俱舍論記 26.105

26.105

「由此應言至皆名行相」者，論主難殺，自為一解。由此應言：諸心、心所取境之時，有影像相類各別故皆名行相。或於境中實類差別，青非黃等取境類別皆名行相，可得言有。問：如《婆沙》七十九，一說行相通心、心所，一說行相以一切法為性。評家行相以慧為性，論主何故以不正義為難？解云：論主意樂即立，非以《婆沙》評家為量。

"Therefore one should say […] are all termed 'modes of activity'": The author severely refutes [the view] and presents his own explanation. Therefore, one should say: When the various minds and mental factors grasp an object, because their images and types are distinct from one another, they are all called modes of activity. Or, as the distinct real types within the object, grasping the distinct types of objects—blue as opposed to yellow, and so forth—are all called modes of activity, so that it can be said to exist. Question: As in Mahāvibhāṣā 79, one explanation says modes of activity extend to mind and mental factors, while another says modes of activity take all dharmas as their nature. The arbiter holds that the mode of activity takes prajñā as its nature; why does the author make an objection based on what is not the orthodox doctrine? Explanation: The author establishes whatever he prefers, not taking the arbiter of the Mahāvibhāṣā as an authoritative criterion.