俱舍論記 30.15

30.15

「又汝所引至亦如心等」者，論主又約喻破。又汝所引祠者等生，其體是何，而能喻我？汝若執祠者是我，喻不極成，我不許有實我體故。若執祠者是心、心所，彼念念滅，新新生故，取捨不成。若許祠者即是色身，亦如心等，彼念念滅、新新生故，取捨不成。

"Furthermore, regarding what you have cited... is also like the mind and so on": the author of the treatise also refutes by analyzing the examples. Furthermore, regarding the 'sacrificer born' and so on cited by you, what is their substance such that they can serve as an example for the self? If you hold that the sacrificer is the self, the example is unestablished, because I do not accept that there is a real substance of self. If you hold that the sacrificer is mind and mental factors, they perish moment by moment and arise anew moment by moment, so taking up and relinquishing cannot be established. If you accept that the sacrificer is the physical body, it is also like the mind and so on: perishing moment by moment and arising anew moment by moment, taking up and relinquishing cannot be established.