俱舍論記 2.154

2.154

「如何磁石至耳根亦爾」者，論主反難外人。以眼能取不至境，即令普取不至境。磁石能吸不至鐵，何不普吸不至鐵？此即引事反難。汝勝論師執眼能見至境，亦同此難。「何不普見眼藥、籌等至眼諸色」，此即入彼宗難。「又如鼻等」下，引例反成。如眼既然，耳根亦爾。問：眼在闇中見闇色時，為見逼眼者？為見遠者？若見逼者，應取至境；若取遠者，應取所障。解云：闇中不見色者，不見所障瓶瓫等及大遠色。於次近者，雖無光明，有空故見。眼之勢力強弱皆爾，隨其所應例應思擇。

"Just as a lodestone ... so too with the auditory faculty": the author of the treatise turns the challenge back upon the opponent. Because the eye can apprehend an object that has not arrived, [the opponent would] make it universally apprehend all objects that have not arrived. A lodestone can attract iron that has not arrived [at it]; why does it not universally attract all iron that has not arrived? This cites a concrete fact to turn the objection back. Your Vaiśeṣika doctrine maintains that the eye can see arrived objects, and is likewise subject to this objection: "Why does it not universally see all colors that arrive at the eye, such as eye salves, applicator probes, and the like?" This refutes them by entering into their own school. From "And just as the olfactory faculty, etc." onwards, an analogical example is cited to turn and confirm the point. As this is true of the eye, so too with the auditory faculty. Question: When the eye is in the dark seeing dark colors, does it see what presses right up against the eye, or does it see what is distant? If it sees what presses against it, it should apprehend an arrived object; if it apprehends what is distant, it should apprehend what is obstructed. It is explained: The reason one does not see forms in the dark is that one does not see obstructed jars, pots, and the like, nor forms that are very far away. For those that are relatively close, although there is no light, because there is space, one sees them. Whether the eye's power is strong or weak is entirely like this; one should reflect on and analyze this by analogy according to how it applies.