俱舍論記 16.93

16.93

「論曰至此三成故」者，如頌四節，釋文亦四，如文可知。又《正理》四十一云「貪、嗔業道即貪、嗔根，如何說由貪、嗔究竟？如欲邪行業道生時，定有貪根能為究竟，非貪、嗔二業道生時別有貪、瞋能為究竟。是故應說貪、瞋等三一一皆由癡根究竟，非無癡者此三起故。有餘於此作是釋言：即說此法由此究竟，自體生時即業道故。彼理窮故作如是釋，然實貪等正現前時，幸有癡根能為究竟，何緣不許執自體耶？餘業道中他究竟故，雖有此義而不許者，勿諸業道皆癡究竟，諸業道成時定有癡俱故。無如是失，以殺、盜等雖皆有癡，而嗔、貪強故。若爾，邪見應不由癡，以邪見俱癡不強故。不爾，邪見俱起癡強，爾時無餘不善根故。非邪見體是不善根，故此俱癡根義而勝。若爾，貪等應不由癡，以貪，及嗔是根是勝；俱行癡劣，應不可言貪、嗔業道由癡究竟。約能究竟爾時癡強，更無餘根究竟。貪等自體於自無助力能，寧可說言自究竟自？故癡究竟於理無失。有餘於此復作釋言：與貪、嗔俱一果諸法，皆可隨勝立貪、嗔名；彼與貪、嗔俱時生故，亦可說彼究竟貪、嗔。於此釋中亦容徵難，恐文煩雜故應且止。」解云：《正理》總有三師。第一師說貪、嗔業道由彼相應癡究竟。第二師說貪由貪究竟、嗔由嗔究竟。第三師說貪、嗔業道由彼相應、俱有諸法究竟，以與貪、嗔相應、俱有故，亦名貪、嗔。《正理》意存初說。問：若存初說，何故頌曰「殺、麁語、嗔恚，究竟皆由嗔。盜、邪行及貪，皆由貪究竟。」准此頌文，嗔由嗔究竟，貪依貪究竟。何故乃言貪、嗔業道由癡究竟？解云：貪、瞋之言亦顯於癡，以相應中必有癡故。若殺、麁語，由瞋、癡究竟。若瞋，由癡究竟。若盜、邪行，由貪、癡究竟。若貪，由癡究竟。故不相違。應知十業道中貪、嗔、邪見，由癡究竟。殺、麁語，由瞋、癡究竟。盜、邪行，由貪、癡究竟。虛誑、離間、雜穢、一一皆容三根究竟。又解：《正理》別為一解。頌文意同第二師說，若作此解不須會釋。問：善業道究竟，何故不說？解云：前說善於三位中皆三善根起，已顯三根皆能究竟，故復而不說。又解：雖復皆由三根究竟，於中非無勢用偏強，翻惡應知。

"The treatise states: … because these three are accomplished": Just as the verse has four clauses, the explanatory text also has four, which can be understood from the text. Furthermore, *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle 41, states: "The paths of action of covetousness and ill-will are identical to the roots of covetousness and ill-will; how can it be said that they are brought to culmination by covetousness and ill-will? Just as when the path of action of sexual misconduct arises, there is definitely a root of covetousness capable of acting as culmination, it is not the case that when the two paths of action of covetousness and ill-will arise, there are separate covetousness and ill-will capable of acting as culmination. Therefore, it should be said that the three—covetousness and the rest—are each brought to culmination by the root of delusion, for these three do not arise in one who is without delusion. Some provide another explanation on this point, saying: It is said that this phenomenon is brought to culmination by this [same phenomenon] because when its own entity arises, it is itself the path of action. Because their reasoning was exhausted, they made such an explanation. However, in reality, when covetousness and the like are directly present, there happens to be a root of delusion capable of acting as culmination; on what grounds should one not accept this, and instead cling to its own entity? In other paths of action, it is brought to culmination by something else; although this principle exists, if it is not accepted [here], should it not be that all paths of action would be brought to culmination by delusion, because when all paths of action are accomplished, there is definitely delusion concomitant with them? There is no such fault, for although killing, stealing, and the rest all have delusion, ill-will and covetousness are stronger. If so, wrong view should not be through delusion, because delusion concomitant with wrong view is not strong. Not so: delusion arising concomitantly with wrong view is strong, because at that time there is no other unwholesome root. The entity of wrong view is not an unwholesome root, so the delusion concomitant with it is superior in its significance as a root. If so, covetousness and the like should not be through delusion, because covetousness and ill-will are roots and are superior; the concomitant delusion is inferior, so it should not be said that the paths of action of covetousness and ill-will are brought to culmination by delusion. In terms of the capacity to bring to culmination, at that time delusion is strong, and there is no other root to bring them to culmination. The entity itself of covetousness and the like has no auxiliary power toward itself; how could it be said that it brings itself to culmination? Therefore, culmination by delusion is logically flawless. Some further provide this explanation: All phenomena that share a single result concomitant with covetousness and ill-will may all be given the name of covetousness and ill-will according to what is predominant; because they arise at the same time as covetousness and ill-will, it can also be said that they bring covetousness and ill-will to culmination. In this explanation too there is room for objection, but fearing that the text would become overly convoluted, we should stop for now." The explanation is: In *Nyāyānusāra* there are three masters in total. The first master says that the paths of action of covetousness and ill-will are brought to culmination by the delusion concomitant with them. The second master says that covetousness is brought to culmination by covetousness, and ill-will is brought to culmination by ill-will. The third master says that the paths of action of covetousness and ill-will are brought to culmination by the phenomena that are concomitant and coexistent with them; because they are concomitant and coexistent with covetousness and ill-will, they are also named covetousness and ill-will. The intention of *Nyāyānusāra* preserves the first explanation. Question: If it preserves the first explanation, why does the verse state: 'Killing, harsh speech, and ill-will are all brought to culmination by ill-will. Stealing, sexual misconduct, and covetousness are all brought to culmination by covetousness'? According to this verse, ill-will is brought to culmination by ill-will, and covetousness is based on covetousness for culmination. Why then say that the paths of action of covetousness and ill-will are brought to culmination by delusion? The explanation is: The words 'covetousness' and 'ill-will' also express delusion, because in their concomitance there is definitely delusion. Killing and harsh speech are brought to culmination by ill-will and delusion. Ill-will is brought to culmination by delusion. Stealing and sexual misconduct are brought to culmination by covetousness and delusion. Covetousness is brought to culmination by delusion. Therefore, they are not contradictory. One should know that among the ten paths of action, covetousness, ill-will, and wrong view are brought to culmination by delusion. Killing and harsh speech are brought to culmination by ill-will and delusion. Stealing and sexual misconduct are brought to culmination by covetousness and delusion. Falsehood, divisiveness, and senseless speech can each be brought to culmination by any of the three roots. Another explanation: *Nyāyānusāra* provides a separate explanation. The meaning of the verse agrees with the explanation of the second master; if one adopts this explanation, no reconciliation is needed. Question: Why is the culmination of wholesome paths of action not discussed? The explanation is: It was previously said that the wholesome in all three phases arises from the three wholesome roots; this has already shown that the three roots are all capable of bringing them to culmination, so it is not repeated. Another explanation: Although all are brought to culmination by the three roots, among them it is not the case that there is no bias in potency, which should be understood by reversing the unwholesome.