俱舍論記 19.133
俱舍論記 19.133
- Language
- Classical Chinese
19.133
「此九雖能至准界應思」者,此九雖能通緣自、上,然理無有自、上頓緣。於緣上中且約界說,或唯緣一界或二界合緣。引證可知。約地分別,准界應思。又《婆沙》十九云「問:何故不一剎那頃頓緣三界若苦若集耶?答:彼緣欲界亦隨增,緣色、無色界不隨增故。問:彼何故緣欲界亦隨增,緣色、無色界不隨增耶?」有一復次云「復次欲界有彼等流、異熟果。色、無色界無彼等流、異熟果故。」又一復次解非頓緣云「若如緣欲界即隨增,緣色、無色界亦爾者,界應雜亂。若如緣色、無色界不隨增,緣欲界亦爾者,即不應理,以無煩惱緣自界法而有不具所緣。相應二隨增者,緣自地法必具所緣,相應縛故。若一剎那頓緣三界若苦若集,於所緣境有隨增、有不隨增者,亦應於相應法有隨增、有不隨增。是即違此因理,亦壞相應法。勿有此失,故別時緣自界、他界,理善成立。」廣如彼釋。又《婆沙》云「何故遍行隨眠能於他部隨增,非他界地?答:遍行隨眠於他部法有等流果或異熟果故能隨增,於他界地無等流及異熟果故不隨增。復次自界他部麁細相似故能隨增,上界地細故不能隨增。」
Regarding "Although these nine are able ... should be considered by analogy with realms": although these nine are capable of apprehending both their own realm and higher realms, in principle there is no simultaneous apprehension of both one's own realm and higher realms. Among those that apprehend higher realms, speaking provisionally in terms of realm, they either apprehend only one realm or apprehend two realms combined. The citation of proof can be known [from the text]. Their distinction according to level should be considered by analogy with realm. Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 19, says: "Question: Why do they not in a single moment simultaneously apprehend the three realms, whether as duḥkha or as samudaya? Answer: Because when they apprehend the Kāmadhātu they also increase in accordance, whereas when they apprehend the Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu they do not increase in accordance. Question: Why do they, when apprehending the Kāmadhātu, also increase in accordance, but when apprehending the Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, not increase in accordance?" One alternative explanation says: "Furthermore, it is because the Kāmadhātu has their nisyanda-phala and vipāka-phala, whereas the Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu do not have their nisyanda-phala and vipāka-phala." Yet another alternative explanation explains why there is no simultaneous apprehension, saying: "If, just as when apprehending the Kāmadhātu they increase in accordance, it were also so when apprehending the Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu, the realms would be chaotic and confused. If, just as when apprehending the Rūpadhātu and Ārūpyadhātu they do not increase in accordance, it were also so when apprehending the Kāmadhātu, that would be illogical; for there is no defilement apprehending dharmas of its own realm that lacks both ālambana- and saṃprayukta-anusaya. Apprehending dharmas of its own level necessarily possesses both ālambana- and saṃprayukta-bandhana. If in a single moment they were to apprehend simultaneously the three realms, whether as duḥkha or as samudaya, having both that which increases in accordance and that which does not regarding the cognitive object (ālambana), they would also regarding associated dharmas (saṃprayuktaka-dharma) have that which increases in accordance and that which does not. This would contradict this logical principle of causation and would also destroy the associated dharmas. In order that there not be this fault, they apprehend their own realm and other realms at different times, which is a well-established principle." It is explained at length as therein stated. Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā says: "Why do universal anuśayas increase in accordance with other categories (nikāya), but not other realms and levels? Answer: Universal anuśayas have nisyanda-phala or vipāka-phala with respect to dharmas of other categories, and therefore are able to increase in accordance; with respect to other realms and levels they have no nisyanda-phala or vipāka-phala, and therefore do not increase in accordance. Furthermore, within one's own realm, the coarseness and subtlety of other categories are similar, so they can increase in accordance; higher realms and levels are subtle, and therefore they cannot increase in accordance."
Translations (1)
- English (machine translation) — English, machine translation