俱舍論記 2.79

2.79

「如能斫所斫至所稱唯重」者，身等色根亦非二事，謂非能燒、所燒，能稱、所稱，以淨妙故。燒身盡時根亦盡者，由彼扶根四境無故，根亦隨無，非能燒根。聲界，六義總非，不相續故。能燒、所稱有二諍論，前約世俗不相離說故言四界，後約勝義剋體以論唯火能燒、所稱唯重。各據一義，理亦無違。雖復性火俱遍能所，據事用勝說為能燒，若用劣者說為所燒。

On the passage "Just as with what can cleave and what is cleaved [...] what is weighed is only heaviness": The material sense faculties of the body and the rest are also not these two functions; that is, they are neither what can burn nor what is burned, nor what can weigh nor what is weighed, because they are pure and subtle. When the body is burned away and the faculty also disappears, it is because the four sense fields supporting the faculty are gone that the faculty also disappears accordingly; it is not that the sense faculty can be burned. The sound element is entirely excluded from all six definitions because it lacks continuity. There are two disputes regarding what can burn and what is weighed: the former is spoken in conventional terms of inseparability, and therefore speaks of four dhātus; the latter is spoken in terms of ultimate reality and strict intrinsic entity, holding that only fire can burn, and what is weighed is only heaviness. Each is based on one perspective, and in principle there is no contradiction. Although the nature of fire is equally present in both agent and object, that whose functional activity is superior is called what can burn, while that whose functional activity is inferior is called what is burned.