俱舍論記 30.25

30.25

「亦觀問者至佛不答有無」者，論主答。亦觀問者阿世邪故。問者或於諸蘊相續假謂命者，依之發問。佛若答無，彼墮邪見，故佛不說。何不為說假名命者？彼未能了緣起甚深諸法理故、非是能受正法器故，佛不為說假有命者。理必應爾，世尊說故。筏蹉，此云犢子。筏蹉外道請問世尊：我於世間為有非有？佛不為記。若記為有，違法真理；若說為無，增彼愚惑。彼便謂我先有今斷，便起斷見。以彼斷見對執有愚。此愚更甚，以愚重故。謂執有我則墮常邊，若執無我便墮斷邊。執有過輕，執無過重。如經廣說：寧起我見如須彌，不起斷見如芥子。以起我見能修諸善，故過是輕。以起斷見能造眾惡，故過是重。故佛不為說無我也。依如是不可說義故，經部中鳩摩邏多有是頌言。初頌總說，後頌別釋。觀為見所傷，不為說有；及壞諸善業，不為說無。故佛說正法，不急不緩。猶如牡虎銜子相似，緩急得所。太急即傷，太緩即墮。佛若說有我，彼執真我有，則為見所傷。見如牙利能傷人故。此釋初句。佛若說無我，彼撥俗我為無，便壞業子。善業如子，名善業子。釋第二句。依如是理，故今論主復說頌言，重攝前義。就四頌中，初兩句頌前命者與身不一不異，次六句頌前佛何不說命者都無，乃至彼墮邪見故佛不說者。就六句中，前兩句總頌，後四句別釋。恐彼問者撥無假我，佛亦不說命者都無。謂諸五蘊相續道中，有業有果假名命者。佛若為說無有命者，恐彼問者撥假命者亦為無故，不說都無。第三行頌前彼未能了緣起理故，非受正法器，不為說假有。世尊不說諸蘊之中有假命者，由觀問者無有力能悟解緣起真空理故，故不為說。第四行頌前筏蹉經，佛觀筏蹉意樂差別。彼問世尊有我、無我，佛不答彼有我、無我。

Regarding 'Also observing the inquirer's [intention ...] the Buddha did not answer whether it exists or not': the author of the treatise replies. It is also because he observed the inquirer's intention (āśaya). The inquirer perhaps designated a nominal 'vital principle' based on the continuum of the aggregates and raised the question on that basis. If the Buddha had answered that it does not exist, that person would have fallen into wrong views; hence the Buddha did not say [so]. Why did he not explain to him that the vital principle is nominally existent? Because he had not yet understood the profound principle of all phenomena being dependently originated and was not a vessel capable of receiving the correct Dharma, the Buddha did not explain to him that the vital principle is nominally existent. The principle must necessarily be so, because the World-Honoured One spoke [as follows]. Vatsa means 'calf' in Chinese. The wanderer Vatsagotra asked the World-Honoured One: 'Does my self exist in the world, or does it not exist?' The Buddha did not declare [an answer] to him. If he had declared it to exist, it would contradict the true reality of dharmas; if he had stated it not to exist, it would increase that person's delusion and confusion. He would then think, 'My self existed previously and is now annihilated,' and would generate the view of annihilationism. This view of annihilationism is contrasted with the delusion of grasping at existence: this delusion [of annihilationism] is even more severe, because its delusion is grave. That is to say, grasping that a self exists falls into the extreme of eternalism, while grasping that there is no self falls into the extreme of annihilationism. The fault of grasping at existence is lighter; the fault of grasping at non-existence is heavier. As the sūtra explains in detail: It is better to give rise to the view of self as large as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to the view of annihilationism as small as a mustard seed. Because generating the view of self still allows one to cultivate various good deeds, its fault is lighter. Because generating the view of annihilationism causes one to commit many evils, its fault is heavier. Therefore the Buddha did not state for him that there is no self. Relying on such an inexpressible principle, Kumāralāta of the Sautrāntika school uttered this verse. The first verse speaks generally, and the second verse explains specifically: Observing that one would be harmed by [false] views, he did not teach existence; and observing that good karma would be destroyed, he did not teach non-existence. Thus the Buddha taught the correct Dharma neither too tightly nor too loosely. It is just like a tigress holding her cub in her mouth: tightness and looseness are properly adjusted. If too tight, it is harmed; if too loose, it drops. If the Buddha had said that the self exists, that person would grasp that a real self exists and would thus be harmed by views, because views are sharp like teeth and capable of harming people. This explains the first line. If the Buddha had said that there is no self, that person would reject the conventional self as non-existent and would thereby destroy the child of karma. Wholesome karma is like a child, hence called 'the child of wholesome karma'. This explains the second line. Relying on such a principle, the author of the present treatise now speaks verses again to recapitulate the earlier meaning. Among the four verses: the first two lines versify the earlier [point that] the vital principle is neither identical with nor different from the body; the next six lines versify the earlier [point of] why the Buddha did not say that the vital principle is completely non-existent, down to the fact that because that person would fall into wrong views, the Buddha did not speak. Among these six lines, the first two lines versify generally, and the following four lines explain specifically. For fear that the inquirer would reject the conventional self as non-existent, the Buddha also did not state that the vital principle is completely non-existent. That is to say, within the path of the continuum of the five aggregates, there is karma and there is fruition, nominally designated as the 'vital principle'. If the Buddha had explained to him that there is no vital principle, fearing that the inquirer would also reject the conventional vital principle as non-existent, he did not say it is completely non-existent. The third stanza versifies the earlier [point that] because he had not yet understood the principle of dependent origination and was not a vessel for receiving the true Dharma, [the Buddha] did not speak of conventional existence. That the World-Honoured One did not state that there is a conventional vital principle within the aggregates was because, observing that the inquirer lacked the capacity to comprehend the principle of the true emptiness of dependent origination, he therefore did not speak of it. The fourth stanza versifies the earlier Vatsagotra-sūtra, where the Buddha observed the particular disposition of Vatsagotra. When he asked the World-Honoured One whether there is a self or no self, the Buddha did not answer him that there is a self or no self.