俱舍論記 30.86

30.86

「謂帶彼相至識能了亦爾」者，論主答。謂能緣識上帶彼所緣境界行相，如緣青色能緣識上帶青相現，識似境，說識能緣。如鏡對質帶質像生，名似本質能照。是故諸識雖亦託根生，識無根相不似根故，不名了根，但名了境。或識於境相續生時，前識為因，別後識起，說前因識名為能了亦無有失，世間於因說作者故。如世間說鐘、鼓能鳴，能生鳴果故，於因立能鳴。或如燈能行，無別能行者，識能了亦爾，無別能了者。

Regarding "It means bearing its aspect... consciousness cognizing is also like this": the author of the treatise answers. This means that upon the cognizing consciousness, the cognitive aspect (ākāra) of that intentional object appears. For instance, when taking blue as an object, the cognizing consciousness appears bearing the aspect of blue; because the consciousness resembles the object, it is said that the consciousness can grasp the object. Just as when a mirror confronts a physical form, it arises bearing the reflection of the form and is said to resemble the original form and be capable of reflecting. Therefore, although the various consciousnesses also arise relying on the faculties, because consciousness lacks the aspect of the faculties and does not resemble the faculties, it is not said to cognize the faculties, but only to cognize the object. Alternatively, when consciousness arises in a continuum with respect to an object, with the prior consciousness serving as the cause for the subsequent consciousness to arise, there is no fault in saying that the prior causal consciousness is the cognizer, because in the world an agent is spoken of in terms of the cause. Just as the world says that a bell or a drum can ring—because it is able to produce the result of ringing, the term 'capable of ringing' is applied to the cause. Or, just as a lamp can move without there being a distinct mover, so too consciousness cognizes without there being a distinct cognizer.