俱舍論記 2.117

2.117

「如是已說至被障諸色故」者，此下第十九是見、非見門。就中，一正明、二傍論，此即正明。初兩句出見體，下六句釋妨遮計。尊者世友眼見，尊者法救眼識見，尊者妙音眼識相應慧見，譬喻者眼識同時心、心所法和合見。問：如《婆沙》、《五事》、《雜心》等論，皆破識、慧、和合，此頌何故但破識耶？解云：隨作論者意樂破故。又解：亦兼破慧。頌言五識俱生慧非見，已知破慧但不破和合。或可以和合計分同經部，論主意明故不別破。又解：具破三種。不見障色，言從強破識，慧及和合准破應知。故《雜心》云「同分眼見色，非彼眼識見，非慧非和合，不見障色故。」又解：此論從強破識，具破三種廣如諸論。故《五事論》第一云「問：誰能見色？為眼根見？為眼識見？為與眼識相應慧見？為心、心所和合見耶？如何所疑一切有疑過。若眼根見，餘識行時寧不見色？何不俱取一切境耶？若眼識見，識但以了別為相，非見為相，豈能見色？若與眼識相應慧見，應許耳識相應慧聞。彼既非聞，此云何見？若心、心所和合能見，諸心、心所和合不定，謂善眼識與二十二心所相應，不善眼識與二十一心所相應，有覆無記眼識與十八種心所相應，無覆無記眼識與十二種心所相應。既不決定，云何和合？答：眼根能見，然與眼識合位非餘，譬如眼識了別色用依眼方有，又如受等領納等用必依於心。此亦應爾。由斯理趣，餘識了時，眼識既空不能見色，亦無俱取一切境失，以一相續中無二心轉故。問：何故六所依、所緣，而一相續中無六識俱轉？答：等無間緣唯有一故。復有餘義：若眼識見，誰復能識？若慧見者，誰復能知？若心、心所和合能見，諸法一一業用不同，於中定無和合見義。又應一體有二作用，謂許能見及領納等。復有餘義：若識見者，識無對故，則應能見被障諸色，慧及和合應知亦然，是故眼根獨名能見。」

"Having thus explained... because of obstructed visible forms": from here on is the nineteenth section, the inquiry into seeing and non-seeing. Within this, first is the direct explanation, and second is the incidental discussion; this is the direct explanation. The first two lines present the nature of seeing, and the remaining six lines resolve objections and refute opposing positions. The Venerable Vasumitra maintains that the eye sees; the Venerable Dharmatrāta maintains that the visual consciousness sees; the Venerable Ghoṣaka maintains that the wisdom (prajñā) associated with visual consciousness sees; the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain that the visual consciousness and simultaneous mental factors in combination see. Question: In treatises such as the *Vibhāṣā*, *Pañcavastuka*, and *Miśrakābhidharmahrṛdaya*, consciousness, wisdom, and combination are all refuted; why does this verse only refute consciousness? Answer: Because it is according to the preference of the treatise-maker to refute it. Another explanation: it also implicitly refutes wisdom. The verse says that the wisdom arising together with the five consciousnesses is not seeing, which already indicates the refutation of wisdom; it simply does not refute combination. Or perhaps because the view of combination partly coincides with the Sautrāntika, and the author's intention is clear, he does not refute it separately. Another explanation: it completely refutes all three. In stating that obstructed visible forms are not seen, it refutes consciousness based on the most prominent view; wisdom and combination should be understood as refuted by analogy. Thus the *Miśrakābhidharmahrṛdaya* states: "The eye of the same category sees visible forms; it is not the visual consciousness that sees, nor is it wisdom, nor combination, because obstructed forms are not seen." Another explanation: this treatise refutes consciousness based on the most prominent view, while fully refuting all three as detailed in various treatises. Thus the *Pañcavastuka*, fascicle 1, states: "Question: What can see visible forms? Does the eye faculty see? Does the visual consciousness see? Does the wisdom associated with visual consciousness see? Or do mind and mental factors in combination see? However it is doubted, all [positions] incur faults under doubt. If the eye faculty sees, why does it not see forms when other consciousnesses are active? Why does it not apprehend all objects simultaneously? If the visual consciousness sees, since consciousness has only discernment as its characteristic and not seeing as its characteristic, how could it see forms? If the wisdom associated with visual consciousness sees, one should grant that the wisdom associated with auditory consciousness hears; since that does not hear, how could this see? If mind and mental factors in combination can see, the combinations of mind and mental factors are indeterminate: a wholesome visual consciousness is associated with twenty-two mental factors, an unwholesome visual consciousness is associated with twenty-one mental factors, an obstructed neutral visual consciousness is associated with eighteen mental factors, and an unobstructed neutral visual consciousness is associated with twelve mental factors. Since they are not determinate, how could there be combination? Answer: The eye faculty can see, yet only when combined with the visual consciousness and not in other states. For example, the visual consciousness's function of discerning visible forms exists only in reliance upon the eye; again, as feeling and so forth, their functions of experiencing and so forth must rely upon the mind. This should be understood in the same way. Due to this reasoning, when another consciousness is discerning, the visual consciousness is absent and cannot see forms; nor is there the fault of apprehending all objects simultaneously, because within a single continuity two minds do not operate simultaneously. Question: Why is it that, with six bases and six objects, six consciousnesses do not operate simultaneously in a single continuity? Answer: Because the equal and immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya) is only one. There is yet another meaning: If visual consciousness sees, what then discerns? If wisdom sees, what then knows? If mind and mental factors in combination can see, since each phenomenon has a different function, among them there is definitely no principle of seeing in combination. Furthermore, a single entity would have two functions, namely being capable of seeing as well as experiencing and so forth. There is yet another meaning: If consciousness sees, since consciousness is without physical resistance (apratigha), it would be able to see obstructed visible forms; wisdom and combination should be understood likewise. Therefore, the eye faculty alone is called that which can see."