俱舍論記 18.146

18.146

「此非定證至由自心生」者，論主總非，正釋下句。汝作是執，此非定證。若福要由攝益他成，則修慈等及正見等應不生福，以慈、正見等於他無益故。是故應許供養制多有多福生，如修慈等。謂如有一修慈定時，於諸有情平等發起與樂意樂，雖無受者及攝益他，而從自善心生無量福。修悲等定，得福亦爾。如是諸有德者，雖已滅過去，而今追申恭敬、供養，福由自心生。

"This is not definitive proof ... it arises from one's own mind": the author of the treatise completely refutes this and properly explains the lower line. This view held by you is not definitive proof. If merit necessarily had to be accomplished through bestowing benefit on another, then cultivating benevolence and so on, as well as right view and so on, would not give rise to merit, because benevolence, right view, and so on bestow no benefit on another. Therefore, one must accept that many merits arise from making offerings to a caitya, just as in the cultivation of benevolence and so on. That is to say, just as when someone cultivates the absorption of benevolence, they arouse an intention to bestow happiness equally upon all sentient beings; though there is no recipient and no benefit bestowed on another, immeasurable merit arises from their own wholesome mind. In cultivating absorptions such as compassion, the merit attained is also like this. Similarly, with respect to the virtuous ones, though they have already passed away into the past, when one now respectfully offers veneration and worship, merit arises from one's own mind.