俱舍論記 6.140

6.140

「若感眼處至應知亦爾」者，若感眼處，定感眼處、身處、觸處、法處，如前釋。餘七不定。耳、鼻、舌三雖同業感，若生欲界，未得、已失即不成故。香、味二處，上界即無。意處，若入無心即無。此香、味、意，有時雖與眼處俱生，容別業感。色雖定與眼俱，容別業感。故感眼處定感四處，餘七不定。耳、鼻、舌三，准眼應釋。問：若依《正理論》，感眼等四處，各定感五處，加色處。何故此論不定感色？解云：此論不說色，彼論說感色，各據一義，如身處中釋。又解：《俱舍》為正，同《婆沙》初說。撿尋《婆沙》全無此說，當知是彼《正理》論師自所分別。若不相離即感彼者，彼說感色應亦感身，既不感身故說非理。

Regarding 'If one experiences the eye āyatana ... the same should be understood': If one experiences the eye āyatana, one definitely experiences the eye, body, tactile, and mental-object āyatanas, as explained before. The remaining seven are indeterminate. Although the three of ear, nose, and tongue are experienced by the same karma, if one is born in the desire realm, they are not possessed when not yet acquired or already lost. The two āyatanas of fragrance and taste are absent in the higher realms. The mind āyatana is absent if one enters mindless [meditation]. Although these [three of] fragrance, taste, and mind sometimes arise together with the eye āyatana, they allow of being experienced by a distinct karma. Although visible form definitely co-occurs with the eye, it allows of being experienced by a distinct karma. Therefore, experiencing the eye āyatana definitely experiences four āyatanas; the remaining seven are indeterminate. The three of ear, nose, and tongue should be explained in analogy to the eye. Question: According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, experiencing the four āyatanas of the eye and so on each definitely experiences five āyatanas, adding the visible-form āyatana. Why does this treatise not consider visible form to be definitely experienced? Explanation: This treatise does not speak of visible form, whereas that treatise speaks of experiencing visible form; each relies on one perspective, as explained under the body āyatana. Another explanation: the *Kośa* is correct, as it agrees with the first statement in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Upon searching the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, there is no such statement at all; one should know that this is the master of *Nyāyānusāra*'s own distinction. If what is inseparable must be experienced along with it, his stating that it experiences visible form should also entail that it experiences the body; since it does not experience the body, what he says is unreasonable.