俱舍論記 6.25

6.25

「法與隨相至此中應辨」者，論主出說一切有部師過。若以互為果釋俱有因，法與隨相非互為果。雖隨相是法果，法非隨相果，故言非互為果。然法與隨相為俱有因，非隨相於法為俱有因。此中應辨。若依《婆沙》十六評家云「同一果義是俱有因義。」又《正理》十五云「有為法一果可為俱有因。」二論意同。《正理》論意：以互為果名俱有因，有過失故。更釋言：有為法中展轉有力同得一果者名俱有因。若作俱舍師救汝言：同一果名俱有因，為據同時？為據異時？若據同時同一果者，如心、心所等自體望自體不同一果、應非俱有因。若言除自體與餘法同一果、是即隨相。若望本法同得一大相果、應望本法互為俱有因。若言有同一果名俱有因、如心、心所等。有同一果非俱有因，如隨相望本法。我但言同一果中得為俱有因，不言但是同一果者皆是俱有因。若作此救，是即同一果言非為定證。若據異時同一果者，如本法與大相同得後一果，隨相與大相亦同得後一果，是即本法與相、隨相展轉相望皆同得後一果。既爾，隨相望於本法，應名俱有因。進退徵責，俱多過失。以理尋思，互為果證過失乃少。但是互為果者定是俱有因，不言是俱有因者皆互為果。雖互為果不遍俱有因，亦得釋俱有因如變礙以解色。無表非變礙亦得名色，何故不能釋通互為果難，乃就過失眾多？若依《入阿毘達磨論》中，具有兩解。故彼論云「諸有為法更互為果，或同一果名俱有因。」俱舍師云：彼論後造。言互為果，學我世親阿闍梨也。問：相應、俱有因皆取同時士用果，各有何意趣？解云：相應因取同時士用果，意欲同緣一境。俱有因取同時士用果，意欲傍資同時諸法令各起用，或起能作因用，或起同類因、遍行因用，或起異熟因用，各取自果。由此二因所作不同，所以意趣各別。問：如《五事論》中解心所法名相應中，有一解云「復次同一時分、同一所依、同一行相、同一所緣、同一果、同一等流、同一異熟，是相應義。」望彼論文，相應心所法亦同一果等，如何乃云相應因意欲同緣一境，非資令取一果等耶？解云：相應心所法通相應因、俱有因。若言一時、一依、一行、一緣義邊，是相應因；若說一果等邊，是俱有因。又解：彼論言相應者，非欲正辨相應、俱有因。

Regarding '[A dharma and its secondary characteristics ... should be distinguished here]', the treatise master exposes the error of the Sarvāstivāda masters. If one explains the coexistence cause by [dharmas] mutually being fruits, a dharma and its secondary characteristics are not mutually fruits. Although the secondary characteristic is the fruit of the dharma, the dharma is not the fruit of the secondary characteristic; hence it says 'they are not mutually fruits.' Yet the dharma is a coexistence cause for the secondary characteristic, while the secondary characteristic is not a coexistence cause for the dharma. This should be distinguished here. If one follows the arbiter in Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 16, it says: 'The meaning of having an identical fruit is the meaning of the coexistence cause.' Furthermore, Nyāyānusāra, fascicle 15, states: 'Saṃskṛta dharmas having one fruit can be coexistence causes.' The intent of the two treatises is the same. The intent of the treatise Nyāyānusāra is: because defining coexistence cause as mutually being fruits incurs errors, it further explains: among saṃskṛta dharmas, those that mutually possess efficacy and together obtain one fruit are called coexistence causes. If, as a master of the Kośa, one rescues this, saying to you: In calling having an identical fruit a coexistence cause, is it based on the same time, or based on different times? If it is based on an identical fruit at the same time, then just as mind, mental factors, and the like, with respect to their own natures, do not share an identical fruit, they should not be coexistence causes. If you say that, excluding their own natures, they share an identical fruit with other dharmas, then that is the secondary characteristics; if, with respect to the primary dharma, they together obtain one fruit of the primary characteristics, they should be mutual coexistence causes with respect to the primary dharma. If you say that some with an identical fruit are called coexistence causes, like mind and mental factors, while some with an identical fruit are not coexistence causes, like the secondary characteristics with respect to the primary dharma, [and argue:] 'I only state that among those with an identical fruit they can be coexistence causes, not that all which have an identical fruit are coexistence causes'—if you offer this defense, then the statement 'identical fruit' is not a definitive proof. If it is based on an identical fruit at a different time, then just as the primary dharma and the primary characteristics together obtain a single subsequent fruit, and the secondary characteristics and the primary characteristics also together obtain a single subsequent fruit, then the primary dharma, the characteristics, and the secondary characteristics, mutually with respect to one another, all together obtain a single subsequent fruit. This being so, the secondary characteristics, with respect to the primary dharma, should be called coexistence causes. Pushing forward or pulling back to cross-examine it, both sides incur many errors. Reflecting on this logically, the proof by 'mutually being fruits' has fewer errors. Whatever mutually are fruits are definitely coexistence causes; it does not say that whatever are coexistence causes are all mutually fruits. Although 'mutually being fruits' does not completely cover all coexistence causes, it can still explain coexistence cause, just as 'subject to alteration and obstruction' explains form (rūpa): non-communicative matter (avijñapti-rūpa) is not subject to alteration and obstruction, yet it is still called form. Why could one not resolve the objection regarding mutually being fruits, but instead resort to numerous errors? If one relies on the Abhidharmāvatāra-śāstra, it contains both explanations. Hence that treatise says: 'Saṃskṛta dharmas mutually being fruits, or having an identical fruit, are called coexistence causes.' The Kośa masters say: That treatise was composed later; when it speaks of 'mutually being fruits', it was learning from our ācārya Vasubandhu. Question: Both the associated cause (saṃprayuktaka-hetu) and the coexistence cause grasp simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala (fruit of virile activity); what is the specific intention of each? Explanation: The associated cause grasps simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala with the intention of mutually taking the same object. The coexistence cause grasps simultaneous puruṣakāra-phala with the intention of collaterally assisting simultaneous dharmas so that each exerts its function—either producing the function of an efficient cause, or producing the function of a homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) or universal cause (sarvatraga-hetu), or producing the function of a maturation cause (vipāka-hetu)—each grasping its own fruit. Because what is produced by these two causes is different, their intentions are distinct. Question: As in the Pañcavastuka's explanation of mental factors as associated (saṃprayukta), one explanation says: 'Furthermore, identical time, identical support, identical mode of activity, identical intentional object, identical fruit, identical outflow, and identical maturation is the meaning of association.' In view of that text, associated mental factors also have an identical fruit, etc.; why then do you say that the associated cause intends to take the same object together, rather than assisting in grasping one fruit, etc.? Explanation: Associated mental factors encompass both the associated cause and the coexistence cause. If spoken of from the aspect of identical time, identical support, identical mode of activity, and identical intentional object, it is the associated cause; if spoken of from the aspect of identical fruit, etc., it is the coexistence cause. Another explanation: When that treatise speaks of 'associated', it does not intend to formally analyze the associated and coexistence causes.