俱舍論記 30.35

30.35

「若爾何緣至非一切智」者，論主難。若爾，何緣佛記慈氏菩薩，及記弟子未來世事，此豈非有墮常過失？亦汝若言：佛先見我，彼般涅槃已便不復見我，以不知故不記有者。破云：則撥大師具一切智，以不能知解脫我故。汝或應許，不記由我體都無故。汝若謂佛見解脫我而不說者。破云：則有離蘊過，計入涅槃蘊滅，我不滅故。及常住過，何得說言我與五蘊不異非常？汝若言已解脫我，佛見非見我俱不可說。破云：則應徵言：不可說佛是一切智、不可說佛非一切智。或應徵言：不可說佛是一切智，以不見我故；不可說佛非一切智，以見我故。

Regarding 'If so, for what reason [did the Buddha declare ...] is not omniscient': the author of the treatise challenges. If so, for what reason did the Buddha prophesy concerning Maitreya Bodhisattva, and prophesy future events concerning his disciples? Would this not also incur the fault of falling into eternalism? Moreover, if you say that the Buddha previously saw the self, but after that person entered parinirvāṇa he no longer saw the self, and because he did not know it he did not declare its existence, the refutation is: Then you deny that the Great Teacher possesses omniscience, because he would be unable to know the liberated self. Alternatively, you ought to accept that he did not declare it because the entity of the self is completely non-existent. If you maintain that the Buddha saw the liberated self but did not speak of it, the refutation is: Then there is the fault of it being separate from the aggregates, since you posit that upon entering nirvāṇa the aggregates are destroyed while the self is not destroyed; and there is the fault of permanence, so how could you say that the self is not different from the five aggregates and not impermanent? If you say that regarding the already-liberated self, whether the Buddha saw or did not see the self is inexpressible, the refutation is: Then one should pose the dilemma: it is inexpressible whether the Buddha is omniscient, and it is inexpressible whether the Buddha is not omniscient. Or one should pose the dilemma: it is inexpressible that the Buddha is omniscient, because he does not see the self; and it is inexpressible that the Buddha is not omniscient, because he sees the self.