some teach six kinds, further adding the ultimate. These are differences of brevity and detail, of expansion and combination; there is no contradiction. Question: If this treatise establishes four kinds of good and so forth, why does Mahāvibhāṣā 2 state: "Now we should ask them: If only the five faculties are intrinsically good, what is the intrinsic nature of the remaining good dharmas? If it is said that those are unwholesome or unspecified, but because they are mixed with the five faculties they are also called good, then since the five faculties are mixed with them, why are they not called unwholesome or unspecified? Furthermore, the five beginning with faith and the remaining dharmas share the same basis, the same aspect, the same object of observation, arise together, abide together, cease together, have the same fruit, share the same outflow, and share the same retribution; yet to say that the five faculties are intrinsically good while the rest, because of admixture, are nominally designated as good, merely accords with deluded notions and does not accord with correct principle. Lest there be this fault, one should say that the worldly supreme dharmas are of faculty and non-faculty nature." According to the Mahāvibhāṣā's refutation, since all mental factors share the same basis and so forth, how could the five faculties alone be called intrinsic? This means the Mahāvibhāṣā generally establishes intrinsic nature. Since this is so for the good, the unwholesome and unspecified should also, by extension, be stated only as intrinsic. How is it not contradictory to establish an additional three such as association? The explanation says: Since the Mahāvibhāṣā refutes establishing the five faculties as intrinsically good based on their sharing the same basis and so forth, it is clear that teaching four kinds of good recounts the view of a different master. Another explanation: In his Kośa commentary, Bodhisattva Sthiramati explains that in reality all are intrinsically good. However, Ācārya Vasubandhu establishes four kinds by setting up distinct names according to the strength or weakness of their meaning: the most powerful and superior among the good is the ultimate good; the next strongest is established as intrinsic; the next weaker is established as associated; the weakest is called originated. The unwholesome is also established in four kinds according to meaning. Thus Mahāvibhāṣā 144, distinguishing the three natures among the twenty-two faculties, notes that one master also states there are four kinds of good and unwholesome, matching this treatise, and it is not refuted. Another explanation: The earlier passage of the Mahāvibhāṣā only refutes the different master who establishes the five faculties as intrinsically good; it does not refute establishing non-greed and so forth as intrinsically good. Therefore, its earlier and later [passages] do not contradict each other.