俱舍論記 5.14

5.14

「又諸同分至覺施設耶」者，此即第四別有同分難。所同分之法體各異，由別同分故得同。能同相望亦各異，如何更無同分同，而起無別能緣覺慧，而起無別施設名言？若更有同分，展轉即有無窮之過。第二《正理》救云「由諸同分是同類事等因性故，即為同類展轉相似覺、施設因。如眼、耳等，由大種造方成色性。大種雖無餘大種造，而色性成。」第三俱舍師破云：若言是同因故體即是同者，同分自類等無別同分，同即為覺、施設因。亦可所同自類等，不須同分同即為覺、施設因。又所引喻有違宗過。眼等色性三世常定，如何乃言由大種造方成色性？但應言由大種造，不應言由大種造方成色性。

As for "Moreover, [if] these various generic conformities (sabhāgatā) ... [why should they not directly] generate cognitions and designations?": this is the fourth objection, [namely,] the objection concerning an additional generic conformity. The substances of phenomena that possess generic conformity are mutually distinct; they achieve conformity through a distinct generic conformity. In relation to each other, the agents of conformity are also distinct; how then, without any further generic conformity making them conform, do they give rise to undifferentiated apprehending cognition and give rise to undifferentiated designated terminology? If there were further generic conformity, that would in turn incur the fault of an infinite regress. Second, the Nyāyānusāra defends [the Sarvāstivāda view], stating: "Because the generic conformities are the cause of similarity for homogenous entities, they serve as the cause of reciprocating similarity in cognition and designation for the same class. Just as the eyes, ears, and so forth become material (rūpa) only by being made up of the primary elements (mahābhūta), yet the primary elements, though not made up of other primary elements, still constitute material nature." Third, the master of the Kośa refutes this, stating: "If you say that because they are causes of conformity their nature is intrinsically conformant, then since generic conformities of their own class lack any separate generic conformity, their conformity alone serves as the cause of cognition and designation. It would likewise be acceptable that those things which possess conformity, in their own class and the like, need no generic conformity [at all] to serve as the cause of cognition and designation. Moreover, the cited analogy has the fault of contradicting your own school's tenets. The materiality of the eye and so on is perpetually fixed throughout the three times; how can you say that they become material only by being made up of the primary elements? You should only say 'they are made up of the primary elements,' and should not say 'they become material only by being made up of the primary elements.'"