俱舍論記 19.73

19.73

「論曰至因執亦斷」者，諸外道等執大自在天、梵王、生主，或餘時等，為世間因生世間者，於自在等麁苦果義，必先計度彼體是常。常謂常見。一、我、作者，我謂我見。即由斯理，身、邊二見唯見苦斷。計我、常已，方於我、常起世因執。因執，謂戒禁取。纔見苦諦時，於自在等常執、我執永斷無餘，故彼我、常所生戒禁因執亦斷。此顯非因計因。戒禁從常、我生，麁果處起故見苦斷。非於集因妄計我、常方起因執，故非因計因非見集斷。

[On the passage], "The commentary says: ... the grasping at the cause is also abandoned": Various non-Buddhists and the like grasp at Maheśvara, Brahmā, Prajāpati, or else time and so forth, as the worldly cause that generates the world; with regard to the coarse, suffering effects such as Maheśvara and the like, they must first calculate their nature to be permanent. Permanent means the view of permanence. [They calculate them to be] unitary, a self, an agent; self means the view of self. Precisely by this reasoning, the two views—[the view of] individuality and [the view of] extremes—are abandoned only upon seeing suffering. Having calculated a self and permanence, only then do they generate, with regard to the self and permanence, the grasping at a worldly cause. Grasping at a cause refers to the clinging to rules and vows. The moment they see the truth of suffering, the grasps at permanence and self regarding Maheśvara and the like are forever abandoned without remainder; therefore, the clinging to rules and vows as causes, generated from that [grasping at] self and permanence, is also abandoned. This shows that calculating what is not a cause to be a cause—the rules and vows—arises from permanence and self, and because it arises with respect to coarse effects, it is abandoned upon seeing suffering. It is not that they falsely grasp at self and permanence with respect to the cause of origin and only then produce the grasping at a cause; therefore, calculating what is not a cause to be a cause is not abandoned upon seeing the origin.