俱舍論記 2.108

2.108

「雖有是理至故如色說」者，答。色、聲二境有多有情同共見、聞，故名為共。香、味、觸三，雖於一人根正合時，餘不能取。若在未來根未合時，於一及餘皆有可生鼻等識義，容有共取。眼等不然，故如色說。又解：猶如兩人鼻、舌、身三根各相著，同嗅中間香、同嘗中間味、同覺中間觸，故名為共。根即不爾，無有兩人共用一根。或一類香、味、觸能發多識，故名為共。根即不爾，無一類根兩人共用發識，根各別故。問：如《正理》第六云「聲如色說，是共境故。香、味、觸三如內界說，非共境故。然諸世間依假名想，有言我等同嗅此香、同嘗此味、同覺此觸。」《雜心》意同《正理》，說香、味、觸第一義如眼說，俗數如色說。此論豈不與彼相違？解云：此論約外香、味、觸未取之時，在未來世容有多人共受用義，故如色說。《雜心》、《正理》據正取時餘不能取，說非共境，故如內界。各據一義，亦不相違。又解：論意各別。《雜心》、《正理》唯取身中內香、味、觸，不能取外，外但為緣引發於內。此論意說，不但取內香、味、觸，亦能取外。故《婆沙》七十一亦有兩說云「或有欲令唯嗅嘗覺各自身中諸香、味、觸。復有欲令亦嗅嘗覺他，及非情諸香、味、觸。若依前義，應作是說：香、味、觸界依世俗理，如色界說。依勝義理，如眼界說。若依後義，應作是說：香、味、觸界若已受用及受用時，依世俗理，如色界說。依勝義理，如眼界說。若未受用，依勝義理，亦可得言如色界說。是故諸論皆作是說：如色界，聲、香、味、觸界亦爾。以香、味、觸可共得故（已上論文）。」《雜心》、《正理》同《婆沙》前師，此論同《婆沙》後師。若依前解，《雜心》、《正理》亦同《婆沙》後師。《婆沙》雖有兩說，然無評家，且以後師為正，以攝法盡故。若外香、味、觸非三根取，應法處收。既法處中無香等三，明知後師為正。

Regarding 'Although there is this principle... therefore it is spoken of as like visible form': this is the reply. The two sense objects, visible form and sound, are seen and heard jointly by many sentient beings; therefore they are termed 'common'. As for the three—odour, taste, and tangible—although when directly contacting one person's faculty, another cannot grasp them, when in the future the faculties have not yet contacted them, they have the capacity to generate the olfactory consciousness and so forth for both one and another; thus joint grasping is possible. The eye and others are not like this; therefore [the three] are spoken of as like visible form. Another explanation says: just as when the three faculties—nose, tongue, and body—of two people touch each other, they jointly smell the intermediate odour, jointly taste the intermediate taste, and jointly feel the intermediate tangible; therefore they are called 'common'. Faculties are not so, for there are no two people who jointly share one faculty. Or, a single category of odour, taste, or tangible can produce multiple consciousnesses, so it is called 'common'. Faculties are not so, for there is no single category of faculty that two people jointly share to generate consciousness, because faculties are distinct. Question: As the sixth fascicle of the Nyāyānusāra states: 'Sound is spoken of as like visible form because it is a common object. Odour, taste, and tangible are spoken of as like the internal elements because they are not common objects. Yet worldly beings, relying on conventional notions, say: "We jointly smell this odour, jointly taste this taste, and jointly feel this tangible."' The intention of the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya agrees with the Nyāyānusāra, stating that in ultimate truth odour, taste, and tangible are spoken of as like the eye, while conventionally they are spoken of as like visible form. Does not this treatise contradict them? Explanation: This treatise refers to external odour, taste, and tangible when they have not yet been grasped, where in the future there is the capacity for multiple persons to jointly experience them; therefore they are spoken of as like visible form. The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Nyāyānusāra are based on the moment of direct grasping, when another cannot grasp them, stating they are not common objects, and thus are like the internal elements. Each relies on one meaning, so they do not contradict each other. Another explanation says: the intentions of the treatises are distinct. The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Nyāyānusāra only admit internal odour, taste, and tangible within the body, being unable to grasp the external; the external merely serves as a condition to elicit the internal. The intention of this treatise is that not only are internal odour, taste, and tangible grasped, but the external can also be grasped. Hence fascicle seventy-one of the Mahāvibhāṣā also has two views, stating: 'Some maintain that one only smells, tastes, and feels the odours, tastes, and tangibles in one's own body. Others maintain that one also smells, tastes, and feels those of others and of inanimate things. If according to the former view, it should be said: the elements of odour, taste, and tangible, according to conventional principle, are spoken of as like the visible form element; according to ultimate principle, they are spoken of as like the eye element. If according to the latter view, it should be said: the elements of odour, taste, and tangible, if already experienced or being experienced, are spoken of as like the visible form element according to conventional principle, and like the eye element according to ultimate principle; if not yet experienced, according to ultimate principle it can also be said that they are like the visible form element. Therefore, treatises all state: as is the visible form element, so too are the elements of sound, odour, taste, and tangible, because odour, taste, and tangible can be jointly obtained' (end of treatise citation). The Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Nyāyānusāra agree with the former master in the Mahāvibhāṣā; this treatise agrees with the latter master in the Mahāvibhāṣā. If following the previous explanation, the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya and Nyāyānusāra also agree with the latter master in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Although the Mahāvibhāṣā has two views, there is no critical judgment; we take the latter master as correct provisionally because it subsumes phenomena exhaustively. If external odour, taste, and tangible were not grasped by the three faculties, they should be subsumed under the dharmāyatana. Since there are no such three as odour and so forth within the dharmāyatana, we clearly know the latter master is correct.