俱舍論記 6.202

6.202

「此非有體至名為滅故」者，經部答。此無為非實有體可得。如色等五境，五識現量證知；如受等心、心所法，他心智現量證知。亦非有用可得，如眼、耳等有見、聞等比量知有。又此無為若離貪等別有體者，如何可立彼貪等事之滅第六轉屬主聲耶？夫聲明中第六轉聲表屬於主，相屬之法必相關涉。貪、瞋等事是有為、擇滅是無為，非互相屬，此彼相望非因果故。此事望彼滅，非因亦非果。若此滅望彼事，雖是能作因，而非取果因，亦名非因。事非能證道故，滅非證得果。滅是常故，復非生因果，故名非果。非因顯非所屬，非果顯非能屬。此彼相望既非因、果，即不相關涉。何得說言彼事之滅屬主聲耶？由此故知，滅無別體，唯遮彼事不生義邊名為事滅。滅無別體，即事之無名為滅故。可言此滅屬於彼事第六得成，順聲明故。今准此文，第六屬主聲有二：一異體相望，如說一切有部言彼事之滅，亦如郡君之奴；二無異體，如經部言彼事之滅，亦如石子之體。

Regarding "This [unconditioned] does not have an existent substantial entity ... because [the cessation of things] is called cessation": the Sautrāntika answers. This unconditioned [dharma] cannot be apprehended as an objectively real substantial entity. Unlike the five sense-objects such as visible form, which are directly perceived through the direct perception of the five sensory consciousnesses; and unlike mental factors such as feeling, which are directly perceived through the knowledge of others' minds. Nor can it be apprehended as having an active function, unlike the eye, ear, etc., whose existence is known by inference through seeing, hearing, etc. Furthermore, if this unconditioned were to have an entity distinct from craving and the like, how could the genitive case, signifying possession, be established in saying "the cessation of that thing [such as craving]"? For in grammar, the genitive case indicates belonging to a possessor, and interrelated phenomena must necessarily be mutually connected. Factors such as craving and hostility are conditioned, while analytical cessation is unconditioned; they do not belong to one another, because when viewed against each other they are neither cause nor effect. When this thing is viewed against that cessation, it is neither cause nor effect. And if this cessation is viewed against that thing, although it is an efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), it is not a cause that grasps a fruition, so it is also termed a non-cause. Because the thing is not a path of direct realization, cessation is not the fruit of direct realization. Because cessation is permanent, it is further not the fruition of an originative cause; hence it is called non-fruition. Being a non-cause demonstrates that it is not that which is possessed; being a non-fruition demonstrates that it is not that which possesses. Since when viewed against each other they are neither cause nor fruition, they have no mutual connection. How could one speak of the genitive case signifying possession in "the cessation of that thing"? Therefore it is known that cessation has no distinct entity; it is merely named "the cessation of the thing" from the standpoint of preventing that thing from arising. Cessation has no distinct entity, for the non-existence of the thing itself is named cessation. One can speak of this cessation belonging to that thing so that the genitive is established, conforming with grammar. Now, according to this text, the genitive case indicating possession has two types: first, when looking across different entities, as when the Sarvāstivāda speaks of "the cessation of that thing," like a master's slave; second, where there is no different entity, as when the Sautrāntika speaks of "the cessation of that thing," like the substance of a pebble.