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俱舍論記 26.121

俱舍論記 26.121

Language
Classical Chinese

26.121

「論曰至應頓離染」者,以世俗智觀一切法,為非我時猶除自品,自品即是自體等法。自體謂俗智自體,相應謂俗智相應心、心所法。俱有謂俗智同時謂四相。故《雜心.雜品》云「亦不緣共有,同一果故。」或可此論言俱有法亦攝於得,以得亦是極相隣近故。《雜心論》說同一果者,不相應中且據親說。或論意各別。問:何故《婆沙》非我觀中云「問:何等名俱有諸法?答:此隨轉色,及此隨轉不相應行。」准《婆沙》亦通色,何故但言四相?解云:此論俗智散位聞思,故不言色。《婆沙》俗智亦通修慧,故兼言色。論意不同,無勞會釋。又《婆沙》第九云「不知自性者,即止大眾部執。不知相應諸法者,即止法密部執。不知俱有諸法者,即止化地部執。言智能知,即止犢子部執(已上論文)。」境是所緣境,有境是能緣智。以境、有境別,故不緣自體。若緣自體,應無差別,同一所緣故,不緣相應法。譬如眾人同觀初月不相見面,極相隣近故,不緣俱有法。如眼不見近眼根色,故剎那三法非此智所緣,此智唯是欲、色界攝。聞、思所成非修所成,以修所成地別緣故,不能總緣。若異此者,修能頓緣,應頓離染。《正理》七十四破云「此不應理。言修所成唯地別緣,非極成故。謂我宗許靜慮地攝修所成慧,有能總緣隨所依身自上境故。厭下欣上方能離染,此既總緣唯欣行相,故於離染無有功能。故彼所言皆為非理。」若作俱舍師救言:修所成慧有能總緣亦非極成,我宗不許修總緣故。此乃宗別,無勞會釋。若依說一切有宗,非我觀亦通修慧。故《正理》七十四云「此智唯是欲色界攝。無色界中雖有此類,而緣法少,非此所明。此通聞、思、修所成慧,皆能除自品緣一切法故。」又《婆沙》第十解無我觀中云「聞、思、修所成者通三種。」又云「地者此行相在七地,謂欲界、未至、靜慮中間,及根本四靜慮,此則總說。若別說者,聞所成慧唯在五地,謂欲界、四靜慮。思所成慧唯在欲界。修所成慧唯在六地,謂前說七地中除欲界。」又准《婆沙》,依地門,聞慧不通未至、中間。問:若依《婆沙》下文解三慧中,一云:聞慧唯在五地,謂欲界、四靜慮。有說:在六地,謂前五及靜慮中間。有說:在七地,謂前六及未至。然無評家。何者為正?解云:《婆沙》前文既無異說,依五地為正。又解:若據非我觀等,殊勝聞慧唯在五地。若據常徒起者,亦通未至、中間。若作此解,俱容為正。問:身生下地起上聞慧不?解云:不起。如《婆沙》第十云「加行得、離染得、生得者,可言通三種。此則總說。若別說者,欲界聞思所成非我行相唯加行得,色界聞所成非我行相可言加行得、可言生得。云何可言加行得?謂若此間於自、共相善修習者生彼便得,若不爾者生彼不得。云何可言生得?謂雖此間善修習已,若未生彼終不能得,生彼方得。彼聞所成非我行相,必依此間所修加行生彼得故。色界修所成非我行相,是加行得及離染得,亦可言生得。」《婆沙》既解色界聞慧非我行相,若加行得者生彼便得,若生得者亦言生方得。明知身在下地不得起上聞慧。若先已得,如何論言生彼便得?古德皆言:身在欲界修習色界聞慧非我觀,生彼即得者。不然,若言先得,何須復言生彼即得?又《婆沙》云「問:云何起非我行相耶?答:若生欲界起欲、色界非我行相,俱能緣一切法。若生初靜慮起初靜慮非我行相,不定者亦能緣一切法,定者唯緣從初靜慮乃至有頂。起上三靜慮非我行相,亦唯能緣從初靜慮乃至有頂。若生第二靜慮起第二靜慮非我行相,不定者能緣一切法,定者唯緣從第二靜慮乃至有頂。起第三、第四靜慮非我行相,亦唯能緣從第二靜慮乃至有頂。若生第三、第四靜慮,如理應說。」《婆沙》既言身生此地起此地非我觀分定、不定。若起上地非我觀,唯約定心緣自、上地,不言不定。以此故知,身生下地不起上地聞慧非我觀。聞慧非我既不得起,所餘聞慧唯皆不起。

On the passage beginning with "The treatise states: ... [otherwise] one should simultaneously be freed from defilement": when one contemplates all phenomena with conventional cognition as non-self, one's own category is still excluded; "one's own category" means such phenomena as its own nature and the like. "Its own nature" refers to the own-nature of conventional cognition; "associated" refers to the mind and mental factors associated with conventional cognition; "co-existent" refers to the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena] simultaneous with conventional cognition. Therefore, the "Miscellaneous Chapter" of the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya states: "It also does not take the co-existent as object, because they have the same single fruit." Or it may be said that when this treatise speaks of "co-existent phenomena," it also subsumes acquisition (prāpti), because acquisition is also extremely adjacent. When the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya speaks of "having the same single fruit," among the unassociated formations it is speaking provisionally based on what is directly intimate. Or the intentions of the treatises are distinct. Question: Why, in the Mahāvibhāṣā's contemplation of non-self, does it say: "Question: What are called co-existent phenomena? Answer: Matter that conforms to this [mind], and conditioned factors unassociated [with mind] that conform to this [mind]"? According to the Mahāvibhāṣā, this also extends to matter; why does [the Kośa] only speak of the four characteristics? Explanation: Conventional cognition in this treatise is [confined to] hearing and reflection in a dispersed state, and therefore it does not speak of matter. Conventional cognition in the Mahāvibhāṣā also extends to wisdom derived from cultivation, and therefore it additionally speaks of matter. The intentions of the treatises differ, so there is no need to harmonize them. Furthermore, the ninth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "'Not knowing its own nature' refutes the Mahāsāṃghika tenet. 'Not knowing associated phenomena' refutes the Dharmaguptaka tenet. 'Not knowing co-existent phenomena' refutes the Mahīśāsaka tenet. Saying that cognition is capable of knowing refutes the Vātsīputrīya tenet." (End of treatise passage). An object is the cognitive object taken; a possessor of an object is the cognition capable of taking the object. Because object and possessor of an object are distinct, it does not take its own nature as object. If it were to take its own nature as object, there would be no distinction between them; because they have the same single cognitive object, it does not take associated phenomena as object. Just as when a crowd of people simultaneously looks at the crescent moon, they do not see each other's faces; because they are extremely adjacent, it does not take co-existent phenomena as object. Just as the eye does not see visual form immediately adjacent to the eye faculty, therefore the three phenomena of the moment are not cognitive objects of this cognition; this cognition is subsumed solely under the realm of desire and the realm of form. It is produced from hearing and reflection, not produced from cultivation, because that which is produced from cultivation takes objects according to distinct stages and cannot take objects collectively. If it were otherwise, cultivation would be capable of taking [all objects] simultaneously, and one should simultaneously be freed from defilement. Nyāyānusāra fascicle seventy-four refutes this, saying: "This is unreasonable. The statement that what is produced from cultivation takes objects solely according to distinct stages is not established by consensus (apriddha). For our school maintains that the wisdom produced from cultivation subsumed under the dhyāna stages contains that which is capable of taking objects collectively according to the personal basis and its own and higher stages. Only by being repulsed by the lower and delighting in the higher can one be freed from defilement; since this collective apprehension is purely an aspect of delight, it possesses no function in the removal of defilement. Therefore, all that he has said is unreasonable." If a Kośa master were to defend it, he would say: "That wisdom produced from cultivation is capable of collective apprehension is also not established by consensus, because our school does not accept that cultivation takes objects collectively." This is merely a divergence between schools, so there is no need to harmonize them. If one follows the Sarvāstivāda school, the contemplation of non-self also extends to wisdom from cultivation. Hence Nyāyānusāra fascicle seventy-four states: "This cognition is subsumed solely under the realm of desire and the realm of form. Although there are kinds like this in the formless realm, they take few phenomena as objects, which is not what is elucidated here. This extends to wisdom produced from hearing, reflection, and cultivation, for all of them are capable of taking all phenomena as objects while excluding their own category." Furthermore, the tenth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā, explaining the contemplation of non-self, states: "That which is produced from hearing, reflection, and cultivation extends to all three kinds." It also says: "As for stage, this aspect occurs in seven stages: the realm of desire, the threshold, the intermediate dhyāna, and the four root dhyānas; this is spoken generally. If spoken specifically, wisdom produced from hearing is solely in five stages: the realm of desire and the four dhyānas. Wisdom produced from reflection is solely in the realm of desire. Wisdom produced from cultivation is solely in six stages: that is, among the aforementioned seven stages, excluding the realm of desire." Moreover, according to the Mahāvibhāṣā, under the heading of stages, wisdom from hearing does not extend to the threshold or the intermediate [dhyāna]. Question: If, following the later text of the Mahāvibhāṣā explaining the three wisdoms, one [opinion] says: "Wisdom from hearing is solely in five stages: the realm of desire and the four dhyānas"; someone says: "It is in six stages: the preceding five and intermediate dhyāna"; and someone says: "It is in seven stages: the preceding six and the threshold"; yet there is no arbitrating master—which is correct? Explanation: Since the preceding passage of the Mahāvibhāṣā presents no differing view, following the five stages is correct. Another explanation: if based on the contemplation of non-self and the like, superior wisdom from hearing is solely in the five stages; if based on what ordinary practitioners arouse, it also extends to the threshold and intermediate [dhyāna]. If explained in this way, both may be admitted as correct. Question: When one's person is born in a lower stage, does one arouse wisdom from hearing belonging to a higher stage? Explanation: One does not. As the tenth fascicle of the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "As for being acquired through preparation, acquired through detachment, and acquired through birth, it may be said to extend to all three kinds. This is spoken generally. If spoken specifically, the aspect of non-self produced from hearing and reflection in the desire realm is acquired solely through preparation; the aspect of non-self produced from hearing in the form realm may be said to be acquired through preparation and may be said to be acquired through birth. How can it be said to be acquired through preparation? If one has well practiced self-characteristics and common characteristics in this [realm], when born in that [realm] one acquires it; if not, when born in that [realm] one does not acquire it. How can it be said to be acquired through birth? Although one has well practiced in this [realm], if one has not yet been born in that [realm], one can never acquire it; only when born there does one acquire it. This is because that aspect of non-self produced from hearing must rely upon the preparation practiced here to be acquired upon birth there. The aspect of non-self produced from cultivation in the form realm is acquired through preparation and acquired through detachment, and may also be said to be acquired through birth." Since the Mahāvibhāṣā explains that for the aspect of non-self of wisdom from hearing in the form realm, if it is acquired through preparation one acquires it upon birth there, and if it is acquired through birth it also says one acquires it only upon birth, it is clear that when one's person is in a lower stage, one cannot arouse wisdom from hearing of a higher stage. If it were already acquired previously, why would the treatise say that one acquires it upon birth there? The ancient masters all said: "When one's person is in the desire realm practicing the contemplation of non-self of wisdom from hearing belonging to the form realm, one acquires it upon birth there." This is not so; if one says it was acquired previously, why would it need to say again that one acquires it upon birth there? Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā states: "Question: How is the aspect of non-self aroused? Answer: If born in the realm of desire, one arouses the aspects of non-self of the realm of desire and the realm of form, both being capable of taking all phenomena as objects. If born in the first dhyāna, one arouses the aspect of non-self of the first dhyāna: that which is non-concentrated is also capable of taking all phenomena as objects; that which is concentrated takes as objects solely from the first dhyāna up to the peak of existence. When one arouses the aspect of non-self of the upper three dhyānas, it also is solely capable of taking as objects from the first dhyāna up to the peak of existence. If born in the second dhyāna, one arouses the aspect of non-self of the second dhyāna: that which is non-concentrated is capable of taking all phenomena as objects; that which is concentrated takes as objects solely from the second dhyāna up to the peak of existence. When one arouses the aspect of non-self of the third and fourth dhyānas, it also is solely capable of taking as objects from the second dhyāna up to the peak of existence. If born in the third or fourth dhyāna, it should be explained accordingly." Since the Mahāvibhāṣā states that when one's person is born in this stage and arouses the contemplation of non-self of this stage, it distinguishes between concentrated and non-concentrated, but if one arouses the contemplation of non-self of a higher stage, it speaks solely of the concentrated mind taking its own and higher stages as objects and does not speak of the non-concentrated, from this we know that when one's person is born in a lower stage, one does not arouse the contemplation of non-self of wisdom from hearing belonging to a higher stage. Since non-self of wisdom from hearing cannot be aroused, all other wisdom from hearing likewise cannot be aroused.

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