俱舍論記 29.14

29.14

「喜即喜受」，釋第四句中喜喜。此論喜無量以喜受為體。又《婆沙》一百四十一云「喜謂慶慰作意相應喜根為性。有餘師說：以善心所中欣為自性（然無評家）。」若依《正理》七十九「出喜體性，三說不同。一以喜受為體、二以欣為體、三以無貪為體。」然彼論意破初說，存後兩家。故彼論云「諸古師說喜即喜受。何緣觀行者爾時喜受生？若緣與樂與慈無異，若緣拔苦應與悲同。又契經言欣故生喜，喜即喜受。如先已說。此喜行相與彼欣同，喜故生喜，義有何異？若言下、上義有異者，輕安與樂義亦應然，差別因緣不可得故。又違本論，云何名喜？謂喜喜相應受、想、行、識等。此中意顯喜俱品法喜增上故，總立喜名。非受受俱，其理決定。若喜即喜受，何言與受俱？若言對法以理為量，應知無過誦本論文。此亦不然，理為量論，要有經證方可定文。若與經違，理必可壞，不應隨意輒改論文。是故此喜定非喜受，以欣為體，或即無貪。謂別有貪是惡心所，於有情類作是思惟：云何當令諸所有樂，彼不能得，皆屬於我？喜能治彼，故是無貪，此與喜根必俱行故，三地可得，如悔憂俱。喜亦無貪。分明相者，於他盛事心不貪著，於他獲得深生欣慰，心熱對治說名為喜。故知此喜亦無貪性（以上論文）。」問：諸論不同，何者為正？解云：《正理》既有立破，即以彼為正。又解：《俱舍》為正，無異說故。又當《婆沙》初師說故，說喜為欣乃當《婆沙》餘師義故。與樂拔苦俱是無瞋，喜是喜受，體性各別。如何此中舉以為難？又喜與欣名義俱別，寧言喜行與彼欣同？說喜喜受，名、義、行相皆順契經。本論非經，無勞會釋。若必須釋，自有明文，故《婆沙》八十一通《品類足》云「彼文應說：謂喜及喜相應想、行、識，不應言受。而言受者，是誦者謬。復次彼論總說五蘊為喜無量自性，雖喜受與受不相應，而餘心、心所法與受相應。故作是說，亦不違理（已上論文）。」若言前解改論文故我已破者，此乃自破《毘婆沙》義。雖欲意違《俱舍》，何故返害自師？《婆沙》後釋不改論文足通《品類》，何故隱而將不通釋？又言無貪為喜無量。此亦非理，一即無文可證、二即名義全殊。曲解順情將為未可。如悔憂俱，二唯欲界。無貪喜俱三地可得，此無貪性應不通上。喜唯三地本由喜根，非喜為性，言無貪者有何意趣？良恐臆度，無真理、教。

"Appreciative joy is joyful feeling" explains the joy of sympathetic joy (muditā) in the fourth line. In this śāstra, the immeasurable of sympathetic joy has joyful feeling (saumanasya-vedanā) as its essence. Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 141, says: "Sympathetic joy has as its nature the faculty of joy (saumanasyendriya) associated with mental application of celebration. Other masters say: It has gladness (pramodya) among wholesome mental factors as its intrinsic nature (however, there is no critical assessor's decision)." If one relies on Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 79: "Presenting the intrinsic nature of sympathetic joy, there are three differing theories: (1) having joyful feeling as its essence, (2) having gladness as its essence, and (3) having non-greed (alobha) as its essence." However, that treatise intends to refute the first theory and preserve the latter two schools. Hence that treatise says: "Ancient masters said that sympathetic joy is joyful feeling. From what cause does joyful feeling arise in the practitioner at that time? If its object is conferring happiness, it would not differ from benevolence; if its object is eliminating suffering, it should be identical to compassion. Furthermore, the sūtras say: 'Because of gladness, joy arises.' Joy is joyful feeling. As was explained before, this mental aspect of joy is identical with that gladness; if joy produces joy, what difference in meaning would there be? If it is argued that the lower and upper stages have different meanings, the same should apply to pliancy (praśrabdhi) and happiness (sukha), because a differentiating causal factor cannot be found. Moreover, this contradicts the root treatise: 'What is called joy? It refers to feeling, ideation, mental formations, and consciousness associated with appreciative joy, etc.' Here the intention is to show that because joy is predominant among the dharmas belonging to the same group as joy, the name 'joy' is collectively established for them. It is definitely not the case that a feeling is associated with a feeling; this principle is conclusive. If appreciative joy is itself joyful feeling, why say it is associated with feeling? If it is said that the Abhidharma takes reasoning as its authority, and that one should know the recitation of the root treatise text is without error, this is also incorrect. A treatise taking reasoning as authority must have sūtra verification before a text can be settled. If it contradicts the sūtras, reasoning will inevitably be undermined; one should not arbitrarily change the treatise text at will. Therefore, this joy is definitely not joyful feeling; it has gladness as its essence, or else it is non-greed. That is, there is a separate greed, which is an unwholesome mental factor that thinks with regard to sentient beings: 'How can it be arranged that whatever happiness exists, they may not attain it and it will all belong to me?' Sympathetic joy counteracts that [greed]; therefore it is non-greed. Because this necessarily accompanies the faculty of joy, it is obtainable in the three grounds, just as regret accompanies sorrow. Appreciative joy is also non-greed. Its distinct characteristic is: the mind does not greedily cling to another's flourishing, but generates deep gladness and comfort over what another has attained; being an antidote to feverish distress of the mind, it is called sympathetic joy. Hence we know that this joy also has the nature of non-greed (the above is the śāstra text)." Question: The various treatises differ; which is correct? An explanation says: Since the Nyāyānusāra establishes [its own thesis] and refutes [others], that one should be taken as correct. Another explanation says: The Kośa is correct, because there are no differing views [within its school]. Moreover, it corresponds to the first master's position in the Mahāvibhāṣā, whereas explaining joy as gladness corresponds only to other masters in the Mahāvibhāṣā. Conferring happiness and eliminating suffering are both non-ill will, while sympathetic joy is joyful feeling, so their intrinsic natures are completely distinct. How could one raise this here as an objection? Furthermore, joy and gladness are distinct in both name and meaning; how could one say that the mental aspect of joy is identical to that gladness? Stating that sympathetic joy is joyful feeling accords with the sūtras in name, meaning, and mental aspect. The root treatise is not a sūtra, so there is no need to reconcile it. If it must be explained, there is already an explicit text; thus Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 81, clarifying the Prakaraṇapāda, says: "That text should say: 'It refers to appreciative joy, and to ideation, mental formations, and consciousness associated with appreciative joy'; it should not say 'feeling.' Saying 'feeling' is an error of the reciters. Furthermore, that treatise generally describes the five skandhas as the intrinsic nature of the immeasurable of sympathetic joy; although joyful feeling is not associated with feeling, the remaining consciousness and mental factors are associated with feeling. Therefore, making this statement also does not contradict reason (the above is the śāstra text)." If it is said: "Because the former explanation alters the treatise text, I have already refuted it," then this actually refutes the meaning of the Mahāvibhāṣā itself. While intending to contradict the Kośa, why turn back and harm one's own teacher? The latter explanation of the Mahāvibhāṣā does not alter the treatise text and sufficiently clarifies the Prakaraṇa; why conceal it and bring forward the unresolvable explanation? Furthermore, the claim that non-greed is the immeasurable of sympathetic joy is also unreasonable: first, there is no textual evidence for it, and second, their names and meanings are completely different. Forcing a reading to suit one's bias should be deemed unacceptable. Just as regret accompanies sorrow, both belonging exclusively to the desire realm; non-greed accompanying joy is obtainable across the three grounds, so this nature of non-greed should not extend to higher realms. That joy is found only in the three grounds is fundamentally due to the faculty of joy, not because joy is its nature; what purpose is there in calling it non-greed? One truly fears this is sheer conjecture, lacking genuine reason and scriptural authority.