俱舍論記 28.45

28.45

「若謂經說至超色想等」者，牒救徵破。汝若謂經說有一類天超段食故，又說彼天喜為食故，說段食上界非有，無斯過者，則無色界不應有色。汝引二經證上二界無有段食，我引三經證無色界而無有色，契經說彼無色界中出離色故。若彼界中猶有色者，何名出離？又契經云四無色解脫最為寂靜，超諸色故。既云超諸色，明知彼無色。又契經說無色有情一切色想皆超越故。斷緣色貪，名超色想。或據四根本及上三邊既超色想，明非有色。若無色界如汝所執實有色者，定應彼色自相可知，如何可言超色想？等，等取前二經。

Regarding 'If it is claimed that the sūtras state... transcending ideations of form, and so on': this takes up their defense, interrogates, and refutes it. If you claim that because the sūtras say a certain class of devas transcends material food, and also say that these devas take joy as food, it is said that material food does not exist in the higher realms without incurring this error, then the formless realm should not have form. You cite two sūtras to prove that the higher two realms lack material food; I cite three sūtras to prove that the formless realm lacks form: [1] The sūtras say that in that formless realm there is emancipation from form. If there were still form in that realm, how could it be called 'emancipation'? [2] Furthermore, a sūtra says that the four formless liberations are the most tranquil because they transcend forms. Since it says they 'transcend forms', it is clearly known that they lack form. [3] Furthermore, a sūtra says that sentient beings of the formless realm transcend all ideations of form. Severing attachment that takes form as its object is called 'transcending ideations of form'. Or, based on the fact that the four fundamental states and the upper three access states transcend ideations of form, it is clear that form does not exist. If the formless realm truly had form as you maintain, its form would certainly have an observable intrinsic characteristic; how then could it be said to 'transcend ideations of form'? 'And so on' includes the previous two sūtras.