俱舍論記 22.91

22.91

「又下品受至樂等三受」者，約品、約地為難。下品苦受現在前時，許為樂受，明利可取。許中苦受現在前時，名為捨受，非明了取。如何應理？又於色界下三定中說有樂故，應有下苦。三受明義，喜亦名樂，故通三定。第四定等以上五地，說有捨受，應有中苦。定勝苦增，豈應正理？結破可知。

As for "Furthermore, low-grade feeling... the three feelings of pleasure and the rest": this raises an objection in terms of grades and meditative stages. When a low-grade painful feeling is present before one, it is admitted to be a pleasant feeling, being clear and distinctly graspable. When a middling painful feeling is present before one, it is called a neutral feeling, not being clearly grasped. How could this be reasonable? Furthermore, because pleasure is said to exist in the lower three dhyānas of the form realm, there should be low suffering there. In the clear definition of the three feelings, joy (prīti) is also called pleasure (sukha), hence it extends through the three dhyānas. In the five stages above the fourth dhyāna and beyond, neutral feeling is said to exist, so there should be middling suffering. If meditation is superior, suffering increases—how could that be reasonable? The concluding refutation can be known.