俱舍論記 2.188

2.188

「頌曰至心所法界」者，後謂意識，於六識中最居後故。依唯過去，由六識身無間滅已皆名為意，此與意識作所依根，是故意識唯依過去無間滅意。問：此宗十八界皆通三世，如何說意唯過去耶？解云：若據意體實通三世，約世據用就顯以論故唯過去。故論云「過去名意，未來名心，現在名識。」五識二依，如文可解。顯依不定，或同時依、或過去依，故引本文將所依性對等無間緣，問答以定。六根據勢用增上，故非心所。等無間緣據開避義，亦通心所不通色根，寬狹不同，引為問答以定依別。問：羅漢後心豈非是意識依，而非等無間緣，何故乃言是意識所依性定是意識等無間緣？解云：若據依義，理實如是。今此文中舉識所依以為問答。羅漢後心更無後識，非是所問，是俱非句攝。又解：此中據體類說，不約作用，還是俱句攝。前解似勝。

Regarding the passage from "The verse says:" up to "mental factors and the dharmadhātu": "The latter" refers to mental consciousness (mano-vijñāna), because it is situated last among the six consciousnesses. Its support is only the past, because when the six consciousness-bodies perish without interval, all of them are named "mind" (manas); this acts as the supporting faculty for mental consciousness. Therefore, mental consciousness relies only on the mind that has perished without interval in the past. Question: In this school, all eighteen realms comprise the three times; why then is it said that the mind is only past? The explanation says: If based on the intrinsic substance of the mind, it actually comprises the three times; yet, treating it temporally in terms of its function and discussing it where it is evident, it is only past. Therefore the treatise says: "The past is called manas, the future is called citta, and the present is called vijñāna." That the five consciousnesses have two supports can be understood from the text. To show that the supports are not uniform—either being a simultaneous support or a past support—the original text is cited, matching the status of being a support against the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) in questions and answers to determine them. The six faculties are [posited as supports] based on the predominance of their functional power; thus, mental factors (caitta) are not [faculties]. The immediately preceding condition is based on the meaning of yielding the way; it also applies to mental factors, but does not apply to the material faculties. Their broader and narrower extents being different, they are cited in questions and answers to determine the distinction among supports. Question: Is not the final mental moment of an arhat the support of mental consciousness, yet not an immediately preceding condition? Why then is it said that whatever has the nature of being a support of mental consciousness is definitely an immediately preceding condition of mental consciousness? The explanation says: If based on the meaning of "support," it is indeed so in principle. Here, this passage raises the supports of consciousness to formulate the questions and answers. Because the final mental moment of an arhat has no subsequent consciousness, it is not what is questioned; it is subsumed under the category of "neither." Another explanation says: Here it is stated based on substantial type, not in terms of functioning; thus, it is still subsumed under the category of "both." The former explanation seems superior.