俱舍論記 28.157

28.157

「此四相望至謂自非餘」者，釋後兩句。此四相望互相生者，初能生二，謂順退分及順住分；不生後二，以隔遠故。諸論皆同。第二生三，除順決擇，亦隔遠故。諸論皆同。第三生三，除順退分，以隔遠故。《婆沙》十一、《正理》、《顯宗》皆同此論。若依《婆沙》一百六十五即有異說，故彼論云「順勝進分與順退分，有說：但為所緣、增上。順勝進分無間，順退分不現前故。如是說者亦現在前，是故與順退分為三緣。除因緣，以彼劣故。與順住分亦爾。」《婆沙》兩說，後說評家、《俱舍》等前師不正義，但生三種，評家生四種。既有評文，即以後師為正。或論意各別，《俱舍》以理為正，非以《婆沙》評家為量。夫淨相生，理應隣次，何容超越？第四生一，謂自非餘，以欣無漏不生餘故。問：順住、勝進能次生前，何故決擇非生勝進？解云：決擇欣無漏，不生次前。住與勝進非欣無漏，容次生前。或勝進相欣求上法，性非止息，故決擇分不生勝進。住、退二分性有止息，可從勝進生，住住、生退分。《正理》、《顯宗》皆有兩說，一說同此論，又一說云「有說亦生順勝進分。」然無評家。後家意說：如住、勝進能生前一，順決擇分亦生前一。若依《婆沙》十一，同《正理》後師。若依《婆沙》一百六十五云「順決擇分與順住分，有說：但為所緣、增上，以順決擇分無間，順住分不現前故。如是說者亦現在前，是故與彼為三緣，除因緣。與順勝進分亦爾。」前說同《正理》後師能生二分，後正義家能生三分。問：何故《婆沙》後唯生一，前有超一？解云：起勝生難，故唯生一。起劣生易，有能超一。問：諸論不同，何者為正？解云：《婆沙》既有評家，生三為正。餘論并是述異師義，或論意別。《俱舍》以理為正，非以《婆沙》評家為量。問：味定生淨定，四分之中生何分耶？解云：若味生自淨，《婆沙》云「有說：味相應等至無間唯起順退分現在前。有說：亦起順住分。」然無評家。若味生下淨，《婆沙》云「有說：起順住分，以易起故。有說：起順勝進分，防護上地故（然無評家）。」

Regarding 'When these four are considered with respect to one another ... namely, itself and none other': this explains the last two lines [of the verse]. When these four produce one another when considered mutually, the first can produce two, namely, the part conducive to deterioration and the part conducive to maintenance; it does not produce the latter two because they are too distant. All treatises agree on this. The second produces three, excluding the [part] conducive to penetration, also because it is too distant. All treatises agree on this. The third produces three, excluding the [part] conducive to deterioration, because it is too distant. Fascicle 11 of the *Vibhāṣā*, the *Nyāyānusāra*, and the *Xianzong* all agree with this treatise. However, following fascicle 165 of the *Vibhāṣā*, there is a different explanation; for that treatise states: 'Between the part conducive to excellence and the part conducive to deterioration: Some say: It serves only as an object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) and a predominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), because immediately following the part conducive to excellence, the part conducive to deterioration does not become manifest. The definitive statement is: It also becomes manifest; therefore, with respect to the part conducive to deterioration, it serves as three conditions, excluding the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), because the former is inferior. It is likewise with the part conducive to maintenance.' There are two explanations in the *Vibhāṣā*; the latter explanation is the judgment of the evaluators (vibhāṣā-kāra), while the *Kośa* and others follow the incorrect doctrine of the former master, [holding that it] produces only three kinds, whereas the evaluators [hold that it] produces four kinds. Since there is an evaluative text, the latter master is taken as correct. Alternatively, the intentions of the treatises differ: the *Kośa* takes reason as correct and does not take the evaluators of the *Vibhāṣā* as standard. As for the arising of pure states from one another, in reason they should be adjacent; how could they permit leaping over? The fourth produces one, namely itself and none other, because longing for the uncontaminated, it does not produce others. Question: The [parts] conducive to maintenance and excellence can immediately produce the preceding [part]; why does the [part conducive to] penetration not produce the [part conducive to] excellence? Explanation: The [part conducive to] penetration longs for the uncontaminated and does not produce the one immediately preceding. Maintenance and excellence do not long for the uncontaminated, so they may produce the one immediately preceding. Alternatively, the characteristic of excellence is to long for higher dharmas and its nature is not quiescence; therefore, the part conducive to penetration does not produce excellence. The two parts of maintenance and deterioration have quiescence as their nature, so from excellence they may be produced, [one] abiding in maintenance and producing the part of deterioration. Both the *Nyāyānusāra* and the *Xianzong* give two explanations; one explanation agrees with this treatise, while another explanation says: 'Some say: It also produces the part conducive to excellence.' Yet there is no evaluator's judgment. The intention of the latter school is: just as maintenance and excellence can produce the preceding one, the part conducive to penetration also produces the preceding one. If one follows fascicle 11 of the *Vibhāṣā*, it agrees with the latter master of the *Nyāyānusāra*. If one follows fascicle 165 of the *Vibhāṣā*, it says: 'Between the part conducive to penetration and the part conducive to maintenance: Some say: It serves only as an object-condition and a predominant condition, because immediately following the part conducive to penetration, the part conducive to maintenance does not become manifest. The definitive statement is: It also becomes manifest; therefore, with respect to it, it serves as three conditions, excluding the cause-condition. It is likewise with the part conducive to excellence.' The former explanation agrees with the latter master of the *Nyāyānusāra* that it can produce two parts; the latter, orthodox school holds that it can produce three parts. Question: Why in the *Vibhāṣā* does the last produce only one, while earlier there is skipping one? Explanation: Arising into what is superior is difficult, hence it produces only one; arising into what is inferior is easy, hence there is the ability to skip one. Question: Treatises differ; which is correct? Explanation: Since the *Vibhāṣā* has an evaluator's judgment, producing three is correct. The other treatises both relate the doctrines of different masters, or the treatises have different intents. The *Kośa* takes reason as correct, not taking the evaluators of the *Vibhāṣā* as standard. Question: When contemplation tainted with attachment produces pure contemplation, which among the four parts does it produce? Explanation: If attachment produces its own pure [state], the *Vibhāṣā* says: 'Some say: Immediately following meditative attainment associated with attachment, only the part conducive to deterioration arises and becomes manifest. Some say: The part conducive to maintenance also arises.' Yet there is no evaluator's judgment. If attachment produces a lower pure [state], the *Vibhāṣā* says: 'Some say: It gives rise to the part conducive to maintenance, because it is easy to arise. Some say: It gives rise to the part conducive to excellence, in order to guard the higher stage (yet there is no evaluator's judgment).'