俱舍論記 19.60.2

19.60.2

由神境通運身傍去不得邊際，遂於上、下起有邊想，於傍世界起無邊想，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 由斯便執我及世間亦有邊亦無邊，即是二種俱有分限無分限義。 四非有邊非無邊，即遮第三為此第四。 彼作是念：我及世間俱不可說定是有邊、定是無邊，然皆實有。 或有說者，彼見世間橫無邊故，執我、世間俱非有邊； 彼見世間竪有邊故，執我、世間俱非無邊。 雖無決定，而實有我。 復有說者，彼執我體或舒或卷不可定說，舒無邊故說非有邊，卷有邊故說非無邊。 問：如是四種既緣現在，云何說為前際分別？ 答：彼待未來，亦名前際。 廣如《婆沙》。 又云：有作是說，執有邊者即是斷見，執無邊者即是常見，執亦有邊亦無邊者即是一分斷見一分常見，執非有邊非無邊者即是唯起薩伽耶見。 解云：前說以我見為性，說執我言故； 後師以斷常我見為性。 四不死矯亂論者，計天常住名為不死，能無亂答得生彼天，不能實答恐不生天。 以言矯亂，名為矯亂。 一怖妄語。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我答便為妄語，怖妄語故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 二怖邪見。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我撥便為邪見。 怖邪見故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 三怖無知。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我印慮詰不知。 怖無知故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 四怖愚鈍。 若違他意便不生天，諸有問我皆應返問，隨彼所欲我便印之。 又性愚癡，若違拒他彼便別我。 怖愚癡故恐不生天，以言矯亂。 此四雖於現在事轉，待未來故，立前際名。 如是四種計天不死，體皆常見。 計答他問為生天因，是戒禁取。 後際分別見中，十六有想論者，謂有色等四，有邊等四，一想等四，有樂等四。 有色等四者，一我有色死後有想，謂所執我以色為性故名有色，此有色我有彼想故名為有想。 彼作是念：此有色我死後有想。 二我無色死後有想，謂所執我無色為性故名無色，此無色我或想為性、或有想用說名有想、或有彼想說名有想。 彼作是念：此無色我死後有想。 三我亦有色亦無色死後有想，謂所執我以色、無色為性，故名亦有色亦無色。 我或以想為性、或有想用說名有想、或有彼想說名有想。 然作是念：此亦有色亦無色我死後有想。 四我非有色非無色死後有想，遮前第三無別依。 彼作是念：我雖實有而不可說定亦有色亦無色。 彼見實我定亦有色亦無色俱有過失，故作是說：此我非有色非無色死後有想。 有邊等四者，一我有邊死後有想，彼所執我體有分限名我有邊，此有邊我死後有想。 二執我無邊死後有想，彼所執我遍一切處名我無邊，此無邊我死後有想。 三執我亦有邊亦無邊死後有想，彼所執我或時有邊、或時無邊，計此我死後有想。 四執我非有邊非無邊死後有想，即遮第三為此第四。 一想等四者，一我有一想死後有想。 緣一境轉名為一想，我與彼合名有一想。 此下死後有想，皆准前釋。 二我有種種想死後有想。 緣異境起名種種想，我與彼合名有種種相。 三我有小想死後有想，依小身故、緣少境故說為小想，我與彼合名有小想。 若執小想蘊為我，有想用故名有少想。 下准此釋。 四我有無量想死後有想，依無量身故、緣無量境故名無量想，我與彼合名有無量想。 有樂等四者，一我純有樂死後有想，樂謂樂受或謂樂具，我與彼合名純有樂。 二我純有苦死後有想，苦謂苦受或謂苦具，我與彼合名純有苦。 三我有樂有苦死後有想，或苦樂雜受、或苦樂俱合，便作是念：我有苦樂。 四我無苦無樂死後有想，不受苦樂名無苦樂，或時暫受如容非有，便作是念：我無苦樂。 應知十六有想論雖皆有想，然初四色、無色差別，次四邊、無邊差別，次四約想差別，後四約受差別，此十六皆以常見為體。 八無想論者，謂有色等四、有邊等四。

By supernormal power to move the physical body laterally, one fails to find an edge, and thus conceives a notion of having an edge with respect to above and below, and a notion of being boundless with respect to the lateral world, grasping the self as entirely pervading therein. Due to this, one grasps the self and the world as both having an edge and being boundless—that is, the sense that both have delimitations and are without delimitations. Fourth: [the doctrine that] it is neither with edge nor boundless, which negates the third to form this fourth. They formulate this thought: 'The self and the world are both ineffable as definitely having an edge or definitely being boundless, yet both are real entities.' Or, as some say: because they see that the world is laterally boundless, they grasp that the self and the world are both not with an edge; because they see that the world is vertically bounded, they grasp that the self and the world are both not boundless. Although there is no determinacy, the self really exists. Still others say: they grasp that the substance of the self either expands or contracts and cannot be definitively stated; because it is boundless when expanding, they say it is not with an edge, and because it has an edge when contracting, they say it is not boundless. Question: Since these four kinds take the present as their object, why are they called speculations regarding the prior limit? Answer: In relation to the future, they are also called the prior limit. [This is] elaborated in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. It also says: 'Some say: one who grasps that it has an edge holds the view of annihilation; one who grasps that it is boundless holds the view of permanence; one who grasps that it both has an edge and is boundless holds a partly annihilationist and partly eternalist view; one who grasps that it is neither with an edge nor boundless only generates the view of personal identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).' The explanation says: the former account takes the view of self as its nature, since it mentions 'grasping a self'; the latter masters take annihilationist, eternalist, and the view of self as its nature. The four evasive wrigglers (amarāvikkhepa): they consider heaven to be permanent, which is called 'immortal' (amara); if one can answer without confusion, one will be reborn in that heaven, whereas if one cannot answer truthfully, one fears not being reborn in heaven. Because one's speech is evasive and confusing, it is called wriggling (evasiveness). First: out of fear of false speech. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I answer, it would be false speech; fearing false speech, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Second: out of fear of wrong view. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I repudiate it, it would be wrong view; fearing wrong view, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Third: out of fear of ignorance. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I confirm it, I fear being interrogated and found not knowing; fearing ignorance, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Fourth: out of fear of dull-wittedness. 'If I oppose the other's mind, I will not be reborn in heaven; whoever asks me, I should ask back in turn, and according to what they desire, I then confirm it. Moreover, my nature is foolish; if I reject the other, they will examine me; fearing foolishness, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' thus speaking evasively. Although these four operate on present matters, in relation to the future they are given the name of the prior limit. Such four kinds conceive of the immortality of heaven; their substance is entirely eternalist view. Conceiving answering another's questions to be the cause of rebirth in heaven is attachment to vows and ascetic rules (śīlavrataparāmarśa). Among the speculations regarding the posterior limit, the sixteen doctrines of [the self being] percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like; four regarding having an edge and the like; four regarding having a single perception and the like; four regarding having pleasure and the like. As for the four regarding having form and the like: First: 'My self has form and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has form as its nature, so it is called 'having form'; because this self that has form possesses that perception, it is called 'percipient'. They formulate this thought: 'This self having form is percipient after death.' Second: 'My self is formless and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'formless'; this formless self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. They formulate this thought: 'This formless self is percipient after death.' Third: 'My self both has form and is formless, and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has both form and formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'both having form and formless'. The self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. Thus they formulate this thought: 'This self that both has form and is formless is percipient after death.' Fourth: 'My self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' This negates the third without a separate basis. They formulate this thought: 'Although the self really exists, it cannot be definitively stated as both having form and being formless.' Because they see that a real self being definitively both with form and formless both incur fault, they state: 'This self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' As for the four regarding having an edge and the like: First: 'My self has an edge and is percipient after death.' The substance of their grasped self has delimitations, so it is called 'my self has an edge'; this self having an edge is percipient after death. Second: grasping 'My self is boundless and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self pervades all places, so it is called 'my self is boundless'; this boundless self is percipient after death. Third: grasping 'My self both has an edge and is boundless, and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self is at times with an edge and at times boundless; they conceive that this self is percipient after death. Fourth: grasping 'My self is neither with an edge nor boundless, and is percipient after death,' which negates the third to form this fourth. As for the four regarding having a single perception and the like: First: 'My self has a single perception and is percipient after death.' Operating with reference to a single object is called a single perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a single perception. Hereafter, 'percipient after death' is to be explained according to the preceding. Second: 'My self has various perceptions and is percipient after death.' Arising with reference to different objects is called various perceptions; the conjunction of the self with that is called having various perceptions. Third: 'My self has limited perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on a small body or taking a limited object, it is said to be a limited perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a limited perception. If one grasps the skandha of limited perception as the self, because it has the function of perception it is called having a limited perception. The rest below are explained accordingly. Fourth: 'My self has immeasurable perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on an immeasurable body or taking an immeasurable object, it is called immeasurable perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having immeasurable perception. As for the four regarding having pleasure and the like: First: 'My self has solely pleasure and is percipient after death.' Pleasure means pleasant feeling or requisites of pleasure; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely pleasure. Second: 'My self has solely suffering and is percipient after death.' Suffering means unpleasant feeling or requisites of suffering; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely suffering. Third: 'My self has pleasure and has suffering, and is percipient after death.' Either suffering and pleasure are experienced mixed, or both suffering and pleasure are combined, so one formulates this thought: 'My self has suffering and pleasure.' Fourth: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure and is percipient after death.' Not experiencing suffering or pleasure is called having neither suffering nor pleasure; or experiencing it temporarily as if it did not exist, one formulates this thought: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure.' It should be known that although the sixteen doctrines of being percipient are all percipient, the first four are distinguished by form and formlessness, the next four by edge and boundlessness, the next four in terms of perception, and the latter four in terms of feeling; these sixteen all take eternalist view as their substance. The eight doctrines of being non-percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like, and four regarding having an edge and the like.