俱舍論記 26.76

26.76

「前說一切至名有貪心」者，論主前難權許第二師解，今還徵破。前說一切貪所繫心皆名有貪心，貪繫是何義？牒計徵問。若貪得隨故名貪所繫，有學無漏心應名有貪心，貪得隨故。若貪所緣故名貪所繫，無學有漏心應名有貪心，亦為他人貪所緣故。若不許彼無學有漏心為貪所緣，云何彼心可成有漏？汝若轉計言謂無學有漏心，由為見等共相惑緣故名有漏心，不為貪等自相惑緣故不名有貪心。不為貪緣可非有貪，既為無明共相惑緣應名有癡，癡所緣故。復以理破：然他心智不緣貪得，亦不可說緣彼緣心之貪。既不得緣，寧知他心是有貪等？故非貪繫名有貪心。以彼釋經亦不得意，故今論主復敘徵破。

Regarding [the text from] “It was said earlier that all” up to “is called a mind with lust”: the author of the treatise previously refuted [the first] and provisionally accepted the second master's interpretation, but now questions and refutes it in turn. It was said earlier that every mind bound by lust is called a 'mind with lust'. What does 'bound by lust' mean? He cites the thesis to interrogate it: If it is called bound by lust because the acquisition (prāpti) of lust follows it, then the undefiled mind of a learner (śaikṣa) should be called a mind with lust, because the acquisition of lust follows it. If it is called bound by lust because it is an object of lust, then the defiled/sāsrava mind of one beyond training (aśaikṣa) should be called a mind with lust, because it is also the object of another person's lust. If you do not accept that the sāsrava mind of that one beyond training is an object of lust, how could that mind be established as sāsrava? If you shift your position and say that the sāsrava mind of one beyond training is called a sāsrava mind because it is taken as an object by afflictions of common characteristics, such as views, and is not called a mind with lust because it is not taken as an object by afflictions of specific characteristics, such as lust: even if it is not an object of lust and may thus not be with lust, since it is an object of the affliction of common characteristics, ignorance, it ought to be called a mind with delusion, because it is an object of delusion. Furthermore, he refutes it by reasoning: However, knowledge of another's mind does not take the acquisition of lust as an object, nor can it be said to take as an object the lust that takes that mind as its object. Since it cannot take these as its object, how could it know that another's mind is with lust or the like? Therefore, being bound by lust does not define a mind with lust. Because that interpretation of the sūtra also misses the intention, the author of the treatise now restates and interrogates to refute it.