俱舍論記 26.29

26.29

「盡無生智至名無生智」者，此即第二明盡、無生別。引本論文顯二智別。智謂決斷，或謂重知。見謂推求，或謂現照。明謂照明。覺謂覺悟。解謂達解。慧謂簡擇。光謂慧光。觀謂觀察。智等八種，竝慧異名。《正理》七十三云「何緣論說無生智中復作是言：我已知苦等。理但應說不復更知等，二行不應俱時轉故。若次第轉，前與盡智無差別故，不應重說。應知此說意為遣疑。恐有生疑：如時解脫先起盡智、後得無生，如是應許不時解脫先起無生、後得盡智。為顯一切盡智先起，故復先說已知等言。或先但言我已知等，顯時解脫唯有盡智。後復重言我已知等，顯不時解脫盡後起無生。故雖重言，而無有失。無生智者，何謂無生？正理師言：謂非擇滅，有無生故此智得生，智託無生名無生智。滅雖常有而得非常，得彼滅時此智方轉，要由得起方名有滅，於有滅位此智方生。或無生言目彼滅得，如涅槃得亦名涅槃，經說以涅槃置在心中故。有彼得位此智方生，智託無生名無生智。有餘於此作是難言：若託無生名無生智，則無生智緣非諦法，是則所說違害自宗，無漏慧生唯緣四諦。彼不審察設此難詞，我上已言於出觀後方起如是分別智故。或此託聲是有第七，非境第七，如盡智故。或許此智緣無生得，此苦諦攝，非非諦故（已上論文）。」

Regarding "Knowledge of exhaustion and knowledge of non-origination ... is named knowledge of non-origination": this is the second section, which clarifies the distinction between [the knowledges of] exhaustion and non-origination. It cites the root treatise to show the distinction between the two knowledges. Knowledge (jñāna) means decisive judgment, or it means knowing again. View (dṛṣṭi) means investigation, or it means direct illumination. Understanding (vidyā) means illumination. Awakening (bodhi) means awakening. Comprehension (adhigama) means penetrating comprehension. Wisdom (prajñā) means discerning selection. Light (prabhā) means the light of wisdom. Contemplation (vipaśyanā) means observation. The eight terms, beginning with knowledge, are all alternative names for wisdom. Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 73, says: "For what reason does the treatise, in the context of the knowledge of non-origination, again state: 'I have known suffering,' and so forth? In principle, it should only say 'I will not know it again,' and so forth, because the two modes of activity should not operate simultaneously. If they operate sequentially, since the former would not differ from the knowledge of exhaustion, it should not be stated repeatedly. It should be understood that this statement is intended to dispel doubt. For fear that someone might raise the doubt: 'Just as one who is liberated at [certain] times first produces the knowledge of exhaustion and later attains non-origination, so should it be accepted that one who is liberated without regard to time first produces non-origination and later attains the knowledge of exhaustion.' In order to show that in all cases the knowledge of exhaustion arises first, it therefore again first states the words 'I have known,' and so forth. Or, first stating only 'I have known,' and so forth, shows that one who is liberated at [certain] times possesses only the knowledge of exhaustion. Later repeating the words 'I have known,' and so forth, shows that for one who is liberated without regard to time, after exhaustion, non-origination arises. Therefore, although it is repeated, there is no fault. As for 'knowledge of non-origination,' what is meant by 'non-origination'? The masters of the Nyāyānusāra say: it refers to analytical cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha); because there is non-origination, this knowledge is able to arise; because the knowledge relies on non-origination, it is named the knowledge of non-origination. Although cessation is eternal, its acquisition is not eternal; only when one acquires that cessation does this knowledge operate; it is necessarily due to the arising of acquisition that there is said to be cessation, and at the stage where there is cessation, this knowledge arises. Or, the word 'non-origination' designates the acquisition of that cessation, just as the acquisition of nirvāṇa is also named nirvāṇa, since the sūtra speaks of placing nirvāṇa in the mind. At the stage where there is that acquisition, this knowledge arises; because the knowledge relies on non-origination, it is named the knowledge of non-origination. Others raise this objection here: 'If relying on non-origination it is named the knowledge of non-origination, then the knowledge of non-origination takes a dharma that is not a truth as its objective domain; if so, what you say contradicts your own tenet, for the arising of undefiled wisdom takes only the four truths as its objective domain.' They make this objection without careful examination, for I have already stated above that only after emerging from contemplation does such discriminative knowledge arise. Or, this expression 'relies on' has the sense of a locative of existence, not a locative of the objective domain, just as with the knowledge of exhaustion. Or, it is accepted that this knowledge takes the acquisition of non-origination as its objective domain, and since this is subsumed under the truth of suffering, it is not a non-truth (end of the treatise text)."