俱舍論記 7.29

7.29

「故如經部至不可思議」者，第三論主非前二說，即述經部。若依《正理》十九有三說：一說諸佛德用、諸佛境界不可思議。第二說如過去世佛於未來現知見轉，謂佛欲知有情因果，然現在世時分短促，故多觀察過去、未來。非佛世尊欲知後際，先觀前際然後能知。乃至廣說（解云：彼師意，宿住智能現知過去，生死智能現知未來。《正理》救，不破之）。第三說有情身內現有未來因果先相，猶如影像，或色、或心不相應行。佛唯觀此便知未來，非要現遊靜慮通慧。然非於彼占相故知，以於未來現證見故。乃至廣說（解云：此師意說，由知先相，未來現證，如因聞聲方始迴顧。《正理》救，不破之）。若依《婆沙》十一，亦有三說。初、二說同此論破，第三評家云「應作是說：佛知未來，是現非比。」乃至廣說。問：此論前二說，《婆沙》亦同此論破，何故《正理》救耶？解云：正理論師故違此論，且作此救，未可為正。問：《正理》初說、《婆沙》評家，與此經部有何差別？解云：三說俱同。又解：《正理》初說同《婆沙》評家，不同經部，此即宗別也。問：若別、若同，如何解釋？解云：此論言舉意遍知者，經部有兩解：一云如來無不定心，舉意遍知者皆由定故能知。若依說一切有部宗，佛亦有散心，即是散心遍知無謬。問：如來散心是現量耶？解云：若二乘散心，但是五識無間所生意識名現量，及定心後所引意識亦名現量。以五識緣境及定心緣境，於境分明俱是現量，從彼所引意識亦於彼所緣境分明，亦得名現量。如願智雖體通定、散，據散心中所引願智知未來法者，此即名散心現量。若如來智，非定心所引及非五識無間所生，亦是現量攝。此即經部與說一切有部不同。又解：經部亦許如來有散心。若作此說，即同說一切有部，故此論不破評家義。

"Therefore, as the Sautrāntikas [say] ... inconceivable" is the third, where the author rejects the two previous theories and presents the Sautrāntika view. According to the *Nyāyānusāra*, fascicle nineteen, there are three theories. The first theory says that the virtues, functions, and sphere of the Buddhas are inconceivable. The second theory says that just as with past time, the Buddha's direct knowing and seeing operates with respect to the future; that is, the Buddha wishes to know the causes and fruits of sentient beings, but since the duration of the present time is fleeting, he mostly examines the past and future. It is not that when the World-Honoured One wishes to know the posterior limit, he first examines the prior limit and only then can know it, and so forth in detail. (The explanation says: That master's intention is that the knowledge of past abodes directly knows the past, and the knowledge of birth and death directly knows the future. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues this and does not refute it.) The third theory says that within the bodies of sentient beings there are currently prior signs of future causes and fruits, like reflections, which are non-associated formations of either form or mind. The Buddha simply observes these and knows the future; he does not necessarily have to currently abide in the supernormal knowledge and wisdom of dhyāna. Yet he does not know by divination of those signs, because he directly realizes and sees the future, and so forth in detail. (The explanation says: This master means that by knowing the prior signs, the future is directly realized, just as one only turns one's head after hearing a sound. The *Nyāyānusāra* rescues this and does not refute it.) According to the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, fascicle eleven, there are also three theories. The first and second theories are refuted in the same way as in this śāstra; the third, the reviewer's verdict, says: "It should be said: The Buddha's knowledge of the future is direct perception, not inference," and so forth in detail. Question: Since the first two theories in this śāstra are also refuted in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, why does the *Nyāyānusāra* rescue them? The explanation says: The author of the *Nyāyānusāra* deliberately opposed this śāstra and temporarily offered this rescue, which cannot be considered correct. Question: What is the difference between the first theory of the *Nyāyānusāra*, the reviewer in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, and the Sautrāntika here? The explanation says: All three theories are identical. Another explanation: The first theory of the *Nyāyānusāra* agrees with the reviewer in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*, but differs from the Sautrāntikas; this is a difference in tenets. Question: Whether different or identical, how is it explained? The explanation says: Regarding what this śāstra calls "knowing all simply by directing the mind," the Sautrāntikas have two explanations: one says that the Tathāgata has no uncollected mind, and that knowing all simply by directing the mind is entirely due to concentration; according to the Sarvāstivāda school, the Buddha also has a distracted mind, which knows all without error even in a distracted state. Question: Is the Tathāgata's distracted mind direct perception? The explanation says: In the distracted mind of the two vehicles, only the mental consciousness generated immediately after the five consciousnesses is called direct perception, and the mental consciousness induced after a concentrated mind is also called direct perception. Since the five consciousnesses cognizing objects and the concentrated mind cognizing objects are both direct perception because they are clear with respect to the object, the mental consciousness induced from them is also clear with respect to that cognitive object and can also be called direct perception. For example, although the knowledge resulting from resolve spans concentration and distraction in essence, when based on the knowledge resulting from resolve induced within a distracted mind knowing future dharmas, this is called direct perception in a distracted mind. As for the Tathāgata's cognition, even when it is not induced by a concentrated mind and not produced immediately following the five consciousnesses, it is still subsumed under direct perception. This is the difference between the Sautrāntika and the Sarvāstivāda. Another explanation: The Sautrāntikas also allow that the Tathāgata has a distracted mind. If one takes this view, it is identical to the Sarvāstivāda; hence this śāstra does not refute the reviewer's position.