俱舍論記 19.91

19.91

「要具三因至非顛倒體」者，答。謂要具三因勝者成倒。言三因者，一向倒故、推度性故、妄增益故。又《正理》云「增聲亦顯體增勝故（已上論文）。」於五見中，謂戒禁取雖推度性及妄增益，非一向倒，緣少分法得清淨故。如戒禁取計有漏道得淨涅槃，雖非究竟斷惑證滅，而能暫離下八地染，證彼滅故。《婆沙》一百四云「戒禁取雖是推度性及妄增益，而非一向倒，亦於少分實處轉故。謂有色界道能淨欲界有，無色道能淨色界有，上地道能淨下地，與無漏道斷染證滅義相似故。」又《顯宗》云「謂戒禁取非一向倒，所計容離欲染等故，少分暫時得清淨故。」問：如見取計樂受為樂、計善法為淨，亦於少分實處轉故，何故是倒？解云：彼執有漏同涅槃樂、同涅槃淨。於有漏中無少樂、淨同彼涅槃，一向倒故，所以名倒。其戒禁取非道計道，即有分同無漏聖道證淨涅槃，故不成倒。斷見、邪見雖一向倒及推度性，非妄增益，無門轉故，所以非倒。所餘貪、瞋、慢、疑等，雖一向倒及妄增益，不能推度，非見性故所以非倒。由具三因勝者成倒，是故餘惑非顛倒體。集、滅、道下見取亦應別簡，略而不論。故《正理》云「餘部見取非增勝故（已上論文）。」其我所見，異執不同，故不別簡。若依初師，我所見非倒。應作是言：我所見雖推度性及妄增益，非一向倒，亦於少分實處轉故。如計實法是我所有，非無體故，所以非倒。若依第二師，此我所見即是我見，異門說二。既我見攝，亦具三因，所以是倒。

"They must possess three causes […] they are not the essence of the inversions": this is the answer. It means that only those that possess the three causes and are preeminent constitute inversions. As for the three causes, they are: being wholly inverted, being of the nature of discernment (saṃtīraṇa), and falsely superimposing (samāropa). Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra says: "The word 'excessive' (sam-) also shows that their essence is preeminent." (End of treatise passage.) Among the five views, although clinging to precepts and vows has the nature of discernment and falsely superimposes, it is not wholly inverted, because it takes a partial phenomenon as achieving purification. For example, when clinging to precepts and vows imputes that a sāsrava path attains pure nirvāṇa, although it does not definitively sever defilements and realize cessation, it is able to temporarily abandon the defilement of the lower eight stages and realize their cessation. The Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 104, says: "Although clinging to precepts and vows has the nature of discernment and falsely superimposes, it is not wholly inverted, because it also operates with respect to a partially real object. Namely, the path of the form realm can purify desire-realm existence; the formless path can purify form-realm existence; the path of an upper stage can purify a lower stage, in a way similar to the sense of the anāsrava path severing defilement and realizing cessation." Furthermore, the Samayapradīpikā says: "Clinging to precepts and vows is not wholly inverted, because what it imputes allows for the abandoning of desire-realm defilement and so forth, partially and temporarily attaining purification." Question: If clinging to views imputes pleasant feeling to be pleasure and virtuous phenomena to be pure, operating likewise with respect to a partially real object, why is it an inversion? The explanation is: it grasps sāsrava [phenomena] as identical to the pleasure of nirvāṇa and identical to the purity of nirvāṇa. Within sāsrava phenomena there is not the slightest pleasure or purity identical to that of nirvāṇa; because it is wholly inverted, it is called an inversion. As for clinging to precepts and vows, in imputing what is not the path to be the path, it is partially identical to the anāsrava noble path in realizing pure nirvāṇa; therefore it does not constitute an inversion. Although annihilationism and false views are wholly inverted and of the nature of discernment, they do not falsely superimpose, because they operate through the avenue of negation; therefore they are not inversions. The remaining [defilements]—attachment, anger, pride, doubt, and so forth—although they are wholly inverted and falsely superimpose, cannot discern; because they are not of the nature of a view, they are not inversions. Since those that possess the three causes and are preeminent constitute inversions, the remaining defilements are not the essence of the inversions. The clingings to views under [the truths of] origin, cessation, and path should also be set aside, but are omitted and not discussed. Hence the Nyāyānusāra says: "Because the clingings to views of the other categories are not preeminent." (End of treatise passage.) As for the view of what belongs to self, because differing positions disagree, it is not separately set aside. If one follows the first teacher, the view of what belongs to self is not an inversion. One should say: although the view of what belongs to self has the nature of discernment and falsely superimposes, it is not wholly inverted, because it also operates with respect to a partially real object. For example, imputing a real phenomenon to be belonging to oneself is not without an entity; therefore it is not an inversion. If one follows the second teacher, this view of what belongs to self is itself the view of self, spoken of as two by an alternative method. Since it is subsumed under the view of self, it also possesses the three causes; therefore it is an inversion.