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俱舍論記 20.96

俱舍論記 20.96

Language
Classical Chinese

20.96

「論曰至前後無定」者,且諸煩惱次第生時,先由不共無明於諦不了,不觀四諦。由不了故,次引生疑,二途猶預。從此猶預,次引邪見撥無四諦。由撥無諦,次引身見,謂取蘊中撥無苦、無常、空、無我理,便決定執此是我故。從此身見引邊見生,謂依前我執斷、常邊,從此邊見引生戒取,謂由於我隨執斷、常一邊,便計此執為能得彼淨涅槃故。從戒禁取引見取生,謂計戒禁能得淨已,必執為勝起見取故。從此見取次引貪生,謂自見中情深愛故。從此貪後次引慢生,謂自見中深愛著已,恃見生高舉,陵蔑他人故。慢次引瞋,謂自見中深愛恃已,於他所起違己見中,情不能忍必憎嫌故。有餘師說:於自見解多種之中,取一捨餘,起憎嫌故。以見諦所斷貪等生時,緣自身中見為境故。如是且依一類次第相牽起說。越次起者,前後不定,以一一後皆容起彼十隨眠故。

Regarding "The commentary states: [...] there is no fixed sequence": for the defilements, when they arise in sequence, first, due to unshared ignorance (avidyā), one does not understand the truths and does not contemplate the four truths. Because of this lack of understanding, it next induces doubt (vicikitsā), wavering between two paths. From this wavering, it next induces wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi), which repudiates the four truths. From repudiating the truths, it next induces view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi)—meaning that among the appropriated aggregates, one repudiates the principles of suffering, impermanence, emptiness, and non-self, and so determinately grasps that this is a self. From this view of self, extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) is induced to arise—meaning that, based on the previous grasping of a self, one grasps the extremes of annihilation or permanence. From this extreme view, attachment to rules and rituals (śīlavrataparāmarśa) is induced to arise—meaning that, according to grasping either the extreme of annihilation or permanence regarding the self, one then presumes that this grasping can obtain that pure nirvāṇa. From attachment to rules and rituals, attachment to views (dṛṣṭiparāmarśa) is induced to arise—meaning that, having presumed that rules and rituals can obtain purity, one inevitably grasps them as superior, giving rise to attachment to views. From this attachment to views, desire (rāga) is next induced to arise—meaning that one has deep affectionate craving for one's own view. After this desire, conceit (māna) is next induced to arise—meaning that, having deeply attached with affection to one's own view, one relies on the view to generate loftiness and disparages others. After conceit, aversion (pratigha) is induced—meaning that, having deeply loved and relied on one's own view, when confronted with views arisen in others that contradict one's own view, one's mind cannot bear it and inevitably resents and dislikes them. Other masters state: among the various sorts of one's own understandings, one accepts one and rejects the others, thereby giving rise to resentment and dislike. This is because when desire and the like abandoned by seeing the truths arise, they take the views in one's own continuum as their object. This explanation is given merely based on one manner of sequential causation. When arising out of order, the sequence is not fixed, because after each one, any of those ten anuśayas may arise.

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