俱舍論記 28.92

28.92

「起不俱時至不能說過故」者，經部答。於前後位起不俱時，或說有漏、或說無漏。斯有何失？汝若謂意喜及身識樂不俱起故，初定應無五支理，二定應無四支理者。此亦無過，一地前後約容有說有喜、樂支。如有尋、伺，雖一地有二不俱起。汝若謂尋、伺亦許俱起，於彼喜、樂不俱起法為喻不成。經部救云：此非不成。心之麁細互相違故，不應俱起。又於尋、伺不俱起法，汝說一切有部不能說過故。既不能出過，為喻還成。

Regarding the passage "Their arising is not simultaneous... because you cannot state a fault": The Sautrāntika answers: In preceding and subsequent states their arising is not simultaneous, and it is said to be either tainted or untainted. What fault is there in this? If you say that because mental joy and the pleasure of body-consciousness do not arise simultaneously, the first absorption should logically have no five factors, and the second absorption should logically have no four factors: This is also without fault; within a single stage, with respect to preceding and subsequent moments, it is spoken of in terms of admissible existence that there are the factors of joy and pleasure. Just as with investigation and scrutiny: although both exist in a single stage, the two do not arise simultaneously. If you say that investigation and scrutiny are also admitted to arise simultaneously, so that using them as an analogy for joy and pleasure not arising simultaneously is invalid: The Sautrāntika rescues [his position], saying: This is not invalid. Because the coarseness and subtlety of mind are mutually opposed, they should not arise simultaneously. Furthermore, regarding the principle that investigation and scrutiny do not arise simultaneously, you, the Sarvāstivāda, cannot state a fault. Since you cannot produce a fault, the analogy remains valid.