俱舍論記 9.179

9.179

「如是句義至彼應先說故」者，聲論師難至緣已起，故言如是句義理不應然。此即總非。所以者何？依一作者實體，有二作用前後別起，可得說言於前作用應有已言。彼聲論計諸法有體有用，體即逕留多位名為作者，用即隨位不同名為作用，一切作用必依作者。彼計作用同勝論師業句義，離體別有指事。別顯如有一人名為作者，起二作用，先澡浴已、後時方食。於前作用可說已言。若有少行法有在起前，可得說言先至於緣後時方起。既無行法有在起前，先至緣已後時方起，如何得說至緣已起？言起前者，現在名起，前謂未來，依法行世未來名前。或起前者，在起前故。即先已至於緣，名為起前。皆表未來非無作者法體可有作用，以彼作用必依體故。故說頌破言：至緣之行若在起先，未來法體而非有故。不應道理。若行至緣與起俱時，便壞己於彼，應先說至緣，後方說起，不應說俱，聲論、經部俱說過、未無體故。以非有故，破彼經部。若以此頌破說一切有部，聲論即以己宗義破。

Regarding "such a phrase-meaning ... because that ought to be spoken of first": the grammarian objects to "having approached the conditions, it arises"; hence they say: "Such a phrase-meaning is not logically acceptable." This is a general rejection. Why is this? Only if, based upon a single real agent-entity, two actions arise separately in succession, can one say that the past/absolutive word "having [done]" applies to the earlier action. The grammarians maintain that dharmas have substance and function: substance endures across many states and is called the agent; function varies according to the state and is called action; and all actions must depend upon an agent. They maintain that action is like the category of karma in the Vaiśeṣika system, existing distinct from substance as an objective entity. To illustrate: just as there is one person called the agent who performs two actions—first having bathed, and later eating—to the earlier action one can apply the word "having [done]". If there were some active dharma existing prior to origination, one could say that having first approached the conditions, it later arises. Since no active dharma exists prior to origination such that having first approached conditions it later arises, how can one say "having approached conditions, it arises"? When speaking of "prior to origination": the present is called origination, and "prior" refers to the future, for according to the dharmas' traversing of the times, the future is called "prior". Or "prior to origination" means existing before origination; that is, having already approached conditions first is called "prior to origination". Both indicate that in the future there is no agent entity that could possess an action, because an action must depend upon an entity. Therefore, they recite a verse to refute it: "If the action of approaching conditions were prior to origination, it would be unreasonable, because the entity of a future dharma does not exist. If the action of approaching conditions were simultaneous with origination, this would ruin 'having [done]'; for that, one should first say approaching conditions and later say origination, and one should not say they are simultaneous," because both the grammarian and the Sautrāntika maintain that the past and future lack real substance. Based on its nonexistence, he refutes the Sautrāntika. If this verse refutes the Sarvāstivāda, the grammarian refutes it using the tenets of his own school.