俱舍論記 16.116

16.116

「若爾汝等至立義可成」者，論主廣破。若謂殺同亦得殺罪，汝等離繫不先作意，遇見他妻或誤觸身，亦應有罪。故見、遇見，見妻同故。故觸、誤觸，觸身同故。然彼宗中故見、故觸成罪，遇見、誤觸不成罪。或善心者為求福故拔離繫髮，或師慈心勸諸離繫令修苦行，或因施主施好飲食宿食不消，此等皆應獲苦他罪。雖無惡心故令他苦，以與惡心拔髮、嗔心令修苦行、惡心與食受苦同故。然彼宗中善心等獲福、惡心等得罪。或胎中子與彼母身，更相逼迫互為苦因，應母與胎有苦他罪。雖無故意令他受苦，與故意受苦同故。然胎與母，彼宗中胎、母互苦皆無有罪。又汝若言：思與不思俱與殺合即得殺罪。能殺與殺合，能殺得殺罪；所殺既殺合，所殺得殺罪。亦應如火不但能燒餘觸火者，亦復能燒自所依木，不應但令能殺得罪。火喻殺，燒喻罪。所依木喻所殺人，餘觸火者喻能殺人。又思、不思但與殺合即得殺罪。自行殺時與殺合故可得殺罪；若遣他殺，殺罪應無，以能教者非殺合故，如火不燒教觸火者。又思、不思但與殺合即得殺罪。諸木、石等應為罪觸，如舍等崩亦害生命故。既此殺合應得殺罪，又非但喻立義可成，與理相符義方成故。

"If so, you […] can a proposition be established": the author of the treatise extensively refutes them. If you say that because the killing is the same one also incurs the sin of killing, then when you Nirgranthas, without prior intention, chance to see another's wife or mistakenly touch her body, you should also incur sin. For intentional seeing and chancing to see are the same in seeing a wife; intentional touching and mistakenly touching are the same in touching a body. Yet in their tradition, intentional seeing and intentional touching constitute sin, whereas chancing to see and mistakenly touching do not constitute sin. Or, if a person of good intentions plucks a Nirgrantha's hair for the sake of merit, or a master out of compassion urges the Nirgranthas to practice austerities, or because a donor gives fine food and drink one suffers from indigestion, all these should incur the sin of tormenting another. Even though there was no malice intentionally causing the other to suffer, the suffering received is identical to having hair plucked with malice, being made to practice austerities with anger, or being given food with malice. Yet in their tradition, good intentions incur merit, and malicious intentions incur sin. Or, when a fetus in the womb and the mother's body press upon each other and mutually cause suffering, both the mother and the fetus should incur the sin of tormenting another. Even though there is no intention to cause the other to suffer, the suffering is identical to intentionally inflicted suffering. Yet regarding the fetus and the mother, in their tradition the mutual suffering of fetus and mother incurs no sin at all. Furthermore, if you say that both intentional and unintentional actions, merely by coinciding with killing, incur the sin of killing: the killer coincides with killing, so the killer incurs the sin of killing; the one killed also coincides with killing, so the one killed should incur the sin of killing. Also, just as fire not only burns another who touches it, but also burns the wood on which it relies, it should not be that only the killer incurs the sin. Fire is an analogy for killing; burning is an analogy for sin. The wood on which it relies is an analogy for the person killed; the other person who touches the fire is an analogy for the killer. Furthermore, [if] intentional or unintentional actions incur the sin of killing merely by coinciding with killing: when one personally carries out the killing, because one coincides with killing, one might incur the sin of killing; but if one orders another to kill, the sin of killing should be absent, because the one who instructs does not coincide with killing, just as fire does not burn the one who instructs another to touch fire. Furthermore, [if] intentional or unintentional actions incur the sin of killing merely by coinciding with killing: trees, stones, and the like should be touched by sin, because when houses collapse they also destroy living beings. Since they coincide with this killing, they should incur the sin of killing. Moreover, a proposition cannot be established by mere analogy alone; only when it accords with reasoning is the meaning established.