俱舍論記 15.138

15.138

「二說俱與至無尋業」者，論主破云：二說俱與六足、《發智》本論相違。故本論言「頗有業唯感心受異熟非身受異熟耶？曰：有。謂善無尋業。」中定善業既無尋攝，明知但感中定心受，不感身受。若說中定善無尋業，能感初定樂根異熟。便有無尋業亦感身受，本論相違，本論說無尋業唯感心受故。又本論說善無尋業能感心受，明知中定善業能感心受異熟。既能感受果，後說此業不感受果，亦違本論。

Regarding "Both explanations are in contradiction with ... karma without vitarka," the author of the treatise refutes them, saying: both explanations contradict the fundamental treatises, the Ṣaḍdharmaskandha and the Jñānaprasthāna. For the fundamental treatise says: "Is there karma that brings about only the ripening of mental feeling and not physical feeling? Answer: Yes. Namely, wholesome karma without vitarka." Since wholesome karma of the intermediate dhyāna is subsumed under [karma] without vitarka, it is clear that it only brings about mental feeling in the intermediate dhyāna and does not bring about physical feeling. If one were to say that the wholesome karma without vitarka of the intermediate dhyāna could bring about the ripening of the faculty of pleasure in the first dhyāna, then there would be karma without vitarka that also brings about physical feeling, which contradicts the fundamental treatise, because the fundamental treatise says that karma without vitarka brings about only mental feeling. Furthermore, the fundamental treatise states that wholesome karma without vitarka can bring about mental feeling; thus it is clear that wholesome karma of the intermediate dhyāna can bring about the ripening of mental feeling. Since it can bring about the result of feeling, the subsequent assertion that this karma does not bring about the result of feeling also contradicts the fundamental treatise.