俱舍論記 20.51

20.51

「又彼所說至亦是所緣」者，敘第二證破。應共尋思：意根、法境為緣生識，為法如意作能生緣？為法但能作所緣境？若法如意作能生緣，如何未來百千劫後，當有彼法應生現前？或當亦無闕緣不生，為能生緣生今時識。夫生緣者相貌分明，彼相隱昧，如何能生？又涅槃性違一切生，立為能生第六意識，不應正理。若法但能為所緣境生意識者，我說過、未亦是所緣。經部許有緣無生心。

Regarding "Further, as to what they said [...] is also an intentional object (ālambana)": Recounting the second proof to refute it. We should investigate together: When the mental faculty (manas) and the dharma-object serve as conditions to generate consciousness, does the dharma act as a productive condition (janaka-pratyaya) just like the mental faculty? Or can the dharma only act as an intentional object (ālambana)? If the dharma acts as a productive condition just like the mental faculty, how could that dharma which will exist hundreds of thousands of kalpas later in the future be about to arise in the present? Or perhaps it will not exist at all, being unproduced due to a lack of conditions—how could it act as a productive condition to produce consciousness at the present moment? A productive condition has distinct characteristics, whereas those characteristics are obscure; how could it produce? Furthermore, the nature of nirvāṇa is contrary to all production; establishing it as a producer of the sixth mental consciousness is inconsistent with correct reasoning. If a dharma only can be an intentional object to generate mental consciousness, I say that the past and future are also intentional objects. The Sautrāntika accepts that a mind can arise apprehending what is non-existent.