俱舍論記 16.102

16.102

「以所殺生至理不應然」者，答。以所殺生現命猶存，不可令彼俱死、前死能殺生者成殺生罪，以所殺生命未斷故。夫成業道，命斷方成，非俱死、前死能殺生者其命已終至第二念可得殺罪。所以者何？至第二念雖所殺生其命不續，彼能殺者以受後有身別依生故。謂殺加行所依止身，今已斷滅落謝過去，至第二念雖有別類身同分生，非是殺罪所依止身。此身曾未起殺生加行，成殺業道，理不應然。

"Because the living being to be killed ... in principle it should not be so": this is the answer. Because the present life of the living being to be killed still remains, the one who is able to kill the living being cannot, if dying together with or dying before, be made to incur the fault of killing living beings, since the life of the living being to be killed has not yet been cut off. Now, a path of karma is constituted only when life is cut off; the one able to kill living beings, dying together with or dying before, whose life has already ended, cannot incur the fault of killing upon reaching the second moment. Why is this? Although the life of the living being to be killed is not continued into the second moment, the killer has already taken a later existence and arisen on a different bodily basis. That is to say, the body that was the basis for the preparatory application of killing has now been cut off, destroyed, and has lapsed into the past; and although in the second moment a bodily generic similarity of a different category arises, it is not the body that was the basis for the fault of killing. For this body, which never previously initiated the preparatory application of killing living beings, to constitute the path of karma of killing would, in principle, not be right.