俱舍論記 20.55

20.55

「謂曾有至其理自成」者，經部答。過去曾有、未來當有，非憶過去色、受等時，如現在分明觀彼為有，但追憶彼曾現有之相，逆觀未來當有亦爾。「謂如」已下，重釋可知。據曾、當有擬對而緣，故作是言如成所緣。曾、當有故，不同龜毛；無實體故，不同現在。過、未二境若如現有應成現世，何謂去、來？若體現無，則應許有緣無境識。其理自成，同我經部。

Regarding "Namely, previously existed [...] the principle is established by itself": This is the Sautrāntika reply. The past previously existed, and the future will exist; when remembering past form, feeling, and so forth, one does not clearly observe them as existent like the present, but merely recollects the characteristics of their previously present existence; looking forward to the future that will exist is likewise so. From "namely, like..." downward, the restated explanation is understandable. It is based on "previously existed" and "will exist" that one projects toward and apprehends them, hence the statement "in such a way as to become intentional objects." Because they previously existed or will exist, they are not like a turtle's hair; because they lack a real entity, they are not like the present. If past and future objects existed like the present, they should become the present time; why speak of past and future? If their entities are non-existent in the present, then one must accept that there is a consciousness apprehending a non-existent object. The principle is established by itself, in agreement with our Sautrāntika.