俱舍論記 14.150

14.150

「然尋本論至佛無學法」者，論主又難，或申經部難。然尋根本、《六足》等論，不見有言唯無學法即名為佛，但言無學法能成於佛。既不遮佛生身體性，應知亦攝所依生身皆名為佛。故於此中不容前難損佛生身成無間罪，以許生身亦是佛故。若異我說，所依生身非是佛者，應佛與僧現在生身住於世俗有漏心時，爾時現無無漏五蘊，應非是僧亦應非佛。雖成過、未，墮在法數，非有情故。又應唯執成苾芻戒即是苾芻。若言戒即苾芻，然如有欲供養苾芻者，彼唯供養成苾芻尸羅，不應四事供養依身。既現供養戒所依身，故知依身亦是苾芻。若言非供養彼戒所依身，是則應與世間相違，以世現供養彼戒所依身故。如是有欲歸依佛者，亦應但歸依成佛無學法。若言唯歸佛無學法，是則還與世間相違，現見歸禮佛生身故。與說一切有部作世間相違過也。論主意說：佛寶體性以佛身中有為無漏法及佛身諸有漏法為佛寶體。

Regarding "However, examining the fundamental treatises [...] the aśaikṣa dharmas of the Buddha": The author of the treatise objects again, or presents the Sautrāntika objection: However, examining the fundamental [treatises], the *Ṣaḍdharmaskandha*, and other treatises, one finds no statement that aśaikṣa dharmas alone are called the Buddha; they only say that aśaikṣa dharmas bring about the Buddha. Since they do not exclude the janmakāya's essential nature of the Buddha, one should know that the janmakāya that serves as the basis is also subsumed and together called the Buddha. Therefore, the earlier objection does not arise here—that injuring the Buddha's janmakāya constitutes an ānantarya sin—because it is accepted that the janmakāya is also the Buddha. If, contrary to what I say, the janmakāya that serves as the basis were not the Buddha, then when the present janmakāya of the Buddha and the Saṃgha abides in a worldly, sāsrava mind, at that time the anāsrava five skandhas would not be present, and they would not be the Saṃgha, nor would he be the Buddha. Although [anāsrava dharmas] are acquired in the past and future, they fall under the category of dharmas, not sentient beings. Furthermore, one would have to hold that the precept that constitutes a bhikṣu is alone the bhikṣu. If one says that the precept is the bhikṣu, then when someone wishes to make offerings to a bhikṣu, he would only make offerings to the śīla that constitutes the bhikṣu, and should not provide the four requisites to the body that serves as the basis. Since offerings are visibly made to the body that serves as the basis of the precepts, one knows that the body serving as the basis is also the bhikṣu. If one says that one does not make offerings to the body that serves as the basis of those precepts, then this would contradict the world, because the world visibly makes offerings to the body that serves as the basis of those precepts. Likewise, if someone wishes to take refuge in the Buddha, he should also only take refuge in the aśaikṣa dharmas that make one a Buddha. If one says that one takes refuge only in the aśaikṣa dharmas of the Buddha, this would again contradict the world, because one visibly takes refuge in and worships the janmakāya of the Buddha. This imputes the fallacy of contradicting the world to the Sarvāstivāda. The author's intended meaning is that the essential nature of the Buddha-jewel takes the conditioned anāsrava dharmas in the Buddha's person and all the sāsrava dharmas of the Buddha's person as the entity of the Buddha-jewel.